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STRATEGIC PLATFORMS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Mark Thomas Bender, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2016 
Platforms, or intermediaries that serve two distinct user groups in a market, are becoming 
increasingly common in ecommerce and digital marketing since the advent of web 2.0. This 
dissertation examines the role of three platforms that facilitate marketing interactions between 
two distinct user groups. In the first essay, Daily Deal Websites as Matchmakers, I examine the 
role that daily deal websites (e.g., Groupon, LivingSocial) serve in matching consumers and 
vendors. Specifically, I am interested in how competition between multiple platforms may 
segment both sides of the markets and allow each daily deal website to play the role of 
matchmaker. However, I also show that segmenting both sides of the market is difficult and this 
may explain the demise of many of these websites. In the second essay, Crowdfunding as a 
Vehicle for Raising Capital and for Price Discrimination, I investigate an entrepreneur’s optimal 
decision to set instruments available in a crowdfunding (e.g., Kickstarter, Indiegogo) campaign 
(campaign goal and funder reward). I find that conditional upon market conditions, consumers’ 
interest in the proposed product, and the entrepreneur’s need to fund the product through 
crowdfunding, that the entrepreneur may choose to set his instruments to either raise capital or to 
price discriminate. In the third essay, Setting Artist Royalties on Music Streaming Platforms, I 
investigate how a streaming platform (e.g., Spotify, Apple Music) may choose to set its royalty 
to attract artists to the platform. I explore when the streaming platform may choose to exclude 
high valuation artists. 
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1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of three essays which investigate the decisions of strategic platforms in 
the digital age and their consequences on the two sides of the markets that they serve. Bringing 
together two distinct user groups that provide each other with network benefits, Groupon, 
LivingSocial, Kickstarter, Indiegogo, Spotify, and Apple Music are just a few prominent 
examples of digital platforms that have integrated themselves into the lives of consumers and the 
minds of managers. While these platforms play a different role within their respective markets, 
they all serve a purpose in bridging the gap between producers and consumers. The important 
functions that these disruptive platforms play in the marketplace can be seen in the following 
numbers: Groupon has 53.9 million active customers, Kickstarter has been used to generate over 
$2.25 billion dollars, and Spotify has over 30 million paid subscribers and 75 million active 
listeners.1 In fact, according to Van Alstyne et al. (2016), in 2014 three of the world’s five 
largest firms were running platform business models. 
Platforms face unique dilemmas when choosing how to market their services because 
they seek to attract two distinct user groups that provide each other with network benefits.  
Consider the following illustrative example of this dilemma. Spotify sets two distinct prices: the 
subscription fee that it charges consumers and the royalty that it gives to artists that have chosen 
to stream their content through the platform. When determining the optimal price for each user 
group, Spotify needs to be aware of the network benefits that each user group provides to the 
1 Statistics as of April 1, 2016. See Groupon Works (2016), Kickstarter (2016), and Spotify (2016a). 
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other party. Artists gain every time Spotify is able to secure an additional consumer because that 
consumer may generate additional revenue for an artist through streaming royalties. From the 
consumers’ perspective, the more artists that opt to distribute their music through Spotify, the 
deeper the catalog to which the consumers have access and the more valuable the service. If 
Spotify is able to get distribution rights to a specific artist, Spotify may be able to lure that 
artist’s fans to the platform. These considerations all play a role in the decisions being made by 
Spotify, the artists, and the consumers. The essays in this dissertation provide novel insight into 
how digital platforms are changing the way producers are marketing their products to consumers, 
how consumers are buying these products, and how the platforms are creating value for all 
involved in the exchange. 
The first essay in my dissertation is titled “Daily Deal Websites as Matchmakers.” Daily 
deal websites operate as intermediaries (platforms) by selling vendor deals to consumers. I 
investigate whether these websites can act as matchmakers between vendors and consumers by 
segmenting each side of the market. Such segmentation ensures an improved match between 
vendors and consumers in terms of the quality provided by the former and the willingness to pay 
for quality of the latter. Specifically, while one intermediary can potentially match relatively 
high quality vendors with high willingness to pay consumers, the other can match the opposite 
profiles of vendors and consumers. My results suggest that such segmentation can be attainable 
if platforms focus on selling products and services in categories with more frequent purchases, in 
new product markets, and in categories for which it is relatively easy for consumers to detect and 
disseminate quality information. However, I also show that segmentation can fail altogether, in 
which case platforms are completely undifferentiated and compete fiercely in prices. This 
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difficulty in segmenting both sides of the market may explain the demise of many daily deal 
websites. 
The second essay in my dissertation is titled “Crowdfunding as a Vehicle for Raising 
Capital and for Price Discrimination.” Crowdfunding campaigns are traditionally used as a 
means for entrepreneurs to raise capital to fund the development of new products. I show that 
crowdfunding may serve an additional purpose of acting as a platform to allow entrepreneurs to 
successfully implement price discrimination. The entrepreneurs’ ability to implement such price 
discrimination depends on the extent to which they are eager to raise capital through the 
crowdfunding campaign in comparison to the eagerness of contributors in the campaign to 
ensure that the product becomes a reality. Specifically, I show that enhanced consumer surplus 
extraction through price discrimination is feasible when the total surplus that the project 
generates is relatively small, when the pool of potential contributors in the campaign is relatively 
small, and when the extent of heterogeneity in the consumer population is relatively high. In 
contrast, when both the development and the financing costs from traditional funding sources are 
relatively high the capacity of crowdfunding to serve as a price discrimination device is 
hampered. I provide insights regarding the entrepreneur’s choice of the funder reward and 
campaign goal, two tools that can enable her to achieve the dual objective of raising funds and 
implementing price discrimination. In an extension, I allow for the platform to strategically set 
the sharing rule and conduct numerical calculations to help us observe such a decision. 
The third essay in my dissertation is titled “Setting Artist Royalties on Music Streaming 
Platforms.” In this essay I investigate how a digital streaming platform in the music industry 
(e.g., Spotify, Apple Music) sets its royalty to entice artists to stream their music on the 
platform. These streaming platforms offer artists a percentage of the platform’s revenue and 
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divide it between the artists on the platform based upon each artist’s streaming share. 
Accounting for competition between a streaming platform and digital store, my analysis shows 
that it may be profitable for the artist to stream her music through a streaming platform if the 
streamer shares enough of its revenue to make up for cannibalization that occurs when the artist 
streams her music. I allow artists to have differing valuations and show that the platform may 
need to set a higher royalty if it wants to stream content from both the high valuation and low 
valuation artists than if it only desires to stream music from low valuation artists. When this 
happens, the streaming platform may find it optimal to exclude high valuation artists from the 
platform and only host music from low valuation artists. However, this is not always the case as 
additional artists make the streaming platform more valuable which can give the platform a 
better bargaining position to attract other artists while offering a low royalty. My results may 
also generalize to other digital content industries with streaming platforms (e.g., movie, 
television, book, video game). 
Chapter 2.0 contains my essay “Daily Deal Websites as Matchmakers. Chapter 3.0 
includes my essay “Crowdfunding as a Vehicle for Raising Capital and for Price 
Discrimination. Chapter 4.0 consists of my essay “Setting Artist Royalties on Music Streaming 
Platforms.” 
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2.0 DAILY DEAL WEBSITES AS MATCHMAKERS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Daily deal websites, such as Groupon, Living Social, and Local Flavor, are websites that sell 
deals on services or products. Consumers who visit these websites and purchase such deals are 
given gift certificates or vouchers to later redeem with a specific vendor who has entered into an 
agreement with the daily deal website. Daily deal websites are platforms that seek to attract and 
match vendors and consumers in a two-sided market. Consumers visit these platforms because 
they provide a vehicle to learn more about a specific product or service without having to pay 
full price for it. Vendors, oftentimes mom and pop shops seeking to expand their business, sell 
deals through these platforms because the platforms have a vast reach due to large consumer 
subscription bases. Their hope is that upon having a good experience with the service, these 
consumers will return in the future to purchase the service again at full price. 
Daily deal websites offer their services to consumers with no usage or subscription fees 
in order to build a consumer base. Having built consumer bases to which vendors want access, 
these websites are able to keep a fraction of the revenue made from each deal sold on their 
website. It has been noted that the fraction of revenue that daily deal websites keep for 
themselves can reach upwards of 50% (Bice 2012). However, selling through daily deal 
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websites introduces risks to the vendors. One such risk is the fact that deals may attract 
consumers who have no intention of making a repeat purchase at full price. A second risk is 
related to the heterogeneity in the vendor and consumer populations. With vendors offering 
products of different quality and consumers having different willingness to pay for higher 
quality, a mismatch between vendors and consumers types may limit the ability of vendors to 
extract surplus from consumers. In this paper we explore the possibility that daily deal websites 
may reduce the second type of risk by segmenting both the vendor and consumer markets. At 
such a segmenting equilibrium the platforms can increase the likelihood of correct matches 
between vendors and consumers. In addition, by reducing the likelihood of a mismatch daily deal 
websites can create additional value that a price discount offered directly by the vendors would 
not be able to achieve. 
In our model there are two daily deal websites (platforms). We assume that the vendor 
population consists of mom and pop stores that are differentiated by their quality. Similarly, the 
consumer population is differentiated by their willingness to pay for higher quality. Vendors 
cannot distinguish between high and low willingness to pay consumers, and consumers cannot 
distinguish between high and low quality vendors. Further, prior to trying a service by 
purchasing a deal offered on a platform the consumer faces additional uncertainty regarding the 
extent to which the service of the vendor is indeed beneficial. This uncertainty could be the result 
of a consumer’s idiosyncratic tastes that are unrelated to quality, such as her preference for 
spiciness or a specific item on a restaurant’s menu. Uncertainty regarding the benefit could also 
stem from doubts of the consumer regarding the trustworthiness of the vendor. After purchasing 
the deal and trying the service, the consumer may find that the quality of the provided service is 
inconsistent with the full price that the vendor charges for it. Mom and pop stores may renege on 
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quality because of unexpected budgetary constraints or financial distress (e.g., to be able to pay 
off a loan). Inconsistency between pricing and the actual quality delivered may lead to distrust of 
the vendor and lack of satisfaction by the consumer. 
In addition, consumers are further differentiated by their reasons for using daily deal 
websites. We assume that there are two segments of consumers each with different goals. 
Information seekers are interested in finding a suitable vendor for the purpose of patronizing him 
in the future. On the other hand, one time shoppers are interested in making only one purchase in 
a given product category for which the daily deal websites offer “deals”.  
We explore the possible existence of a segmenting equilibrium whereby each platform 
specializes in matching different segments of vendors and consumers (information seekers and 
one time shoppers). Specifically, while one platform matches high quality vendors with high 
willingness to pay consumers in both the information seeking and one time shopper populations 
(high quality “matchmaker”), the competing platform matches the opposite profiles of vendors 
and consumers (low quality “matchmaker”). This possible matching of different segments of the 
populations results in vertically differentiated platforms. In contrast to traditional models of 
vertical product differentiation, at a segmenting equilibrium platforms are differentiated not 
because they actively choose to offer different qualities of service. Rather, when different 
segments of the vendor population self-select to be represented by different platforms, part of 
consumers’ uncertainty regarding quality is alleviated, and quality differentiation between 
platforms endogenously arises. Put differently, it is the selection of platforms by the different 
segments of the vendor and consumer populations and not the active choice of quality by the 
platforms themselves that generates the vertical differentiation between the platforms.  
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When a segmenting equilibrium exists, a consumer can benefit from a deal offered by a 
platform in three different ways. First, she knows that the platform she selects represents, on 
average, merchants that offer qualities more likely to be consistent with her willingness to pay 
for quality. Choosing to buy the deal from the “correct” platform (i.e., representing either high or 
low quality vendors) provides her information about the average quality of the vendor without 
having to incur any additional costs of searching online or consulting with friends and relatives. 
Second, after visiting the mom and pop vendor and experimenting with his service she can verify 
whether the vendor is trustworthy, in sense that the full price he charges is consistent with the 
observable attributes of quality he offers. Quality information available from other sources can 
be outdated and not as reliable as the actual utilization of the vendor’s services. And third, she 
can determine whether the service offered by the vendor is compatible with her idiosyncratic 
tastes that are unrelated to quality. Reviews offered by other consumers may reflect their own 
idiosyncratic preferences which do not necessarily coincide with the tastes of the consumer 
herself. These three pieces of information are all obtained by purchasing the deal (at a significant 
discount in comparison to the full price) from the platform. 
We identify three distinct types of segmenting equilibrium. The first one is a full 
segmenting equilibrium in which all three populations (vendors, information seekers, and one 
time shoppers) are segmented by the platforms and the high quality platform sells deals at a 
higher price than the low quality platform. However, for this equilibrium to exist it is necessary 
that information seekers are highly skeptical about the benefit they are likely to derive, either 
because of compatibility issues or because of suspicions regarding the honesty of vendors. When 
this equilibrium exists it is characterized by fierce price competition between platforms because 
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information seekers become very price sensitive when their odds of finding a suitable vendor are 
very small. 
We also identify two different partial segmenting equilibria in which only the vendor and 
information seeker populations are segmented. In the first partial segmenting equilibrium, the 
high quality platform offers lower priced deals than the low quality platform. The entire one time 
shopper population visits the high quality platform because they are guaranteed a higher quality 
product at a lower price. This equilibrium exists when the reward high quality vendors expect 
from repeat purchases by consumers is much higher than the reward low quality vendors can 
expect. This added benefit from repeat purchases that is derived by high quality vendors is 
relatively big when there is a large population of information seekers and when the full market 
price is a steep function of quality. However, we find that for this equilibrium to exist the 
steepness of the quality-price schedule should exceed the average willingness to pay for higher 
quality in the consumer population. In fact, when the size of the information seeker segment is 
only moderate, this steepness of the price schedule should exceed even the highest valuation of 
quality among consumers, a requirement that is unlikely to hold for the continued existence of 
this vendor market. Moreover, this equilibrium exists only if more than 50% of the population 
consists of information seekers. Such a requirement is inconsistent, however, with reports 
suggesting that most consumers who use deals have no intention of returning to the vendors that 
offer them to make purchases at full price (see for example Dholakia 2011). 
In the other partial segmenting equilibrium, the high quality platform offers deals at 
higher prices than the low quality platform. In addition, the price differential between the 
platforms is such that all one time shoppers visit the low quality platform. To sustain this 
equilibrium, the portion of the consumer population that consists of information seekers should 
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be sizable, yet not too large, and the market quality-price schedule should be relatively flat. In 
our model, the market price schedule is flat when it is relatively inexpensive for vendors to make 
improvements in quality and when it is easy for consumers to detect and disseminate quality 
information about vendors. Of all the three segmenting equilibria, the partial segmenting 
equilibrium of the second kind, the one with high quality platforms offering deals at higher 
prices than the low quality platforms, is the most attainable given that its existence depends on 
reasonable values of the parameters of the model.  
When the probability that information seekers can find a suitable vendor is not too small 
and when the steepness of the quality-price schedule is moderate, segmentation may fail 
altogether. In the absence of segmentation, platforms are not differentiated and random matching 
of vendors and consumers arises. Random matching leads, however, to fierce (undifferentiated 
price) competition between platforms, an outcome that hurts the platforms. The possible non-
existence of a segmenting equilibrium and the undifferentiated competition between the 
platforms, can explain, to some extent, the poor performance of many daily deal websites.2 
To reduce such intense competition and provide services not only as sellers of deals but 
as matchmakers daily deal websites should identify product categories for which profitable 
segmentation might be possible. Given that the second type of partial segmentation is the most 
reasonable among the three types we consider, platforms should focus on selling deals from 
product categories that are likely to support this type of equilibrium. Specifically, product 
categories for which the market quality-price schedule is relatively flat. This is the case for 
                                                          
2 One of the more prominent daily deal websites, Amazon Local, shut down its business in December 2015 
following the 2014 closure of another major daily deal website, Google Offers (La Monica 2015). Living Social, 
another major player in the daily deals space, announced in October 2015 that it was laying off 20% of its staff 
(Lunden 2015). Even Groupon, the biggest player in the deals industry, has been struggling with its own economic 
difficulties (Kharif and Katz 2015). 
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categories where small investments are sufficient to improve the perceived quality of the service 
by consumers. This property may be true for restaurants, where higher quality can be the result 
of better (and marginally more expensive) ingredients, but may not be true for dentistry, where 
higher quality is the result of additional training or investment in new technology. In addition, a 
flatter quality-price schedule is more likely when it is easier for consumers to detect and 
disseminate quality information. Once again, this should hold for restaurants, where quality is 
more experience based, as opposed to medical doctors or auto mechanics where quality is more 
credence based. Similarly, we expect consumers to be able to more easily detect and disseminate 
quality information in categories where purchases are frequent (such as yoga classes) as opposed 
to categories where purchases are infrequent (such as laser eye surgery or mechanics). 
Further, our findings suggest that this second type of partial segmentation is more likely 
to occur when the portion of information seekers in the consumer population is sizable. 
Therefore, to be able to segment the market and increase profits, daily deal websites need to 
search for product categories where consumers are actively seeking information to learn about 
their preferences, with the aim of returning to suitable vendors. This is more likely to be the case 
in categories with more frequent purchases (e.g., restaurants versus laser eye surgery).3 It is also 
more likely to hold in new product markets. For example, the market for barre classes (the latest 
fitness craze) is likely to exhibit sizable levels of information seekers attempting to determine if 
they like this type of workout.4 
3 For example, in a Groupon sponsored case study, Brioso Fresh Pasta’s owner credits his company’s success on 
Groupon to the deals having created repeat customers (Groupon 2016a). 
4 In a Groupon sponsored case study, Pure Barre’s owner credits her company’s success on the daily deal website to 
the deals’ ability to generate many new customers immediately, about fifty percent who became permanent 
members (Groupon 2016b). 
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Our study contributes to several streams of research. The first is the literature on platform 
competition in two-sided markets. Much of this literature has investigated competition between 
horizontally differentiated platforms (Gabszewics et al. 2002; Armstrong 2006; Hagiu 2009, Gal-
Or et al. 2012). One exception is a study by Brown and Morgan (2009) who investigate whether 
two platforms can coexist in equilibrium when one offers superior service than the other. In our 
paper, however, vertical differentiation between the platforms arises through self-selection by 
heterogeneous populations of consumers and vendors. The quality of the platform is not under its 
control. Rather, it is the segments of the consumer and vendor populations who choose to 
transact with the platform that determine its quality. 
Our study is also related to the literature on market segmentation that is implied by 
quality differentiation (Mussa and Rosen 1978; Katz 1984; Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas 
2008). In this literature firms have full control over the qualities of the products they offer and 
consumers self-select among the vertically differentiated products offered by these firms. In 
order to support segmentation the firms need to satisfy only one incentive compatibility 
constraint related to self-selection by consumers. However, for platforms that seek to match 
vendors with consumers, there is an additional incentive compatibility constraint related to self-
selection by vendors. We show that the additional vendor incentive compatibility constraint 
makes it harder for these platforms to implement an equilibrium in which both sides of the 
market are segmented.  
Some of the comparative statics we conduct highlight the difference between the 
traditional models of vertical product differentiation in one sided markets and vertical 
differentiation between platforms that play the role of “matchmakers” between vendors and 
consumers. For instance, when the spread in consumer valuations of quality in the population 
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expands while the spread of qualities in the vendor population stays the same, price competition 
between platforms intensifies, as it becomes less important for consumers to identify an 
appropriate quality match. As a result, the platform that charges the lower price gains in market 
share. In contrast, in traditional models of vertical product differentiation in one sided markets, a 
bigger spread in consumer valuations leads to producers actively increasing the extent of quality 
differentiation between them, thus leading to alleviated price competition.  
There is a growing literature that investigates various aspects of daily deal websites. 
Some of these are empirical (Byers et al. 2012; Dholakia 2011). Two analytical studies that have 
examined daily deal websites are Edelman et al. (2016) and Kumar and Rajan (2012). However, 
both are from the perspective of vendors. Unlike our paper, these studies have no strategic 
intermediary or intermediary competition. Two analytical studies of daily deal platforms that 
introduce a strategic intermediary are Subramanian and Rao (2016) and Shivendu and Zhang 
(2012). The former paper investigates whether it is in the platform’s interest to advertise the 
number of deals sold. The authors demonstrate that doing so may signal the vendor’s quality to 
inexperienced buyers. The latter paper investigates the discount rate on deals offered on 
platforms. Our study differs from these papers by introducing competition between two daily 
deal websites and by examining the impact of this competition on the profitability of the 
platforms. 
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2.2  MODEL 
We model an environment where mom and pop stores use daily deal websites to promote their 
services.5 The objective of the websites is to encourage consumers to purchase the services at 
reduced prices in order to acquire information about unknown vendors. The vendors hope that 
based upon their early experience, consumers will return to purchase their services at full price. 
Hence, vendors use the daily deal websites as platforms to increase consumer awareness of their 
service offerings. We model, therefore, a two sided market in which platforms act as 
intermediaries in an attempt to attract and match consumers and unknown vendors. It is possible 
that daily deal websites will also contract with large companies and chains in an effort to 
advertise their own services and grow their user base. However, we seek to model the more 
common case of these daily deal websites featuring deals from smaller local businesses and mom 
and pop shops (Dholakia 2011, Kumar and Rajan 2012). 
Even for a specific geographic region, there is often a multitude of vendors who offer a 
certain service for sale (e.g. roofing, Italian dinner, massage, etc.). Given their large number, it is 
many times the case that consumers are not aware of all vendors and have difficulty in 
distinguishing among them in terms of the quality of service they provide. We model this 
environment by assuming that there exists a continuum of vendors within a specific service 
category that are uniformly distributed based upon quality along the interval [0, 𝑞𝑞]. Vendor 𝑞𝑞 
5 For expositional convenience, we will limit the firm side of the market to service providers, which we will refer to 
as vendors throughout this paper. 
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sells a service of quality 𝑞𝑞; however, the quality of each vendor is private information available 
only to the vendor himself.    
Because there is a continuum of vendors, each vendor is a price-taker and no single 
vendor has the power to set a price. This assumption is realistic in that mom and pop stores that 
utilize daily deal websites have little market power and find themselves in competition amongst 
many other vendors selling a similar service. We also assume that a vendor, whose service 
quality is 𝑞𝑞, incurs a cost of  𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑 > 0.  
Gal-Or (2013) borrows from Shapiro (1983) to model a similar competitive environment 
in which price taking firms offer products of different quality. Both studies demonstrate that in 
such an environment, prices exceed marginal cost in order to sustain equilibrium where firms do 
not have incentives to “milk” their reputation (once established) by offering minimal quality, and 
thus saving on cost. They demonstrate, in particular, that if cutting promised quality can be 
detected by consumers with a lag of one period the equilibrium price is determined according to 
the function 𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞) + 𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞) where 𝑟𝑟 is the interest rate the vendors use to discount future 
profits. Under normal circumstances, the rent 𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞) ensures that a vendor, after establishing 
himself as a vendor of quality 𝑞𝑞 (for example by offering trials via daily deal websites as in our 
environment) has an incentive to maintain it. The interest rate 𝑟𝑟 reflects the length of the period it 
takes consumers to detect and disseminate information about a cut in promised quality by a firm. 
If this period is long, then the interest rate 𝑟𝑟 (and therefore the rent 𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞)) has to be larger to 
support honest behavior. A longer period may be the result, for instance, of infrequent use of the 
product by consumers, thus translating to a higher value of r. A more detailed summary of the 
model discussed in Gal-Or (2013) can be found in Appendix A. 
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 In our case, this formulation yields 𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑞𝑞. As in these two earlier studies, 
consumers are wary of “fly by night vendors” that offer very low quality (i.e., quality zero). This 
price schedule guarantees that a vendor that offers the observable quality 𝑞𝑞 has no incentive to 
cut quality to the minimum level of zero offered by such vendors in order to save on costs. The 
rent 𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞 that this vendor earns ensures that he has the incentive to establish and 
maintain his reputation as a vendor of quality 𝑞𝑞. Note that this rent increases when 𝑟𝑟 is higher, 
implying that if it takes longer for consumers to detect “dishonesty” on the part of vendors, rents 
have to be higher in order to support “honest” behavior. For instance, if a restaurant has the 
established reputation of only using organic ingredients, this rent has to guarantee that the 
restaurant does not have an incentive to “cut corners” by using non-organic ingredients instead. 
If it is more difficult for consumers to detect such a deviation from the established reputation the 
value of r is likely to be higher. 
In spite of the fact that the quality-price schedule ensures that the vendor does not have 
an incentive to “milk” his reputation, we will allow in the model for the possibility that the 
vendor might face unforeseen circumstances that force him to reduce quality due to unexpected 
financial distress. This possibility will contribute to uncertainty consumers may face regarding 
the benefit they are likely to derive when using the services of a vendor.   
 There are two daily deal websites that act as intermediary platforms between the 
consumers and vendors; these platforms compete for both the vendor and the consumer business. 
The platforms are uninformed about vendor quality and about consumer willingness to pay for 
quality. Each platform sells deals to consumers at price6 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 for 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿}. Groupon, for instance, 
6 Deals are usually offered in the form of discounts or gift certificates.  Our formulation that platforms set the actual 
prices of deals can be interpreted as them offering gift certificates to guarantee the final discounted price of the 
service.  
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can sell deals that offer a discount on the prices charged by the vendors in a specific category. It 
can strategically choose this discount to be either higher or lower than the discount offered for 
deals in this category sold by competing platforms. We assume that each platform has full 
control over its own deal price 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖. Industry analysts have argued that daily deal merchant 
agreements favor the platform and give the vendor little room to negotiate, especially for small 
(unknown) vendors (Agrawal 2011). Platforms have complete price setting power in our model 
because they operate on a national level, but the vendors with whom they contract are often 
specific to a geographic area. Further, platforms have large consumer subscription bases and 
mom and pop vendors can only reach these consumers using the platforms. For its services, each 
platform takes a share of the revenue; this share is denoted by 1 − 𝛼𝛼 and we will assume it to be 
the same for each vendor and platform. In Appendix A we demonstrate that segmentation can 
become more easily supported when each platform can strategically choose its share of revenues 
and 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 ≠ 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿. For simplicity, we assume that platforms incur no cost. 
There is a continuum of consumers who are uniformly distributed based upon their 
willingness-to-pay for quality along the interval �𝜃𝜃,𝜃𝜃�, where 𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0. The parameter 𝜃𝜃 of the 
consumer determines her willingness to pay for quality. If consumer 𝜃𝜃 has complete confidence 
of the benefit she can derive from consuming the service of vendor 𝑞𝑞, her gross utility is equal to 
𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞. However, before trying the service by purchasing the deal offered on the platform the 
consumer is likely to face uncertainty regarding the extent to which the service of the vendor is 
indeed beneficial. This uncertainly may be tied to attributes of the service that are unrelated to 
the quality offered by the vendor. For instance, if the vendor is a restaurant operator the 
consumer’s utility may be affected by the appeal of the serviced food (spiciness, specific menu 
items) and the restaurant’s ambiance to her tastes. In addition, uncertainty regarding the benefit 
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may also be the result of the vendor possibly reneging on quality because of unexpected 
budgetary constraints or financial distress (e.g., to be able to pay off a loan). Specifically, after 
purchasing the deal and trying the service of the vendor the consumer can verify whether the full 
price 𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) charged by the vendor is actually consistent with the observable attributes of quality 
this vendor offers7. Inconsistency between pricing and the actual quality delivered may lead to 
distrust of the vendor and lack of satisfaction by the consumer. Such inconsistency may increase, 
in particular, doubts about other unobservable attributes of the service. We model the existence 
of uncertainty by introducing the parameter c to measure the extent to which consumers are 
confident regarding their benefit. We assume that before purchasing the deal the consumer 
assigns probability 𝑐𝑐 to the event that she will derive the benefit 𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 when buying the service 
from vendor 𝑞𝑞. She assigns the probability (1 − 𝑐𝑐) to the event that she will derive no benefit 
from the vendor’s service either because she doesn’t find the vendor’s service compatible with 
her tastes or because of doubts about the vendor’s trustworthiness.  
Before trying the service, the consumer’s net expected utility depends on whether she 
will buy directly from the vendor at the full price 𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) or from the platform at the reduced prices 
𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 or 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. Specifically, in equations (2.1) and (2.2) we express the consumer’s net expected 
payoff when buying a deal via platform 𝑖𝑖 or directly from the vendor, respectively:   
𝑢𝑢1(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑐𝑐(𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞) − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖, (2.1) 
𝑢𝑢2(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑐𝑐(𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞) − 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑞𝑞. (2.2) 
The parameter 𝑎𝑎 measures the consumer’s basic willingness to pay for the service that is 
unrelated to its quality when she is perfectly certain that the purchase of the service is beneficial 
7 While the price schedule 𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) ensures that a vendor of type q has no incentive to cut quality under normal 
circumstances, mom and pop vendors may face unforeseen circumstances of financial distress because of their 
limited access to capital markets.   
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to her (i.e., when 𝑐𝑐 = 1). We assume this parameter to be sufficiently big to ensure that the net 
payoff of the consumer is positive even when paying full price for the service and irrespective of 
the quality provided by the vendor. Consumers can purchase at most one deal for a given service 
from either one of the platforms. 
In addition to the heterogeneity of the consumers in terms of their willingness to pay for 
higher quality, consumers differ also in terms of their interest in acquiring information about 
vendors for the purpose of guiding their future purchasing decisions. In this regard, we assume 
two different segments. The first segment consists of consumers who seek to learn about the 
service offered by a given vendor in order to determine whether they will continue to buy the 
service from him in the future. In contrast to the information seeking segment, the second 
segment consists of one-time shoppers who buy the service only once by using the daily deal 
websites with no intention of ever buying the service again for full price. We assume that a 
fraction 𝛽𝛽 of all consumers consists of information seekers and a fraction (1 − 𝛽𝛽) consists of 
one-time shoppers.8  
We consider an infinite horizon environment where in each period a new vendor from the 
vendor population arrives and seeks to be represented by one of the platforms. Similarly, a new 
group of consumers with characteristics as described above arrives and considers buying a deal 
from one of the platforms. Each information seeker continues to sample vendors from one of the 
platforms until she finds a suitable vendor that she is confident about the service he provides 
(i.e., a vendor that is compatible with her tastes and that charges an honest price consistent with 
the level of quality he offers). This last event happens with probability 𝑐𝑐. Specifically, after 
experimenting with the service, if an information seeking consumer finds a suitable vendor, she 
8 We may think of these one-time shoppers as individuals who purchase a deal while on a trip, have no need to make 
future purchases from a category (e.g., concert from an out of town group), or are bargain hunters.   
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returns to buy the service directly from him in every future period. Otherwise, she continues to 
sample vendors from the same platform. We assume that the initial experimentation with a given 
vendor fully reveals to the consumer both his quality 𝑞𝑞 and whether this is a suitable vendor. If 
an information seeking consumer judges the vendor as unsuitable she never buys the service 
from him again, and instead, chooses to sample another vendor from the same platform.9
 We designate by 𝑚𝑚 the common interest rate considered by consumers in discounting 
future benefits derived from purchasing the service. Hence, an information seeking consumer of 
type 𝜃𝜃 derives the following expected utility when obtaining a deal from platform 𝑖𝑖, denoted by 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃): 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑐𝑐�𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃 ∗ 𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞|consumer 𝜃𝜃 visits platform 𝑖𝑖]� − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐
𝑚𝑚
𝐸𝐸[𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 − 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑞𝑞]|consumer 𝜃𝜃 visits platform 𝑖𝑖] + 1−𝑐𝑐
1+𝑚𝑚
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃). (2.3)
The first term of (2.3) measures the expected net benefit of the consumer from the initial 
purchase via the platform. The second term measures the present value of the expected net 
benefit when the consumer finds the sampled vendor suitable and returns to buy the product in 
perpetuity directly from him in future periods. The third term in (2.3) captures the possibility that 
the consumer does not find the sampled vendor suitable and samples, therefore, another vendor 
from the platform (happens with probability (1 − 𝑐𝑐)). In this case, she waits another period 
before she can sample the second vendor, implying that her future expected utility is discounted 
by one period (multiplied by 1 (1 + 𝑚𝑚)⁄  ). The value of the interest rate m reflects the frequency 
of consumption of the service by information seekers, where lower frequency leads to a bigger 
value of m. As a result, the benefit from repeat purchases in the future that is derived by 
9 When continuing to sample, each information seeker compares the payoff she can obtain from the two platforms. 
This comparison yields the same choice whenever it is made, given that the environment is stationary. 
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information seekers is smaller. Note that with segmentation of the vendor population consumers 
can improve their estimate of the average quality offered via each platform. The conditional 
expected quality terms in (2.3) capture the updating of the information that is facilitated at a 
segmenting equilibrium. 
One-time shoppers visit daily deal websites with a sole interest of obtaining a service at a 
reduced deal price. These consumers have no intention of making a repeat purchase at full price. 
A one-time shopper of type 𝜃𝜃 receives the following expected utility when visiting platform 𝑖𝑖, 
denoted 10 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃): 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑐𝑐�𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃 ∗ 𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞|consumer 𝜃𝜃 visits platform 𝑖𝑖]� − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖. (2.4) 
Because of our focus on small mom and pop vendors we assume that before consumers 
choose the platform they are unaware of the vendor’s existence, and therefore, do not have 
access to any information regarding the vendor’s quality. This is the reason that in (2.3) and (2.4) 
the consumer has to calculate the expected quality she is likely to encounter by choosing a given 
platform. We also assume that the consumer does not search for direct information about a 
vendor’s quality (e.g., by asking friends or searching online) once they learn of his existence via 
his advertised deal. There are three possible reasons for why such a direct search may be of 
limited value to the consumer. First, the information she gets from this search may be outdated, 
as mom and pop vendors may face financial distress that forces them to lower quality in order to 
save on costs. Such a possibility is not necessarily reflected in old online reviews. Second, such 
reports and reviews of quality may be colored by the idiosyncratic preferences of the report 
10 Note that the parameter 𝑐𝑐 for one time shoppers could be higher than that for information seeking consumers, 
because one time shoppers are not interested in a possible long term relationship with a given vendor. Although such 
consumers may still incur disutility because of incompatibility of the vendor with their tastes or because of the 
vendor’s dishonesty, this possible disutility may not be as high as it is for information seekers. To simplify the 
analysis we assumed 𝑐𝑐 to be the same for the two types of consumers. 
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writers. These preferences do not necessarily coincide with those of the consumer herself. Lastly, 
if platforms are successful in segmenting the vendor population, the consumer can already 
estimate the average quality she can expect when buying a deal from either platform. If the 
consumer has to incur additional search cost to obtain more precise information than the average 
quality measure, it may not be worthwhile for her to incur this cost, given the noise included in 
such reports (i.e., idiosyncratic preferences and outdated experiences of report writers). 
Note that in our model consumers learn about the existence of the vendor only after 
visiting the platform. The consumer can assess the complete characteristics of the vendor, 
including the full price he charges, only after purchasing the vendor’s deal and using his 
services. In particular, we assume that the deal itself does not provide useful information about 
horizontal attributes of the vendor or the full price he is charging. Indeed, Groupon’s or Living 
Social’s deals can include only vague information about the full prices charged by featured 
vendors. Ads may state, for instance, $15 for $30 worth of Italian cuisine, $12 for $25 to spend 
on a dinner (see Groupon and Living Social for such deals in the Restaurants category). These 
statements do not specify full prices of different items on the menu, and as a result, are of limited 
informational value to consumers. Similarly, the advertised deal is unlikely to communicate 
whether the vendor is compatible with the subjective tastes of the consumer (e.g., for the 
spiciness of food or the restaurant’s ambiance). This is the reason consumers in our model are 
uncertain of whether the service of the vendor will be beneficial to them. (The parameter 𝑐𝑐 in our 
formulation captures the degree of confidence of the consumer about such a benefit.)   
The timing of the game is as follows. First, each platform simultaneously sets a deal price 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖. Second, given the knowledge of 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖, a vendor that seeks to be represented by a platform 
decides whether to sell his “trial” service through platform 𝐻𝐻 or platform 𝐿𝐿. Simultaneously, 
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consumers choose whether to buy a deal from platform 𝐻𝐻 or platform 𝐿𝐿. After trying the service 
and verifying the service’s quality and compatibility, an information-seeking consumer who 
finds the service suitable returns in future periods to make subsequent purchases directly from 
the vendor at full price. If she does not find the service suitable, she samples another vendor 
from the same platform. 
2.3 ANALYSIS 
We seek to characterize an equilibrium in which high 𝑞𝑞-type vendors and high 𝜃𝜃-type consumers 
self-select to transact with platform 𝐻𝐻 and low 𝑞𝑞-type vendors and low 𝜃𝜃-type consumers self-
select to transact with platform 𝐿𝐿. We will refer to such an equilibrium that segments the markets 
as a segmenting equilibrium. Figure 2.1 depicts a segmenting equilibrium as defined above.11 At 
the segmenting equilibrium vendors of type 𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞∗ and consumers of type 𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃∗ choose 
platform 𝐻𝐻 and vendors of type 𝑞𝑞 < 𝑞𝑞∗ and consumers of type 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃∗ choose platform 𝐿𝐿. 
11 The designation of the platforms is without any loss of generality. We could also solve for the opposite 
arrangement in which high (low) 𝑞𝑞-type vendors and high (low) 𝜃𝜃-type consumers interact with platform 𝐿𝐿 (H). 
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   Vendors Consumers 
Figure 2.1: Segmenting Equilibrium 
We start by analyzing the choice of the consumers between the two platforms. At a 
segmenting equilibrium, consumers know that platform 𝐻𝐻 offers deals for vendors of relatively 
high quality (𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞∗) and platform 𝐿𝐿 offers deals for vendors of relatively low quality (𝑞𝑞 < 𝑞𝑞∗).  
They use this information to update their expected net utility when buying from each platform.  
For the information seeking consumers the expected net utilities are: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝐼𝐼 (𝜃𝜃) = 𝑐𝑐�𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃 ∗ 𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞|𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞∗]� − 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 𝐸𝐸[𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 − 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑞𝑞|𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞∗] +
1−𝑐𝑐
1+𝑚𝑚
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝐼𝐼 (𝜃𝜃), 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑐𝑐�𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃 ∗ 𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞|𝑞𝑞 < 𝑞𝑞∗]� − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 𝐸𝐸[𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞 − 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑞𝑞|𝑞𝑞 < 𝑞𝑞∗] +
1−𝑐𝑐
1+𝑚𝑚
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃). 
𝜃𝜃 
Platform H 
Platform L 
𝜃𝜃∗ 
𝑞𝑞∗ 
𝜃𝜃 
𝑞𝑞 
0 
25 
As pointed out earlier, information seekers use the platforms to obtain information about 
vendors. Because of the segmentation of the vendor population they know that platform H 
represents, on average, higher quality vendors and platform L represents lower quality vendors. 
They use this information in calculating the average quality of vendors serviced by each 
platform. This average quality is 𝑞𝑞
∗+𝑞𝑞
2
for 𝐻𝐻 and 𝑞𝑞
∗
2
 for 𝐿𝐿.  Solving for 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼  and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 from the 
above two expected utility expressions we obtain: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝐼𝐼 (𝜃𝜃) = 1+𝑚𝑚
𝑐𝑐+𝑚𝑚
�𝑐𝑐 �𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃 �𝑞𝑞∗+𝑞𝑞
2
�� − 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 �𝑎𝑎 + �𝑞𝑞∗+𝑞𝑞2 � �𝜃𝜃 − 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟)���, (2.5) 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃) = 1+𝑚𝑚
𝑐𝑐+𝑚𝑚
�𝑐𝑐 �𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃 𝑞𝑞∗
2
� − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 �𝑎𝑎 + 𝑞𝑞∗2 �𝜃𝜃 − 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟)���. (2.6) 
From (2.5) and (2.6) we can calculate the utility gain that an individual of type 𝜃𝜃 receives 
from visiting platform 𝐻𝐻 as opposed to visiting platform 𝐿𝐿: 
∆𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃) ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 (𝜃𝜃) − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃) = 1+𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐+𝑚𝑚 �𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚+1)𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞2𝑚𝑚 − (𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿) − 𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)2𝑚𝑚 �. (2.7) 
From (2.7), it is clear that the utility gain of buying from 𝐻𝐻 rather than 𝐿𝐿 is increasing in 𝜃𝜃. 
Hence, segmentation of the information seeking consumers might be possible if there exists a 
𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗-type inside the support [𝜃𝜃,𝜃𝜃] such that ∆𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗) = 0. For types 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗ ∆𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃) < 0 and for  
𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗ ∆𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃) > 0, implying that the information seeking consumers self-select the platforms as 
predicted at a segmenting equilibrium. Solving the equation ∆𝐼𝐼(𝜃𝜃) = 0 for 𝜃𝜃 in (2.7) yields: 
𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗ = 2𝑚𝑚(𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻−𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿)
𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚+1)𝑞𝑞 + 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑚𝑚+1 . (2.8) 
One-time shoppers have no intention of a repeat purchase. Therefore, they seek to 
maximize their net expected utility when buying the service only once via one of the platforms as 
follows: 
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑐𝑐[ 𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃 ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑞𝑞|𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞∗)] − 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻, (2.9) 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑐𝑐[𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃 ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑞𝑞|𝑞𝑞 < 𝑞𝑞∗)] − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. (2.10) 
Constructing the difference in the net utility from visiting platform 𝐻𝐻 as opposed to platform 𝐿𝐿, 
we obtain: 
∆𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃) ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃) − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑐𝑐𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞2 − (𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿). (2.11) 
Segmentation of the one-time shoppers is feasible if there exists 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗ such that ∆𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗) = 0.  
Because the function ∆𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃) is increasing in 𝜃𝜃, consumers of type 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗ will choose platform 
𝐿𝐿 and those of type 𝜃𝜃 > 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗ will choose 𝐻𝐻. Solving the equation ∆𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃) = 0 yields: 
𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗  = 2(𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻−𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿)
𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞
. (2.12) 
Comparing the expressions derived for 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗ and 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗ in (2.8) and (2.12) we notice that 
whereas 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗ depends on the values of the parameters 𝑑𝑑, 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑚𝑚, 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗ does not. The parameters 
𝑑𝑑, 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑚𝑚 are all related to the consequences of repeat purchase by consumers. The term 
𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) in (2.8) measures the steepness of the full price schedule and the parameter 𝑚𝑚 is the 
interest rate the consumer uses to discount her expected benefit from repeat purchases. Because 
one-time shoppers do not intend to ever buy the service again for full price, the values of these 
parameters do not affect their behavior. The values of both 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗ and 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗ increase when the gap (𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿) increases, as more consumers opt to purchase the relatively cheaper deal from 𝐿𝐿. Note 
also that the value of 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗ increases when 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) increases. When 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) is high purchasing 
high quality service is much more expensive than low quality service, when the consumer returns 
to the same vendor and pays full price for the service. Factoring this higher price differential 
implies that more consumers will choose to experiment with the deal offered by the low quality 
platform, and 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗ increases. 
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For simplicity, define 𝑥𝑥 as the fraction of information-seeking consumers who visit 
platform 𝐿𝐿, namely 𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝜃𝜃
𝐼𝐼∗−𝜃𝜃
𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃
. Therefore, 1 − 𝑥𝑥 is the fraction of information-seeking buyers 
who visit platform 𝐻𝐻. Similarly, define 𝑦𝑦 as the fraction of one-time shoppers who visit platform 
𝐿𝐿, namely 𝑦𝑦 ≡ 𝜃𝜃
𝐷𝐷∗ −𝜃𝜃
𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃
. Hence, 1 − 𝑦𝑦 is the fraction of one-time shoppers who visit platform 𝐻𝐻.  
With knowledge of consumer strategies, vendors seek to maximize their own profits by 
choosing whether to sell a deal through platform 𝐻𝐻 or platform 𝐿𝐿. A vendor of quality 𝑞𝑞 receives 
the expected profit of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞) and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞) by selling through platform 𝐻𝐻 and platform 𝐿𝐿, 
respectively, expressed by the following equations. 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞) = 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑥𝑥) �𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 − 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟 � + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝑦𝑦)[𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 − 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞], (2.13) 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞) = 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 �𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 − 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟 � + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦[𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 − 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞]. (2.14) 
The first term in both (2.13) and (2.14) is profits from information seekers and the second 
term is profits from one-time shoppers. The profits from information seekers accrue both from 
the vendor’s share of the deal (𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞) and the expected profits from repeat purchases 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟 .  
The per period rent that accrues to vendor 𝑞𝑞 when selling his product for full price is (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞 − 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞 = 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞. However, the vendor can expect this rent to be repeated in perpetuity if 
a consumer finds the service of the vendor suitable (i.e., if she finds that the vendor is honest 
with its price for the quality of the service he offers and if she finds the service compatible with 
her tastes). Hence, the expected net present value from repeat purchases by a satisfied 
information seeker amounts to 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞
𝑟𝑟
. The profits from one-time shoppers accrue only from the 
vendor’s share of the deal. 
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In order to focus on the informational benefits of daily deal websites, we have assumed 
that no consumers in the population are directly familiar with the vendors unless they use the 
services of the platforms. This explains why there are no terms in (2.13) and (2.14) that capture 
profits that accrue from informed consumers who buy directly from the vendors without the 
assistance of the platforms.12 Essentially, (2.13) and (2.14) represent the additional profits that 
the vendor can expect from consumers who are completely uninformed. 
As with the consumer population, in order to ensure the existence of segmentation of the 
vendor population, there should be a vendor of quality 𝑞𝑞∗ in the support of the vendor population [0, 𝑞𝑞] such that this vendor is indifferent between the two platforms. All vendors of quality 𝑞𝑞 <
𝑞𝑞∗ should prefer platform 𝐿𝐿 and those of quality 𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞∗ should prefer platform 𝐻𝐻. Designating 
by ∆𝐸𝐸(𝑞𝑞) the added profits of a vendor of type 𝑞𝑞 when transacting with 𝐻𝐻 rather than 𝐿𝐿, we 
obtain from (2.13) and (2.14) that: 
∆𝐸𝐸(𝑞𝑞) ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝑞𝑞) − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑞𝑞𝑑𝑑[𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑐𝑐)(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(2𝑦𝑦 − 1)] −
𝛼𝛼[(𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦)𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 − (𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑥𝑥) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝑦𝑦))𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻].  (2.15) 
The value of 𝑞𝑞∗ satisfies the equation ∆𝐸𝐸(𝑞𝑞∗) = 0. Note that the vendor of quality 𝑞𝑞 takes the 
values 𝜃𝜃𝐼𝐼∗, and 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗ as given when calculating the added benefit he derives from platform H and 
L (and therefore x and y as given). Hence, it is only the first term of (2.15) that depends upon the 
vendor’s own quality level. In particular, the sign of the coefficient of 𝑞𝑞 in this term [𝛽𝛽(1 −
𝑐𝑐)(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(2𝑦𝑦 − 1)] determines whether the function ∆𝐸𝐸(𝑞𝑞) is increasing or 
decreasing in 𝑞𝑞. To ensure the existence of a segmenting equilibrium where high 𝑞𝑞-types transact 
with 𝐻𝐻, the function should increase in 𝑞𝑞, implying the following result. 
12 If we allowed such consumers to exist, our results would not be affected as long as their proportion is sufficiently 
small as compared to that of deal redeemers. During deal periods this is likely to happen (Fenn 2010). 
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Lemma 2.1. To ensure segmentation of vendors: 
(i) 𝜕𝜕∆𝜋𝜋(𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
> 0, 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝛿𝛿 ≡ [𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑐𝑐)(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(2𝑦𝑦 − 1)] > 0 , and
(ii) 𝑞𝑞∗ > 0 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 
𝛾𝛾 ≡ [(𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦)𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 − �𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑥𝑥) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝑦𝑦)�𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻] > 0. (2.16) 
We assume that the conditions given in Lemma 2.1 hold when deriving the three segmenting 
equilibria below. 
Finally, in Lemma 2.2 we derive the objective functions of the platforms, assuming that 
they use the same interest rate 𝑟𝑟 as vendors in discounting future profits. 
Lemma 2.2.  The objective functions of the platforms can be expressed as follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻 = 1𝑟𝑟 �1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑥𝑥)𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝑦𝑦)𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻� (1 − 𝛼𝛼), (2.17) 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 = 1𝑟𝑟 �1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿� (1 − 𝛼𝛼). (2.18) 
The platforms choose their fees 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 and 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 to maximize their respective objective 
functions. Note that the expected payoffs of the platforms in (2.17) and (2.18) increase as 𝑐𝑐 
declines. When the probability of finding a suitable vendor 𝑐𝑐 declines, information seekers are 
more likely to continue sampling from the platform before finding a good match. As a result, the 
platform can expect to obtain more revenues from them.   
In addition, from (2.17) and (2.18), we observe that a change in the deal price of a given 
platform has counteracting effects on its profits. On the positive side, it raises its markup, but on 
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the negative side, it reduces the demand by shifting the indifferent consumer in (2.8) and (2.12) 
in favor of the competing platform, thus affecting the values of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦. Note that even though 
platforms do not charge consumers any subscription fees their profits depend on their market 
shares among consumers (1 − 𝑥𝑥 and 1 − 𝑦𝑦 for H and 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 for L). When consumers sign up 
with one of the platforms they end up choosing to purchase a “trial” product from one of the 
vendors represented by this platform. Such purchases constitute the source of revenues of the 
platform.   
2.3.1 Full Segmenting Equilibrium with Both Populations of Consumers Segmented 
Next we investigate whether a segmenting equilibrium can arise when both the population of 
information seekers and the population of one time shoppers are segmented, namely 0 < 𝑥𝑥 < 1 
and 0 < 𝑦𝑦 < 1. If both populations are segmented it necessarily means that 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. If 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 
all one time shoppers choose platform 𝐻𝐻 and 𝑦𝑦 = 0. Note that in (2.12) if 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 then 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗ <0, and because 𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0 it follows that 𝑦𝑦 = 0. Because platform 𝐻𝐻 is cheaper and represents, on 
average, higher quality vendors it is clear that all one time shoppers will choose it when 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 <
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. Assuming that a fully segmenting equilibrium exists 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 and consumers and vendors 
can infer that the platform that offers the better deal (lower price) represents the vendors of lower 
average quality. Equipped with these inferences they choose the platform as explained earlier. 
Assuming indeed that both populations are segmented, we optimize (2.17) and (2.18) with 
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respect to 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 and 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 to obtain the following solution for the fees13 expressed in terms of the 
market shares 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦. 
𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 = 𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃��𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐 (1−𝑥𝑥)+(1−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝑦𝑦)�
2�
𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑚𝑚(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(𝑚𝑚+1)+(1−𝛽𝛽)� , 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 = 𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃��𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐 𝑥𝑥+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦�
2�
𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑚𝑚(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(𝑚𝑚+1)+(1−𝛽𝛽)� . (2.19) 
Substituting (2.19) back into the expressions for 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 derived from (2.8) and (2.12), 
yields a system of two equations in 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 as unknowns. Solving it yields: 
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚+1
+ 1
�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�
�
𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑚𝑚+1
− 𝜃𝜃�, 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝜃𝜃
𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃
, where (2.20) 
𝑠𝑠 ≡
��𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃��
𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
+(1−𝛽𝛽)�−𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
�
2𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑚𝑚+1) ��
3�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃��
𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑚𝑚(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(𝑚𝑚+1)+(1−𝛽𝛽)� . 
In Lemma 2.3 we state conditions that have to be satisfied by the market shares 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 to ensure 
segmentation of the vendors when both populations of consumers are segmented. 
Lemma 2.3. To ensure segmentation of vendors when both populations of consumers (i.e., 
information seekers and one time shoppers) are segmented it is necessary that: 
(i) 0 < 𝑥𝑥 < 1
2
 ,    1
2
< 𝑦𝑦 < 1, and 
(ii) (1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐) � 𝛽𝛽1−𝛽𝛽� > (2𝑦𝑦−1)(1−2𝑥𝑥) > 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 �(1 − 𝑐𝑐) � 𝛽𝛽1−𝛽𝛽� , �1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐+�1−𝛽𝛽2𝛽𝛽 ��1+1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐���1
2
�1+
1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
�+
1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
�
�
𝛽𝛽
1−𝛽𝛽
��. 
13 In all of the three equilibria, in their maximizations platforms take into account the fact that both information 
seekers and one time shoppers react to their deal prices (i.e., they use (2.8) and (2.12) to obtain the expressions 
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿
= − 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻
= 2𝑚𝑚
𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚+1)𝑞𝑞�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃� and 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 = − 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 = 2𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃� ). 
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According to Lemma 2.3 to ensure segmentation of the vendor as well as the two 
consumer populations, it is necessary that platform 𝐻𝐻 obtains the bigger market share among 
information seekers and platform 𝐿𝐿 obtains the bigger market share among one time shoppers. In 
addition, the ratio (2𝑦𝑦 − 1) (1 − 2𝑥𝑥)⁄  has to fall in the interval specified in part (ii) of the 
Lemma. The numerical calculations we conduct in Table 2.1 illustrate that it is very difficult to 
satisfy the conditions of Lemma 2.3 for reasonable values of the parameters of the model. Only if 
the parameter 𝑐𝑐 assumes a very small value it is possible to sustain such an equilibrium. For 
instance, when 𝜃𝜃 = 2,𝜃𝜃 = 10, the maximum value that 𝑐𝑐 can assume is 0.05. When the spread of 
𝜃𝜃 values is larger, the value of 𝑐𝑐 can be bigger but still rather small (when the interval of 𝜃𝜃 
values is (2,20) 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 = 0.07 and for the interval (2,30) 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 = 0.09). 
A very small value of 𝑐𝑐 implies that there is a very small probability for a consumer to 
find a suitable vendor. Hence the consumer may have to sample many vendors from a given 
platform before finding a good match. For 𝑐𝑐 = 0.05, the consumer has to sample, on average, 20 
vendors (1/𝑐𝑐) before finding a suitable vendor. Because consumers anticipate a bigger number of 
repeated purchases from the platforms when 𝑐𝑐 declines they become more price-sensitive, and 
competition in price between the platforms intensifies. Indeed, in (2.8) and (2.12) a smaller value 
of 𝑐𝑐 implies that consumers are much more responsive to the price differential 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿.  
Intensified price competition generates higher powered incentives for platforms to achieve 
segmentation in order to alleviate such competition. Our numerical calculations illustrate that the 
value of 𝑐𝑐 has to be extremely small for segmentation of the three different populations – 
vendors, information seekers, and one time shoppers – to be feasible. 
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The difficulty of obtaining segmentation when there are three different populations to be 
segmented is related to the incentive compatibility conditions. The segmentation of each 
additional population implies that one more incentive compatibility constraint has to be satisfied. 
In traditional models of vertical product differentiation, producers have full control over the 
qualities they choose, and a single incentive compatibility condition that determines the choice of 
consumers constrains the producers. For platforms matching vendors with consumers there are 
multiple incentive compatibility conditions constraining the platforms. In particular, with full 
segmentation there are three incentive compatibility conditions related to self-selection by 
information seekers, by one time shoppers, and by vendors, thus making segmentation according 
to quality more difficult to obtain.   
2.3.2 Partial Segmenting Equilibrium with Only One of the Two Consumer Populations 
Segmented 
In view of the difficulty of obtaining segmentation of the three different populations, next we 
investigate the possible existence of a segmenting equilibrium with only one of the two 
consumer populations being segmented. Because information seekers have more to gain from 
segmentation given that their objective in purchasing the deal is to find a good fit with a vendor 
for long term consumption, we explore the possible existence of an equilibrium with only 
information seekers being segmented and one time shoppers all choosing the same platform. 
When 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 this platform is 𝐻𝐻 and when 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 this platform is 𝐿𝐿. We refer to this type of 
35 
equilibrium as partial segmenting equilibrium.14 Although one time shoppers have different 
valuations of quality, just as information seekers, at this type of equilibrium they end up always 
choosing the platform that offers them the better deal in terms of price, even when this platform 
represents, on average, lower quality vendors.   
2.3.2.1 Partial Segmenting Equilibrium with 𝐑𝐑𝐇𝐇 < 𝐑𝐑𝐋𝐋.  In this case, because 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 it 
follows from (2.12) that 𝑦𝑦 = 0. Substituting 𝑦𝑦 = 0 in the objective functions of the platforms 
yields: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻 = 1𝑟𝑟 �(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 �(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑥𝑥) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)��, 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 = 1𝑟𝑟 �(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 (1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥�. (2.21) 
Optimizing (2.21) with respect to fees yields the following solution for 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 and 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 
expressed in terms of 𝑥𝑥: 
𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 = 𝑞𝑞�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚+1)2𝑚𝑚 �(1 − 𝑥𝑥) + (1−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽 (𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟)�, 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 = 𝑞𝑞�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚+1)2𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥. (2.22) 
Substituting for 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 and 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 from (2.22) back into the expressions for 𝑥𝑥 derived from (2.8) 
yields an equation that can be solved for 𝑥𝑥 as follows: 
𝑥𝑥 = 𝜃𝜃−2𝜃𝜃
3�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�
+ 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
3(𝑚𝑚+1)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃� + (1−𝛽𝛽)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)3𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟) . (2.23) 
14 One-time shoppers can only be segmented when 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. From Lemma 2.3 if they are segmented, 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑦𝑦. This 
inequality is impossible when  0 < 𝑦𝑦 < 1 and 𝑥𝑥 = 1. The latter would be necessary for one-time shoppers to be 
segmented and information seekers not to be segmented.       
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In Proposition 2.1 we derive conditions that the parameters of the model should satisfy in order 
to support segmentation of both the population of vendors and the population of information 
seekers when 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. 
Proposition 2.1. 
(i) A partial segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 exists if:
𝜃𝜃�+𝜃𝜃
2
< 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿>𝐻𝐻) < 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑚𝑚+1 < 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿>𝐻𝐻), (2.24)  where 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿>𝐻𝐻) and 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿>𝐻𝐻) are as given in Appendix A, 
      and 𝛽𝛽 > 1
2−𝑐𝑐
. 
(ii) The size of the feasible region that supports the equilibrium expands as 𝛽𝛽 and
�𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� increase and as 𝑐𝑐 decreases.
(iii) At such an equilibrium 𝑥𝑥 > 1
2
 and 𝑦𝑦 = 0. 
Recall that the full market price is given by 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑞𝑞 and that m is the interest rate 
used by consumers. Therefore, 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) (𝑚𝑚 + 1)⁄  represents the slope of the full market price 
schedule as discounted by consumers. According to part (i) of Proposition 2.1 a partial 
segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 exists only if this slope lies in the interval indicated in 
(2.24). This interval is nonempty provided that 𝛽𝛽 > 1 (2 − 𝑐𝑐)⁄ , namely if a sufficiently big 
portion of the population of consumers consists of information seekers.   
Moreover, it is easy to show that the size of the interval increases as 𝛽𝛽 and �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� 
increase and as 𝑐𝑐 declines. Hence, as the size of the population of information seekers and the 
heterogeneity of consumers increase (heterogeneity increases when the spread 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃 increases) 
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or when the probability of finding a suitable vendor decreases; there is a larger set of values of 
the price steepness that can support segmentation of the two populations when 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. Note 
also that as 𝑐𝑐 declines there is a longer interval of 𝛽𝛽 values that can support segmentation. For 
instance, when c = 0.5 𝛽𝛽 > 2 3⁄ , but when 𝑐𝑐 = 0.2 𝛽𝛽 > 5 9⁄ . As mentioned earlier, a smaller 
value of 𝑐𝑐 implies from (2.8) and (2.12) that consumers become more sensitive to the price 
differential between the platforms. For a smaller 𝑐𝑐, consumers are less likely to find a suitable 
vendor, implying that they may have to sample a bigger number of vendors from a given 
platform before finding the right match. As a result, they become more sensitive to the price 
differential |𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿| when choosing between the platforms. When consumers become more 
price sensitive, platforms have a stronger incentive to achieve segmentation in order to alleviate 
price competition, thus making segmentation more likely.   
The lower bound of the interval in (2.24) ensures that the condition of Lemma 2.1 is 
valid, namely that segmentation of vendors is feasible. The upper bound ensures that 𝑥𝑥 < 1, 
namely that information seekers are segmented as well. From Part (iii) of the Proposition, 𝑥𝑥 >1 2⁄ , namely platform 𝐿𝐿 obtains a bigger share of the information seekers than platform 𝐻𝐻. 
However, because platform 𝐻𝐻 charges the lower fee the entire population of one time shoppers 
chooses platform 𝐻𝐻 (𝑦𝑦 = 0). 
Note that interval (2.24) implies that a segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 exists if the 
reward to high quality vendors from repeat purchases by information seekers is very high. This 
reward is high when the size of the segment of information seeking consumers (𝛽𝛽) is big and 
when the market price schedule is sufficiently steep (𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) (𝑚𝑚 + 1)⁄  is bigger than the lower 
bound of interval (2.24)). When the reward from future purchases is large, high quality vendors 
distinguish themselves from low quality vendors by agreeing to offer customers a better 
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introductory deal via the platform that represents them. Low quality vendors have no incentive to 
mimic this behavior because they do not expect a very high reward from information seekers 
who return to purchase their service again, given the significant steepness of the market price 
schedule (bigger than the average valuation for quality in the population).   
In spite of agreeing to offer customers a better introductory deal, the high quality 
platform actually attracts a smaller fraction of the information seeking consumers than the low 
quality platform (𝑥𝑥 > 1 2⁄ ). Given that this type of equilibrium is supported only when 
𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) (𝑚𝑚 + 1)⁄  is relatively large information seekers anticipate paying a much higher price 
for higher quality when purchasing the service again for full market price. More of them choose, 
therefore, to experiment with the platform that is known to represent low quality vendors. Even 
though this platform charges them a high initial deal price, if they return to the selected vendor 
they can expect to pay a much lower full price when they purchase the service a second time. In 
contrast, all one-time shoppers buy the deal from the high quality platform because they have no 
concern about future payments. Given that the high quality platform offers a better deal, and on 
average, represents higher quality vendors, all one-time shoppers choose to transact with 𝐻𝐻. 
To illustrate how high the reward to quality should be in order to support segmentation, 
in Figure 2.2 we depict the relationship between the lower bound on the steepness of the quality 
contingent price  schedule (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿>𝐻𝐻) ) and the share of the population that consists of information 
seekers (𝛽𝛽). 
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Figure 2.2:  The Graph of 𝐋𝐋𝐋𝐋(𝐋𝐋>𝐇𝐇) vs 𝛃𝛃15 
According to this Figure, the discounted market price should reward vendors for higher 
quality at a rate that exceeds the average valuation of consumers for improved quality (higher 
than �𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃� 2⁄  ). Moreover, when the size of the population of information seekers is relatively 
small but is still in the feasible region, namely 1 (2 − 𝑐𝑐)⁄ < 𝛽𝛽 < ?̂?𝛽, the reward to higher quality 
has to exceed even the highest possible valuation of quality among consumers (higher than 𝜃𝜃). 
As discussed earlier a very steep quality-price schedule arises when the cost of offering higher 
quality is relatively high (big values of 𝑑𝑑) or when it is more difficult for consumers to detect and 
disseminate information about vendors who cut quality below their established reputation (big 
15 Illustrates that extremely high rewards to quality are necessary to support segmentation when RH < RL. See 
Appendix A for the value of β� . 
?̂?𝛽
𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃2
𝜃𝜃 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿>𝐻𝐻) 
𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿) = 12 − 𝑐𝑐 1 𝛽𝛽 
40 
values of 𝑟𝑟). Increased cost of high quality or difficulty of detecting deteriorated quality raises 
the temptation of the vendors to “milk” their reputation, thus requiring higher rents to ensure that 
they offer their promised quality at the equilibrium. However, it is very unlikely that the required 
price would exceed the maximum amount consumers are willing to pay for improved quality. To 
support segmentation with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿, however, the steepness of the market price may sometimes 
have to exceed this maximum level 𝜃𝜃. Consider, for instance, the case that 𝑐𝑐 = 0.5 and 𝑟𝑟 = 0.1.  
In this case 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿) = 0.67 and ?̂?𝛽 = 0.77. Hence, more than two thirds of the population of
consumers has to consist of information seekers. As mentioned before, based upon recent reports 
(Dholakia 2011) such a large population of information seekers is unlikely. Moreover, when 0.67 < 𝛽𝛽 < 0.77, the steepness of the price-quality schedule has to exceed the maximum 
valuation for improved quality among consumers in order to support segmentation. When 𝛽𝛽 >0.77 this required steepness is not as extreme but is still higher than the average valuation in the 
population. 
It is worthwhile to note one interesting comparative statics result that is unique to the two 
sided market we consider. The result relates to changes in the extent of heterogeneity in the 
population of consumers. We find that increasing the spread �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� for a fixed mean valuation 
of quality �𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃� 2⁄  in the population of consumers (mean preserving spread), leads to 
intensified price competition between the platforms and a decline in the market share of platform L among information seekers (𝑥𝑥 decreases). As the spread of consumer valuations increases 
while the spread in the vendor population remains the same (still distributed over (0, 𝑞𝑞)), the 
importance of finding a good quality match to consumers declines as the relative spread in 
quality in comparison to the spread in consumer valuations declines. This forces platforms to 
compete more aggressively, and when price competition intensifies, it is the lower priced 
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platform that gains in market share, namely platform 𝐻𝐻 (this comparative statics result is 
reversed if the spread in qualities in the vendor population increases while the spread of 
valuations among consumers stays the same). Note that in traditional models of vertical product 
differentiation (one sided markets), producers unambiguously benefit from increased consumer 
heterogeneity because such increased heterogeneity leads to greater product differentiation and 
alleviated price competition. In two sided markets it is the heterogeneity of one side of the 
market relative to the heterogeneity of the other side that determines the extent of price 
competition between the platforms. 
2.3.2.2 Partial Segmenting Equilibrium with 𝐑𝐑𝐇𝐇 > 𝐑𝐑𝐋𝐋 . We now consider the possible 
existence of a segmenting equilibrium with the entire population of one time shoppers choosing 
platform L (𝑦𝑦 = 1), which can only happen if 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 .  Substituting into the objective of the 
platforms 𝑦𝑦 = 1 yields: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻 = 1𝑟𝑟 �𝛽𝛽 (1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐) (1 − 𝑥𝑥)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻�, 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 = 1𝑟𝑟 ��𝛽𝛽 (1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐) 𝑥𝑥 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)� (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿�. (2.25) 
Optimizing with respect to the fees yields: 
𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 = (1−𝑥𝑥)𝑞𝑞�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚+1)2𝑚𝑚 , 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 = �𝑥𝑥+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽 (𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟)�𝑞𝑞�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚+1)2𝑚𝑚 . (2.26) 
Substituting the expressions for the fees from (2.26) back into 𝑥𝑥 as derived from (2.8) yields an 
equation with 𝑥𝑥 as unknown.  Solving it yields: 
𝑥𝑥 = �𝜃𝜃−2𝜃𝜃�
3�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�
−
(1−𝛽𝛽)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)
3𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟) + 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)3(𝑚𝑚+1)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�. (2.27) 
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In Proposition 2.2 we derive conditions on the parameters of the model that are necessary to 
support segmentation of both the population of vendors and the population of information 
seekers when 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. 
Proposition 2.2. 
(i) A partial segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 exists if:
      0 < 𝑇𝑇∗ < 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
< �1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
� �1 − 𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃(𝑚𝑚+1)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�� , (2.28) 
where 𝑇𝑇∗ defines a positive lower bound on the value of the ratio 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
, and 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) < 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑚𝑚+1) < 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) < 𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃2 . (2.29) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿), and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) are as defined in Appendix A. 
(ii) The size of the region that supports the equilibrium expands as 𝜃𝜃 increases, 𝜃𝜃
decreases, and 𝑐𝑐 declines.
(iii) At this equilibrium 𝑥𝑥 < 1
2
 and 𝑦𝑦 = 1. 
According to part (i) of Proposition 2.2, to support equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 and 𝑦𝑦 = 1, 
it is necessary that the fraction of the consumer population who are information seekers is 
sizable, yet not too big. The upper bound on the ratio (1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝛽𝛽⁄  in (2.28) implies that 𝛽𝛽 has to 
be sufficiently big. Given that the degree of success of segmentation depends on the size of the 
population that can be segmented, it is necessary that the size of the population of information 
seekers exceeds a certain critical level. However, in contrast to the equilibrium characterized in 
Proposition 2.1 when 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿, in Proposition 2.2 the reward to high quality has to be relatively 
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modest to support  equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. The requirement for this modest reward leads the 
lower bound 𝑇𝑇∗ on the ratio (1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝛽𝛽⁄   in (2.28) (upper bound on 𝛽𝛽), and to the upper bound on 
the slope of the full market price schedule 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) in (2.29), which is less than �𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃� 2⁄ . In 
fact, the upper bound on this slope is much smaller than the lower bound on the slope that 
supports the segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 (i.e., 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿)). Similar to the result reported 
in Proposition 2.1, here as well, the size of the region that supports segmentation expands as the 
heterogeneity in the consumer population increases (i.e., 𝜃𝜃 increases, 𝜃𝜃 decreases) and the 
probability of finding a suitable vendor (c) declines. 
According to part (iii) of the Proposition, at the equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿, platform 𝐻𝐻 
commands a larger share of information seekers than platform 𝐿𝐿 (𝑥𝑥 < 1 2⁄ ). When information 
seekers face a relatively flat quality contingent price schedule, they are encouraged to experiment 
using the deal offered by the high quality platform in spite of the higher price deal that this 
platform charges. Because they can expect to pay only marginally more for higher quality 
service if they decide to purchase the service again, they have a stronger incentive to experiment 
via the platform that represents the higher quality vendors. In contrast to the results reported in 
Proposition 2.1, segmentation in Proposition 2.2 is achieved with the deal price more correctly 
representing the quality of the set of vendors that self-select to transact with the platforms. The 
vendors that offer, on average, higher quality command also a higher price for the deal they offer 
to consumers via the platform.  
To illustrate how flat the quality contingent price schedule should be in order to support 
the segmentation described in Proposition 2.2, in Figure 2.3 we depict the relationship between 
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿), the upper bound on the slope of the schedule, and 𝛽𝛽, the portion of the population that 
comprises of information seekers. 
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Figure 2.3: The Graph of 𝐔𝐔𝐋𝐋(𝐇𝐇>L) vs 𝛃𝛃16 
According to Figure 2.3 the slope of the price schedule has to be smaller than the average 
valuation for improved quality in the population of the consumers. When 𝛽𝛽 is relatively small, 
this slope has to be extremely small. In particular, in the neighborhood of 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿), the reward to
higher quality (as measured by the slope of the price schedule) that vendors receive has to be 
even smaller than the lowest valuation for quality among consumers (lower than 𝜃𝜃) in order to 
support this type of segmentation. Note that the partial segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 
exists for intermediate values of 𝛽𝛽. This set of feasible 𝛽𝛽 values expands as 𝑐𝑐 declines. For 
example, for 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5,𝜃𝜃 = 10,𝜃𝜃 = 2, 𝑞𝑞 = 3, 𝑟𝑟 = .10,𝑚𝑚 = .15,𝑑𝑑 = 1 ,and 𝑐𝑐 = 0.5, the feasible 
16 Illustrates that a very flat quality contingent price schedule  is necessary to support segmentation when RH > RL. 
See Appendix A for the values of  UBmax(H>L), UBmin(H>L), βmax(H>L) and βmin(H>L).
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region of 𝛽𝛽 values that supports this equilibrium is 0.42 < 𝛽𝛽 < 0.47. For the same set of 
parameter values and 𝑐𝑐 = 0.2 the feasible region of 𝛽𝛽 expands to 0.27 < 𝛽𝛽 < 0.46.  
 As in the partial equilibrium described in Proposition 2.1, in the partial equilibrium 
characterized in Proposition 2.2 the intensity of price competition between the platforms depends 
on the relative heterogeneity in the two sides of the market. As before, intensified competition 
increases the market share of the platform that offers the lower priced deal, which is platform 𝐿𝐿 
at the partial segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. 
2.3.3 Recommendations to Facilitate Segmentation 
From Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 partial segmenting equilibria exist only when the slope of the 
quality contingent price schedule is significantly high or low, respectively. The required big 
𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) (𝑚𝑚 + 1)⁄  value necessary to support the equilibrium in Proposition 2.1 and the small 
𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) (𝑚𝑚 + 1)⁄  value necessary to support the equilibrium in Proposition 2.2 are needed to 
ensure either very high or very low rewards to quality. In Proposition 2.3 we state that under 
moderate rewards to quality, segmentation of this type cannot exist. 
Proposition 2.3. 
For intermediate values of the discounted slope of the market price schedule 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑚𝑚+1
 in the 
interval �𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿), 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿)� partial segmenting equilibria do not exist. 
An inspection of the bounds imposed on 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) (𝑚𝑚 + 1)⁄  in (2.24) and (2.29) yields 
that 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) < 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿) implying that there is a nonempty interval of 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟) (𝑚𝑚 + 1)⁄  values 
that cannot support this type of segmentation. (See Figure 2.4 for a visual representation of 
46 
Proposition 2.3.) The size of the interval of nonexistence is smaller as 𝛽𝛽 increases or as 𝑐𝑐 
declines. Hence, when a bigger share of the population of consumers consists of information 
seekers and when the probability of finding a suitable vendor decreases (𝑐𝑐 declines), it is more 
likely that a partial segmenting equilibrium can arise (either in the form of 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 or 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 >
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿). 
 
 
Of the three types of equilibria we have considered it seems like the one characterized in 
Proposition 2.2 is the most likely to arise. The full segmenting equilibrium with both information 
seekers and one time shoppers being segmented requires unrealistically low values of the 
parameter 𝑐𝑐. Such low values imply that consumers have to frequently sample vendors in the 
same category from a given platform before being able to find a suitable vendor, and that 
platforms are forced to charge very low prices, as a result. In particular, when 𝑐𝑐 approaches zero, 
𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 = 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 = 0 in (2.19), (2.22), and (2.26). The partial segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 is 
equally unlikely. This type of equilibrium requires an unrealistically large portion of the 
consumer population to consist of information seekers. As well, it also requires a very steep price 
Partial Segmenting 
Equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 Partial Segmenting Equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 No Segmenting 
Equilibrium 
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿) 
Figure 2.4 – Values of 𝐝𝐝(𝟏𝟏+𝐫𝐫)
𝐦𝐦+𝟏𝟏
 Supporting Partial Segmenting Equilibria 
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quality schedule, so much so, that the required steepness may even exceed the highest 
willingness to pay for quality among consumers. Because markets where prices exceed consumer 
willingness to pay normally collapse, this type of segmentation is unlikely as well. 
Sustaining the partial segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 requires more reasonable 
values of the parameters. The portion of the population that consists of information seekers 
should be sizable, yet not too large, and the required steepness of the quality-price schedule 
should be relatively small in comparison to the willingness to pay for higher quality in the 
consumer population. Viable markets normally have this latter characteristic. In the context of 
our model, a relatively flat quality price schedule arises in markets where offering higher quality 
is not extremely more costly for vendors than offering low quality (i.e., 𝑑𝑑 is small) and 
consumers can easily detect and disseminate information about vendors who choose to lower 
quality below their established reputation (i.e., small 𝑟𝑟). Consumers can easily detect and 
disseminate quality information in categories where purchases are frequent and where quality is 
experience based as opposed to credence based (e.g., restaurants, fitness classes, and salon 
services vs. medical doctors and auto mechanics). Note that because the two platforms offer at 
the equilibrium deals at different prices, consumers and vendors can infer which platform 
represents, on average, higher quality vendors. 
If segmentation fails, the platforms are not differentiated and the matching of consumers 
to vendors is completely random. With random matching, platforms compete fiercely on deal 
prices, and marginal cost pricing implies that 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 = 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 = 0. With segmentation, the platforms 
are vertically differentiated and they can charge positive deal prices. However, this vertical 
differentiation is not the result of platforms actually having control over the quality of the service 
they provide. Instead, the differentiation is the result of different segments of the vendor and 
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consumer populations choosing to interact with different platforms. In traditional models of 
vertical product differentiation, producers have full control over the qualities of the products they 
offer. In order to support segmentation they need to satisfy only one incentive compatibility 
constraint related to self-selection of the differentiated products by consumers. For 
intermediaries that seek to match vendors with consumers there are, in fact, two separate 
incentive compatibility conditions that constrain the ability of the platforms to implement 
segmentation. It is not only the choice of consumers but that of the vendors as well that has to be 
incorporated in ensuring the segmentation of each side of the market. The additional self-
selection constraint of the vendors makes it more difficult to implement equilibrium with 
vertically differentiated platforms. It is important, therefore, for the platforms to carefully select 
the categories of service that can support the partial segmentation characterized in Proposition 
2.2. 
It is noteworthy that the segmentation in our model is attained even though platforms 
have a single instrument at their disposal to generate differentiation: the price each of them 
charges for the deal. If additional instruments were available, we conjecture that the range of 
parameter values that could support segmentation would expand. One such instrument is a 
different sharing rule of the profits between the platform and the vendor (different values of 𝛼𝛼 
selected by the platforms). In Appendix A we demonstrate, indeed, that it becomes easier for the 
platforms to implement segmentation when sharing rules are chosen strategically. 
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2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We offer a characterization of segmenting equilibrium in a two sided market where daily deal 
websites assume the role of platforms. In the segmenting equilibrium, platforms provide 
information to vendors and consumers about the type of populations they serve. The use of daily 
deal websites can reduce, therefore, the risk of mismatch between consumers and vendors in a 
given product category. When segmentation exists, platforms can generate positive profits by 
charging for the added informational benefits that they bestow on each side of the market. 
However, as is clear from recent reports in the trade press, daily deals are not necessarily 
profitable for intermediaries that offer them. In this paper, we argue that one possible reason for 
this unfortunate outcome may be related to the failure of platforms to implement an equilibrium 
in which they offer differentiated products/services to consumers. In the absence of 
differentiation, segmentation of vendors and consumers is not feasible, and random matching of 
the two populations arises. Such random matching leads to intense price competition between the 
platforms and zero profits. This may explain the recent demise of the daily deal industry, 
including the exit of the daily deal websites Google Offers and Amazon Local, and large 
employee layoffs of the industry leaders Groupon and Living Social. 
We characterize three distinct patterns of segmenting equilibria. One of these equilibria, 
the full segmenting equilibria, allows all three populations (one time shoppers, information 
seeking consumers, and vendors) to be segmented. It is characterized by the high quality 
platform selling deals at higher prices than the low quality platform. The other two equilibria are 
partial segmenting equilibria in which the vendor and the information seeking populations are 
segmented, but the entire one time shopper population visits the low price platform.  
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Considering the market conditions that need to be satisfied for each the three types of 
segmenting equilibrium, we argue that the partial segmenting equilibrium with the high quality 
platform charging the higher deal price is the most likely to arise. To sustain this equilibrium, 
daily deal websites must consider product categories with sizable, yet not too large information 
seeking populations, and categories characterized by relatively flat quality-price schedules. We 
posit that new product categories and product categories with frequent purchases are likely to 
satisfy the requirement of having sizable information seeking populations. We also argue that a 
product category has a relatively flat quality-price schedule if the cost of improved quality for 
vendors is not extremely high, if consumers make frequent purchases in the category, and if it is 
relatively easy for consumers to detect and disseminate quality information.17 
17 Interestingly enough, Groupon’s newest CEO, Rich Williams, has stated that it is in his company’s best interest to 
focus on specific categories, such as high frequency local categories (Groupon, Inc. 2016) 
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3.0 CROWDFUNDING AS A VEHICLE FOR RAISING CAPITAL AND FOR PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Online crowdfunding provides an alternative way for entrepreneurs to finance the development 
and production of new products without the need of traditional financial intermediaries. While 
crowdfunding has been around since the first entrepreneur solicited friends and family for 
funding, the Internet has expanded the accessible “crowd” from friends and family to individuals 
all over the world. Allowing these consumers-turned-investors to support the development of a 
product that they like, crowdfunding platforms bring together entrepreneurs looking to finance a 
product with individuals who have funds to provide to the project. Many entrepreneurs utilize 
crowdfunding to finance new product ideas because traditional financial intermediaries such as 
banks and venture capitalists find their ideas to be too risky. However, as crowdfunding gains in 
popularity, entrepreneurs who would have traditionally sought funding from these intermediaries 
look instead to the crowd to finance a project.   
While several types of crowdfunding exist (reward, patronage, lending, and equity), our 
focus is on reward based crowdfunding. (For more information on the other types of 
crowdfunding see Mollick (2014).) This is the model used by the leading creative project 
crowdfunding website Kickstarter. Reward based crowdfunding taps consumers for funding, as 
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opposed to traditional investors, through the design of the reward and the promise of a new 
product. An important reason why reward based crowdfunding has been successful is the 
existence of high valuation consumers who wish to ensure that their preferred products are 
produced and become available on the market. Entrepreneurs that use the services of 
crowdfunding platforms employ campaign goals to motivate such consumers to make pledges. 
These consumers are aware that unless the campaign goal to finance their preferred product is 
reached the product might never be produced. Crowdfunding campaigns also offer pecuniary 
rewards (e.g., a digital download of a crowdfunded album’s first single) that further incentivize 
contributions from hopeful consumers. When the early pledges of such consumers in the 
campaign exceed the reward that the entrepreneur promises to pay them when the project is 
complete, these consumers with higher valuation for the product pay de-facto a higher price for it 
than those having lower valuation. Hence, crowdfunding has the potential to serve as a price 
discrimination device. This was likely the case for the team behind the movie Blue Mountain 
State who was able to use crowdfunding to raise $40 from each of 836 backers in exchange for 
the digital download of the movie and some small product affiliated gifts (Falconer 2015). 
However, the primary goal of crowdfunding campaigns is for entrepreneurs to raise 
capital to fund the development of new products. Many times campaigns offer entrepreneurs the 
opportunity to save significant amounts in financing costs. As a result, entrepreneurs may end up 
providing very generous rewards to funders in order to incentivize them to submit high pledges 
in the campaign. If, as a result, funders’ pledges fall short of such generous rewards, high 
valuation consumers end up paying a lower (rather than a higher) price in comparison to low 
valuation consumers. In such instances, crowdfunding fails as a price discrimination device. In 
this research we investigate conditions under which a crowdfunding campaign can, indeed, be 
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used as a device to extract additional surplus from high valuation consumers. We also examine 
the entrepreneur’s choice of the pecuniary funder reward and campaign goal, two instruments 
that the entrepreneur can use to achieve the dual objective of raising funds to finance the project 
while successfully implementing price discrimination between high valuation and low valuation 
consumers.  
Our model consists of two stages. In the first stage, the entrepreneur chooses the two 
instruments of the campaign: the campaign goal and the funder reward geared towards 
incentivizing high valuation consumers to pledge in the campaign. In the second stage, high 
valuation consumers, that we also refer to as “fans of the product,” strategically decide if and 
how much they wish to contribute to the campaign. We assume that only when the total funds 
raised in the campaign exceed the campaign goal can the entrepreneur and platform keep the 
contributions of funders. Otherwise, all contributions are returned to funders. (This is the rule 
used by Kickstarter.) High valuation consumers choose their pledges strategically in response to 
the two instruments of the campaign, the campaign goal and the pecuniary funder reward, 
selected in the first stage. In their decision, they also consider their expected surplus from 
consuming the product and the possibility to “free ride” on contributions or other funds that 
might become available to the entrepreneur both in and out of the campaign. 
 At the completion of the campaign, if the aggregate contributions exceed the campaign 
goal and if the total funding the entrepreneur can raise (consisting of contributions from funders 
and the loan the entrepreneur can procure from outside funding sources) is sufficient to cover the 
development cost of the project, the product may be produced and sold to the consumer 
population. If the product is produced, the entrepreneur distributes the pecuniary reward to the 
high valuation consumers who contributed to the campaign. 
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We find that when the entrepreneur is very eager to raise funds through the crowdfunding 
campaign her ability to implement price discrimination between high and low valuation 
consumers is hindered. She is more eager to raise such funds when the total surplus from 
completion of the project is significant or when both the development cost of the project and 
financing costs through traditional funding sources are high. In this case, the entrepreneur offers 
a more generous funder reward in order to encourage higher pledges from fans of the product. 
However, such a high reward limits the ability of the entrepreneur to successfully extract extra 
surplus from fans of the product.  
In contrast, when high valuation consumers value the product significantly higher than 
the price they anticipate to pay for it (namely, when their anticipated consumption benefits are 
high), they are highly motivated to contribute to the campaign as is, and the entrepreneur can cut 
the reward offered. This increases the entrepreneur’s ability to use crowdfunding as a means to 
extract additional surplus from fans of the product in comparison to uniform pricing. In addition, 
the importance of generating capital from high valuation consumers declines when the 
entrepreneur is more likely to raise funds from other possible participants in the campaign. While 
this allows the entrepreneur to offer fans a smaller reward, it does not necessarily enhance her 
ability to use crowdfunding for price discrimination purposes. When fans of the product 
anticipate that contributions from others are more likely, they have a stronger incentive to “free 
ride” on such contributions by reducing their pledges.  
The entrepreneur can optimally choose the level of the campaign goal to supplement the 
choice of pecuniary funder reward. In this regard, the entrepreneur weighs two counteracting 
effects. On the one hand, lowering the campaign goal raises the odds that the less demanding 
goal can be reached and that contributions raised in the campaign can be retained by the 
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entrepreneur. On the other hand, a low campaign goal implies that fans are less motivated to 
submit high pledges as they anticipate that the less demanding goal can be easily reached by 
contributions raised from others. In addition, a lower campaign goal implies that a bigger share 
of the development costs has to be financed via costly traditional funding sources.  
We demonstrate that the entrepreneur has an incentive to raise the goal when the pool of 
funders outside of the fan group is relatively small or when it becomes more expensive to fund 
the product through outside funding (borrowing from a bank). In such instances, it becomes more 
important for the entrepreneur to highly motivate fans and obtain a bigger share of the 
development cost from the crowdfunding campaign. In contrast, when the entrepreneur can keep 
a bigger share of the campaign’s contributions, she is more determined for the campaign to be 
successful, and lowers, therefore, the campaign goal in order to increase the likelihood of a 
successful campaign. However, even when lowering the campaign goal the entrepreneur does not 
necessarily lower it to ensure that the goal can always be met. Instead, the entrepreneur finds it 
optimal to risk an unsuccessful campaign in order to more highly motivate high valuation 
consumers to submit high pledges, thus saving on capital costs. 
Of particular interest, we also find that the entrepreneur will always set the campaign 
goal below the level that allows her to completely cover the development cost of the product. As 
a result, the entrepreneur chooses to sometimes procure a portion of the development costs via 
traditional funding (i.e., a loan from the bank). While raising the campaign goal can help the 
entrepreneur to motivate more aggressive pledge behavior it also exposes her to the risk of a 
failed campaign when funds are insufficient to meet the more demanding goal. Given that the 
entrepreneur can also use the funder reward as an instrument to motivate funders and given that a 
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traditional outside funding source is available to the entrepreneur, she chooses the goal to be 
strictly lower than the level that allows her to cover the entire development cost.  
Our research also illustrates the difference between crowdfunding and traditional vehicles 
that have been suggested in the literature in order to implement price discrimination. In this 
literature, the success of vendors to segment the market and practice price discrimination 
primarily depends on the extent of heterogeneity in the consumer population. With 
crowdfunding, while the success of price discrimination still depends on the extent of 
heterogeneity among consumers, it also depends on a variety of other variables. These variables 
determine how eager the entrepreneur is to obtain funding from the campaign to finance the 
project in comparison to how eager fans are to ensure that the product becomes a reality. 
Successful price discrimination between high and low valuation consumers is more likely with 
crowdfunding if fans are relatively more eager for the product to become available than the 
entrepreneur is about covering most development costs from the campaign. In our model, fans 
are more eager when they do not expect a large pool of other contributors, and therefore have 
fewer opportunities to free ride on such contributions. The entrepreneur is less eager when the 
new venture generates a relatively small total surplus. In this case, the entrepreneur has reduced 
incentives to motivate fans to contribute, and therefore, offers them only a modest reward. This 
permits her to extract greater surplus from high valuation consumers via their early contributions. 
In contrast, the entrepreneur becomes more eager to obtain funding from the campaign (thus 
hampering her ability to use crowdfunding to price discriminate) when both the development 
cost of the project and the financing costs through traditional funding sources are relatively high. 
For their service of bringing together the entrepreneur and funders, the crowdfunding 
platform retains a fraction of the contributions raised in a successful campaign. In an extension 
57 
we allow the platform to strategically choose the sharing rule taking into account how such a 
choice will affect the instruments of the campaign selected by the entrepreneur, and ultimately, 
the overall contributions raised in the campaign. We demonstrate that the platform faces a 
tradeoff in choosing the sharing rule. On the positive side, increasing the share of the 
contributions that the entrepreneur retains can benefit the platform because the entrepreneur is 
more likely to set a lower campaign goal and a larger reward to funders in this case. The lower 
campaign goal increases the likelihood of a successful campaign and a larger reward motivates 
higher pledges from strategic funders. On the negative side, a bigger share promised to the 
entrepreneur implies that the platform retains a smaller portion of the contributions. 
Our numerical calculations show that the platform’s optimal sharing rule increases as the 
donations from altruistic donors decreases or the development cost of the project increases. In 
both instances, pledges from the strategic funders become more important. By raising the 
entrepreneur’s share of the total contributions, the platform provides higher powered incentives 
to the entrepreneur to raise the funder reward, which motivates the strategic funders to pledge at 
higher levels. 
Our research is related to several streams of literature. First is the literature on price 
discrimination. This literature examines different devices that can be used to price discriminate 
between segments of consumers such as coupons (e.g., Narasimhan 1984), bundling (e.g., 
Adams and Yellen 1976), and quality pricing (Mussa and Rosen 1979). We introduce in this 
paper a novel device that can help entrepreneurs to benefit from price discrimination while 
raising funds for their projects. Crowdfunding is most similar to advance purchase discounts 
(e.g., Dana 1998, Nocke et al. 2011) typically used in pricing of service products (e.g., in hotel 
industry) in that both use time as the means to segment the consumers. The main difference 
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between the two is in the segment that pays the higher price. In advance purchase discounts 
consumers who buy late pay higher prices because they have higher valuations. In crowdfunding, 
however, high valuation consumers whose early campaign contributions exceed the campaign 
reward effectively pay higher prices than those who wait for the product to become available on 
the market. 
Another related literature is on fundraising of a discrete public good (e.g., Cadsby and 
Maynes 1999, Menezes et al. 2001, Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984 and 1988) in which case these 
goods are provided only if a distinct funding threshold is met. In our paper, as well, there is a 
funding goal which must be met before the entrepreneur receives the funders’ contributions. It 
can then use these contributions to develop the product. However, in our paper the funding goal 
is set endogenously by the entrepreneur, whereas in this literature it is often exogenously 
determined by the cost of the good. As well, the entrepreneur can set an additional campaign 
incentive (i.e., campaign reward) to further motivate funders to contribute to the campaign. 
There is an emerging literature on crowdfunding. Most of the research in this area, 
however, is empirical (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2015, Mollick 2014, Ward and Ramachandran 2010). 
The empirical literature supports the claim that individuals who contribute to campaigns are 
strategic and pay attention to various campaign variables when choosing to contribute.  For 
instance, Mollick (2014) provides evidence that perceived project quality affects the success of 
the campaign.   
Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher (2014) and Hu, Li, and Shi (2015) are two 
analytical papers that explore crowdfunding. Belleflamme et al. (2014) compare two forms of 
crowdfunding. In one type funders are consumers who pre-order the product and in the other the 
funders may not be interested in consuming the product but give funds in exchange for a share of 
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future profits. Our model is more similar to the prior type of crowdfunding. However, in our 
model instead of pre-ordering the product, high valuation consumers make pledges in the hopes 
that they receive the reward set by the entrepreneur and that they can purchase the product when 
it becomes available on the market. This reward is conditional on the campaign goal being met 
and the product being produced. While in Belleflamme et al. (2013), the entrepreneur has one 
instrument, the pre-ordering price, to influence participation in the crowdfunding, in ours she has 
two instruments to motivate funders, the crowdfunding campaign goal and funder reward. 
Similar to our study, in Belleflamme et al.’s pre-ordering case the entrepreneur is able to price 
discriminate between crowdfunders (consumers who pre-order the product) and other consumers 
who buy the product when it is available on the market. However, in their study, the entrepreneur 
is always able to extract extra surplus from consumers who pre-order because of additional 
utility such consumers derive from the sheer act of being contributors in the campaign. The focus 
of this paper is on examining conditions under which the profit extracted via the pre-ordering 
scheme is higher than when the entrepreneur chooses profit sharing in the crowdfunding 
campaign. In contrast, in our setting even when high valuation consumers are attracted to the 
campaign the entrepreneur cannot necessarily extract extra surplus from them. Our focus is on 
deriving conditions of the crowdfunding environment that can facilitate such additional surplus 
extraction from high valuation consumers. We incorporate, therefore, several relevant features of 
such campaigns that are not considered in this earlier paper. They include, the strategy of setting 
the campaign goal, consideration of outside funding to supplement funds raised in the campaign, 
uncertainty regarding the level of contributions, and the price paid by the entrepreneur to the 
platform running the campaign.  
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Hu, Li, and Shi (2015) examine the manner in which a project creator offers different 
product options in a crowdfunding campaign. Each of the product alternatives in Hu et al. (2015) 
corresponds to a different level of reward that the creator offers in exchange for a particular 
pledge level requested from buyers. The authors find that price discrimination with a menu of 
products can be more profitable than uniform pricing. A novel finding of their paper is that in 
comparison to a traditional product line design setting, the qualities of the products are less 
differentiated in crowdfunding. We also examine the possibility that crowdfunding can facilitate 
price discrimination. However, we focus on investigating whether the need of entrepreneurs to 
raise funds in the campaign may limit their ability to practice price discrimination. We 
incorporate, therefore, in the model, development costs of the project and financing costs from 
traditional funding sources in order to evaluate how the instruments of the campaign (funding 
reward and campaign goal) and the entrepreneur’s ability to practice price discrimination depend 
upon such costs.  In contrast to the product line design in Hu et al. (2015), in our setting there is 
only one basic product and one reward level. Price discrimination is successful if fans of the 
product, via their early pledges, pay de-facto a higher price than low valuation consumers. 
3.2 MODEL 
Consider an entrepreneur with an idea for a new product. The entrepreneur seeks funding to 
cover the development cost 𝐾𝐾 of the new product. To this end, she tries to raise capital for her 
project by tapping the crowd on a platform. When creating the crowdfunding campaign, the 
entrepreneur has two strategic decisions she must make. First, she must set a campaign goal 𝐹𝐹 
for the aggregate contributions. Only if aggregate contributions exceed this goal is the campaign 
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considered successful. If these contributions fall short of the goal, the campaign is declared 
unsuccessful and they are returned to the funders.   
Second, the entrepreneur makes the strategic choice of the level of the promotional 
funder reward ∆ to be awarded to funders whose contribution exceeds a certain predetermined 
threshold. The funder reward corresponds to the future transfer of funds between the 
entrepreneur and the funders if the new product is successfully developed. Given that many 
rewards in crowdfunding campaigns are tied to the production of the product (e.g., a digital copy 
of the first single on an album) we assume that the funder reward is given to backers only after 
production occurs. We also assume that concerns regarding her reputation prevent the 
entrepreneur from reneging on the promised reward once the product is produced. Indeed, 
empirical evidence shows that most entrepreneurs deliver on their promised rewards upon 
successful production of their products (Mollick 2014). 
In order for production to take place, the entrepreneur must raise enough funds to cover 
the cost 𝐾𝐾 of developing the product. If the funds available to the entrepreneur exceed the 
development cost, the entrepreneur incurs the development cost and the product is produced. 
Products produced are sold to consumers and rewards are distributed to backers of the 
crowdfunding campaign. Without loss of generality we assume that other than the development 
cost 𝐾𝐾, the entrepreneur incurs no additional production costs. 
We allow for the entrepreneur to have access to traditional sources of funding in addition 
to funds raised in the crowdfunding campaign. Increasingly entrepreneurs are utilizing 
crowdfunding websites to finance only part of the development cost of their projects, hoping that 
successful campaigns attract traditional investors to complete the investment necessary to cover 
the entire cost of the projects (Geigner 2013). To account for this possibility, we consider an 
62 
environment where the entrepreneur may have access to funding sources other than the crowd. 
We model the possible outside funding source that is available as a lender that may provide 
funds to the entrepreneur at an interest rate 𝑠𝑠.  
 We assume that when the entrepreneur approaches the lender with news of a successful 
crowdfunding campaign, she can definitely secure funds from the lender to cover the shortfall 
between the contributions collected in the campaign and the development cost. In contrast, a 
failed campaign may be perceived as a risky investment. Such a failure may raise a “red flag” 
regarding the managerial skills of the entrepreneur. Her failure to attain the goal of the campaign 
may be interpreted by the lender as inability to set realistic objectives. Therefore, an entrepreneur 
who approaches the lender with news of a failed campaign faces uncertainty regarding her ability 
to obtain funding from the lender. We model this uncertainty by assuming that following a failed 
campaign the lender approves a loan to the entrepreneur with probability 𝑞𝑞 < 1. In case of a 
failed campaign, however, the entrepreneur has to secure a loan of $𝐾𝐾 because she cannot keep 
any portion of the contributions when the goal of the campaign is not met. 
In addition, we assume that raising sufficient capital to cover the development cost of the 
product does not necessarily guarantee that the product will become a reality. Because 
entrepreneurs may run into difficulties while developing the product or may make poor estimates 
of the cost of the project, it is sometimes the case that an entrepreneur is unable to introduce the 
product in the marketplace or may be unable to deliver the promised quality level (e.g., may have 
to renege on certain features) even after she collects sufficient funds to cover its anticipated cost. 
An investigative article found that out of the top 50 projects on Kickstarter, at the time of the 
article 15 projects had not been delivered to their backers as promised (Pepitone 2012). 
Therefore, we introduce a probability that is associated with the technical success of the product 
63 
which we denote by 𝑝𝑝 < 1. This probability is known to the entrepreneur, consumers who plan 
to pledge in the campaign, and the platform.   
If the entrepreneur is able to develop and produce the product, she sells it as a 
monopolist. This assumption is reasonable as many crowdfunding projects are for new products 
that are intended to ultimately serve niche markets: an electric skateboard, a 3D printer pen, a 
farm-to-table organic restaurant, etc. The entrepreneur’s new product appeals to two types of 
consumers. The first type consists of 𝑖𝑖 high valuation consumers (or fans of the product) having 
the reservation price 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻. The bulk of the market is comprised of consumers who have much 
lower valuation for the product. There are 𝑚𝑚 consumers in the second group and their valuation 
is  𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 < 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻. We assume that if the product is successfully developed the entrepreneur finds it 
optimal to set the price of the product at 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 because the segment of low valuation consumers is so 
big, that it makes it profitable for the entrepreneur to set the price to ensure that the entire market 
is covered (i.e., all 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚 consumers are served). We assume that the low valuation segment of 
consumers is unaware of the campaign. In Appendix B we relax this assumption and allow for a 
portion of these consumers to be aware of the campaign.  
High valuation consumers (fans of the product) are aware that the campaign exists and 
are interested in contributing to the campaign because they expect to receive a positive 
consumption surplus if the product is produced. The fans choose their contribution level 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  (or 
𝐷𝐷 at the symmetric equilibrium) strategically to maximize their expected payoff. This expected 
payoff depends upon the fans’ expected surplus from consuming the product and the promotional 
funder reward ∆ that they receive if they make a pledge and the product is successfully 
developed. The expected payoff depends also on the threshold total contribution level 𝐹𝐹 and any 
expected contributions from other funders which together determine the likelihood of the 
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successful completion of the project. Because all fans share the same valuation in our 
formulation, the entrepreneur chooses a single minimum threshold that entitles funders to receive 
the pecuniary reward. The entrepreneur sets it equal to the pledge level selected by high 
valuation consumers at the equilibrium, 𝐷𝐷. Any pledge equal to or above this threshold is eligible 
for the reward. 
We assume that there is uncertainty regarding the total contributions raised in the 
campaign. Specifically, contributions may exceed the aggregate contributions of the fans. The 
pool of contributors outside of the fan group may consist of different types of individuals. They 
may be altruistic individuals who want to help entrepreneurs cultivate their dreams without 
having any actual interest in the specific product or reward. They may be funders who like the 
idea of the project without actually planning to become consumers of the product. Examples may 
include environmentalists supporting “green” projects even if they do not plan to be consumers 
of the final product when it becomes available. They may also be future consumers (out of the 
pool of the 𝑚𝑚 lower valuation consumers) who have a marginally higher valuation than the price 
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 they anticipate to pay for the product when it becomes available in the market. Therefore, such 
consumers each provide only a small amount in the campaign. This amount does not qualify 
them for the higher pecuniary reward ∆, but may qualify them for a smaller symbolic reward, 
such as being included in the “early backers of the product club” or receiving a “thank you” 
letter. We designate the aggregate level of such random donations by 𝑥𝑥, and assume that 𝑥𝑥 is 
stochastically determined according to a uniform distribution over the support [0,𝑋𝑋�].   
Indeed, in reality, we can observe many contributions to campaigns that are individually 
so small that they fall short of any threshold level that would qualify the contributors for any 
pecuniary reward. It is also quite common for contributors in campaigns to opt to receiving no 
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reward for their contributions. Indiegogo is one crowdfunding website that facilitates inferring 
some information regarding the size of the segment of funders who do not anticipate receiving 
any significant reward in return for their contribution. This website posts the pledge level 
submitted by each funder as well as the number of funders who opt to receive no reward for their 
contributions. Based on information regarding two campaigns that were ongoing on October 9, 
2015, this segment of non-reward motivated contributions is quite significant. In the case of 
Dipper Audio Necklace that was 63% funded on this day, about 40 out of a total of 128 funders 
(about 30%) made contributions in which they did not anticipate any pecuniary reward. In the 
case of Wine Down SF that was 48% funded on this day, 10 out of 62 backers (about 16%) did 
not expect any such reward. 
Notice that in addition to raising funds and thereby saving on capital costs, the 
crowdfunding campaign can enable the entrepreneur to price discriminate between fans of the 
product and lower valuation consumers. Because pledges are paid with certainty in the campaign 
and the reward is paid only with some probability if the product becomes available in the market, 
price discrimination can be implemented if (𝐷𝐷 − 𝑝𝑝∆) > 0, namely if the pledge exceeds the 
expected future reward paid upon completion of the product. In this case, high valuation 
consumers pay de-facto a higher price than low valuation consumers (i.e., they pay in 
expectation 𝐷𝐷 + 𝑝𝑝( 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 − ∆) whereas the lower valuation consumers pay in expectation 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿).  
The crowdfunding platform is tasked with bringing together funders and entrepreneurs. 
For its service of bringing together the two populations, the platform keeps a percentage of the 
aggregate contributions. We designate by 𝛼𝛼 the percentage of the aggregate contributions that the 
entrepreneur can keep. (For campaigns on Kickstarter, this is between 90-92% including 5% 
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Kickstarter fee and 3-5% processing fees).  Figure 3.1 summarizes all of the variables used in our 
model. 
We model the crowdfunding campaign as a two stage game. In the first stage, the 
entrepreneur sets the levels of the campaign goal 𝐹𝐹 and the funder reward ∆. In the second stage, 
high valuation consumers decide how much to pledge 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 and nature determines the realization of 
random donations 𝑥𝑥. At the completion of the campaign if the aggregate funds raised (i.e., high 
valuation consumers’ pledges and random donations) exceed the campaign goal, and if the total 
funding the entrepreneur can raise (including the possible loan the entrepreneur can get from the 
lender) are sufficient to cover the development cost 𝐾𝐾, the product has the potential to be 
produced. Once sufficient funds are raised, the product will be produced with probability 𝑝𝑝. If 
the product becomes available, it is sold to 𝑚𝑚 + 𝑖𝑖 consumers at the price 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿, and the reward ∆ is 
distributed to contributors in the campaign whose contribution exceeded the minimum pledge 
level selected by the entrepreneur. In an extension we later consider a third stage that precedes 
the other two in which the platform first chooses the sharing rule 𝛼𝛼. 
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Variable Definition 
𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 Valuation of the product for high valuation consumers 
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 Valuation of the product for low valuation consumers 
𝑖𝑖 Number of high valuation consumers in the market 
𝑚𝑚 Number of low valuation consumers in the market 
𝑥𝑥 Random donations raised through the campaign 
𝐾𝐾 Development cost of the new product 
𝑞𝑞 Probability that the entrepreneur can borrow funds from an outside 
lender given a failed campaign 
𝑝𝑝 Probability that a successfully funded product is actually produced; 
also referred to as probability of technical success 
𝑠𝑠 Interest rate on funds borrowed from outside lender 
𝛼𝛼 Share of contributions raised through the crowdfunding campaign 
that the entrepreneur keeps 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 Contribution by high valuation consumer 𝑖𝑖 
∆ Funder reward set by entrepreneur 
𝐹𝐹 Campaign goal set by entrepreneur 
Figure 3.1: Summary of Variables
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3.3 ANALYSIS 
3.3.1 Pledge Behavior of the High Valuation Consumers 
To obtain subgame perfect equilibrium, we start by considering the second stage when high 
valuation consumers (fans of the product) choose their pledges. Fans are aware of the fact that 
the entrepreneur has access to an outside funding source and consider this when choosing how 
much to pledge. They know, therefore, that as long as the crowdfunding campaign is successful 
�(∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝑥𝑥) ≥ 𝐹𝐹�, the entrepreneur will be able to secure any additional funds needed to 
cover the development cost of the project through outside funding. However, fans know that with 
probability (1 − 𝑝𝑝), the entrepreneur may not be able to produce the product as planned. This 
exposes the fans to the risk of losing their investment (pledge) without obtaining the promised 
benefits from consumption of the product and the funder reward. Additionally, because fans 
know that the project may be fully funded even when the crowdfunding campaign is 
unsuccessful (with probability q when (∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝑥𝑥) < 𝐹𝐹), they may have muted incentives to 
contribute to the campaign, as they expect positive odds for the product to be available even in 
the absence of their contributions. Specifically, they anticipate that with some probability the 
project will be executed even when they reduce their contributions and the goal of the campaign 
is not met. (We assume that the entrepreneur’s expected benefit from producing the product 
always exceeds the incurred financing and development costs [𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 − 𝐾𝐾(1 + 𝑠𝑠)] > 0 ). 
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The above discussion leads to the following expression for the expected utility of high 
valuation consumer i when choosing his pledge: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = ∫ (𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 + ∆) − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑋𝑋�𝐹𝐹−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 + 
𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 ∫ (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖0 . (3.1) 
The first integral of (3.1) is the expected net payoff of the fan when the goal of the campaign is 
met. With probability 𝑝𝑝 the product is produced as planned and the fan receives the funder 
reward ∆ and proceeds to buy the product yielding a consumption net benefit of 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿. 
However, the fan must pay his pledge 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 upfront, when the goal of the campaign is met, even if 
the product is never produced. The second integral is the high valuation consumer’s net payoff 
when the campaign fails, in which case he can benefit from consuming the product with some 
probability 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 that is strictly less than one (𝑞𝑞 is the probability that the entrepreneur can receive 
funding from the outside source given a failed campaign and 𝑝𝑝 is the probability that the product 
will be produced given sufficient funding). High valuation consumer i chooses his pledge level 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 to maximize (3.1). Fans face a tradeoff when choosing 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖. A higher pledge level increases the 
probability that the campaign will be successful and the product will be produced, but decreases 
fan 𝑖𝑖’s welfare when the campaign is successful. 
Note that in modeling the behavior of high valuation consumers we assume that they 
have the freedom to optimally set their pledge level. Essentially we assume that the 
crowdfunding platform follows a Name Your Own Price (NYOP) model instead of a Posted 
Price (PP) model, where the pledge level necessary to receive a certain reward would be dictated 
by the entrepreneur. The reason we make this assumption is that it is consistent with the 
mechanics of Kickstarter in which after selecting a reward the funder gets to choose his exact 
contribution level. Additionally, one can observe that there is heterogeneity in the pledge levels 
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submitted by participants on crowdfunding campaigns even when expecting an identical reward 
in return for the pledge. Such heterogeneity implies that each funder chooses to name a different 
price for a given reward, an outcome consistent with the NYOP model. Further, it turns out that 
the NYOP model yields simpler derivations than the PP model without qualitatively changing 
the main results of the paper. In particular, the effect of changes in the instruments of the 
campaign (𝐹𝐹 and ∆) on the pledge level submitted by high valuation consumers is similar under 
the PP and the NYOP models. Appendix B includes the derivation of the behavior of high 
valuation consumers under the PP model. Using (3.1) and solving for the symmetric pledge 
strategy yields the behavior reported in Lemma 3.1. 
Lemma 3.1. The pledge behavior of each high valuation consumer can be expressed as follows: 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑝𝑝((1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻−𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)+∆)+𝐹𝐹−𝑋𝑋�
𝑚𝑚+1
 . (3.2) 
The equilibrium pledge increases when the spread in the valuations of the product in the 
consumer population, as measured by 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 is higher. This difference in valuations determines 
the future surplus from consumption that fans of the product can expect. Note that the expected 
future consumption surplus declines when the probability of technical success of the product 𝑝𝑝 is 
lower, thus reducing the incentive of fans to contribute to the campaign. Similarly, fans reduce 
their contributions when the probability 𝑞𝑞 that the entrepreneur can obtain outside funding after a 
failed campaign 𝑞𝑞 is higher. The equilibrium pledge increases when either one of the two 
instruments that the entrepreneur chooses is bigger (either the funder reward ∆ or the campaign 
goal 𝐹𝐹), when surplus from consumption 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 is higher, when the maximum level of random 
donations 𝑋𝑋 is smaller, and when the number of high valuation consumers 𝑖𝑖 is smaller.   
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As the surplus from consumption 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 increases, fans increase their pledge in order to 
raise the probability that they will be able to consume the product in the future (we refer to this 
as the “consumption effect”). As the funder reward ∆ increases, fans pledge more to increase the 
probability that they will be able to receive the bigger reward. The increase in the pledge level in 
both of these instances depends, however, on the probability 𝑝𝑝 that the product will be produced 
because funders receive no consumption or reward benefits when the product is not produced. 
When the campaign goal 𝐹𝐹 increases, the likelihood of a successful campaign declines, and it is 
less likely that the product will be produced. Fans try to reverse this possibility by increasing 
their pledge. We refer to the effect of changes in the levels of the instruments ∆ and 𝐹𝐹 as the 
“instrument effect”. Note that in our environment the effect of either instrument on the pledge 
behavior of strategic funders is identical. The pledge function depends simply on the sum of the 
two instruments. When either the maximum level of random donations 𝑋𝑋� increases or the 
number of high valuation consumers 𝑖𝑖 increases each high valuation consumer has stronger 
incentives to “free ride” on the contributions of other funders, thus reducing his willingness to 
pledge himself (we refer to this as the “free riding effect”). The comparative statics we obtain 
from (3.2) would remain unchanged if we assumed that the pledge level is set by the 
entrepreneur instead of chosen optimally by high valuation consumers (see Appendix B.)  
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3.3.2 The Entrepreneur’s Choice of the Campaign Goal and Reward 
In the first stage the entrepreneur chooses the three campaign instruments 𝐹𝐹, ∆, and the minimum 
threshold level to quality for ∆ in order to maximize her expected profit. When choosing these 
instruments, the entrepreneur tries to attain the dual objective of motivating more aggressive 
pledge behavior by fans and of aligning more closely the payments of different consumer groups 
with their willingness to pay for the product. By offering high valuation consumers the 
opportunity to submit pledges in the campaign the entrepreneur can extract additional surplus 
from these fans. With this objective of surplus extraction, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to set 
the minimum pledge level that qualifies for the reward ∆ at the level 𝐷𝐷, the symmetric 
equilibrium pledge of fans derived in (3.2). 
Whenever aggregate contributions exceed the campaign goal 𝐹𝐹, the entrepreneur is able 
to keep her fraction of the revenue from the campaign (given the equilibrium pledges of fans this 
fraction amounts to 𝛼𝛼(𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝑥𝑥)). The actual execution of the project takes place, however, only 
when the entrepreneur is able to raise enough money to cover the development cost 𝐾𝐾. As 
mentioned earlier, because successful campaigns are interpreted by outside investors positively 
we assume that if the goal of the campaign is met the entrepreneur can raise any remaining funds 
necessary to cover the development cost 𝐾𝐾 through an outside funding source at interest rate 𝑠𝑠. 
In addition, recall that with probability 𝑞𝑞 the product may still be produced even after a failed 
campaign. Given the equilibrium pledge strategy 𝐷𝐷 of each fan, the expected profit of the 
entrepreneur can be expressed by the following piecewise profit function: 
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = (3.3) 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝜔𝜔 + � [𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 + (𝛼𝛼(𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝑥𝑥) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∆ − 𝐾𝐾) − 𝑠𝑠(𝐾𝐾 − 𝛼𝛼(𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝑥𝑥))] 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷
𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 +� [𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 + (𝛼𝛼(𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝑥𝑥) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∆ − 𝐾𝐾)] 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑋𝑋�𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷
  if 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
𝜔𝜔 + � [𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 + (𝛼𝛼(𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝑥𝑥) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∆ − 𝐾𝐾)] 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑋𝑋�
𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷
 if 𝐹𝐹 ≥
𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
where 𝜔𝜔 = 𝑞𝑞 ∫ [𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 − (1 + 𝑠𝑠)𝐾𝐾] 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷0 . 
The expected profit expression depends on whether the campaign goal is set below or 
above 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼, which we refer to as the gross-cost of the project. The first term 𝜔𝜔 appears in the 
expected profits of the entrepreneur irrespective of whether the campaign goal is set below or 
above the gross-cost of the project. It measures the expected payoff of the entrepreneur when the 
campaign fails. In this case, if the lender is willing to make a loan to the entrepreneur (happens 
with probability 𝑞𝑞) the entrepreneur will cover the development cost by borrowing the entire 
funds from the lender at an interest rate 𝑠𝑠. She will earn, therefore, the difference between 
expected revenues 𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 and the overall cost of (1 + 𝑠𝑠)𝐾𝐾 of financing the project. 
The remaining terms depend on whether the entrepreneur chooses the campaign goal 
below or above the gross-cost of the project 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼. If the goal is chosen below the gross-cost two 
possibilities may arise. The first possibility is that the campaign is successful but insufficient 
funds are available to cover the entire cost of the project. In this case, the entrepreneur has to 
borrow the shortfall (𝐾𝐾 − 𝛼𝛼(𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝑥𝑥)) and pay the interest rate s on these funds. The second 
term of the expected profits when 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼 corresponds to this possibility. The second 
possibility is that the campaign has raised sufficient funds to cover the entire development cost, 
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in which case the entrepreneur does not need to borrow any additional funds. The third term of 
the expected profits when 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼  corresponds to this possibility. Note that the product will be 
produced as promised with probability 𝑝𝑝 irrespective of whether sufficient funds to cover the 
entire cost have been raised in the campaign, implying that the entrepreneur has to pay the funder 
reward in each of these two possibilities only when the product is indeed produced. When the 
goal is chosen above the gross-cost of the project, whenever the campaign is successful it also 
generates sufficient funds to cover the entire development cost. As a result, the entrepreneur does 
not need to borrow any additional funds in this case. The second term of the expected profits 
when 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼 corresponds to this event.    
The entrepreneur chooses the instruments ∆ and 𝐹𝐹 to maximize her expected profit in 
(3.3) subject to the constraint that the optimal pledge strategy of each strategic funder is given by 
(3.2). A higher campaign goal 𝐹𝐹 encourages fans to contribute more to the campaign in order to 
increase the likelihood of reaching the higher goal as well as extracting additional surplus from 
the fans. However, this higher goal decreases the probability of a successful campaign and thus 
the potential for the entrepreneur to earn profits by selling the product in the market.   
Similarly, a larger reward ∆ incentivizes fans to make more aggressive pledges but 
reduces the profit of the entrepreneur when she is able to produce the product. A larger ∆ may 
help the entrepreneur extract surplus from high valuation consumers because it induces the fans 
to contribute more to the campaign, however a larger ∆ can effectively decrease the realized 
price that fans must pay for the product because it results in a larger transfer of funds from the 
entrepreneur to the high valuation consumers. 
We first derive the optimal funder reward ∆ for a fixed value of 𝐹𝐹 and calculate the 
elicited pledge 𝐷𝐷∗ given the optimal funder reward ∆. (Both the funder reward ∆ and aggregate 
75 
pledges from fans 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ are fully characterized in Appendix B.) It is interesting that the 
expression for the optimal funder reward remains the same irrespective of whether the campaign 
goal is set above or below the gross-cost of the development. Because the funder reward has to 
be paid to fans if the product becomes available in either of these two cases, the entrepreneur 
chooses its value to be the same regardless of whether 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼 or 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄ . We report 
comparative statics for the optimal value of the funder reward ∆ in Proposition 3.1. 
Proposition 3.1. For a fixed value of 𝐹𝐹, the optimal value of the funder reward ∆: 
(i) Increases when the total surplus generated by the project (as measured by the difference
between the expected total willingness to pay of consumers and the development cost, 
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) − 𝐾𝐾) is bigger and when either the maximum level of random donations 𝑋𝑋� or the 
gap in valuations 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 are smaller. 
(ii) Increases when the campaign goal 𝐹𝐹 is raised and when the interest rate 𝑠𝑠 increases.
(iii) Increases with the sharing rule 𝛼𝛼.
When the project generates a larger surplus the entrepreneur is more highly motivated to 
execute the project, and therefore, offers a larger reward to fans in order to ensure that sufficient 
capital to cover the development cost becomes available. In this case, the entrepreneur has 
greater interest in raising enough capital to produce the product than extracting surplus from the 
high valuation consumers, which limits her ability to price discriminate (i.e., a larger ∆ reduces 
the effective price premium paid by the fans for the product, 𝐷𝐷 − 𝑝𝑝∆)).   
 In contrast, when the entrepreneur expects high levels of random donations, the relative 
importance of fans in generating capital declines, and the entrepreneur offers them a smaller 
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reward. Even though the entrepreneur offers high valuation consumers a smaller reward her 
ability to use crowdfunding to price discriminate is hindered because fans have a stronger 
incentive to free ride on contributions by others.  
Similarly, when the benefit that fans derive from the product (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) is higher, they are 
highly motivated as is, and the entrepreneur cuts the reward offered to fans who pledge. This 
again leads to favorable conditions for extracting consumer surplus from high valuation 
consumers, thus enhancing the entrepreneur’s ability to price discriminate.   
Raising the campaign goal requires the entrepreneur to raise the funder reward in order to 
provide extra incentives to fans to increase their contribution and ensure that the more 
demanding goal is met. This result demonstrates the two counteracting effects on the ability of 
the entrepreneur to extract surplus from fans when raising the campaign goal. From (3.2) raising 
the goal motivates fans to pledge more aggressively. However, given that it also reduces the 
likelihood that the more demanding goal can be met it requires the entrepreneur to reward high 
valuation consumers more generously in order to reduce the likelihood of a failed campaign.   
As the interest rate 𝑠𝑠 increases, the entrepreneur increases the reward because it becomes 
costlier to finance the project through loans. The entrepreneur is intent, therefore, on raising 
more funds in the crowdfunding campaign by providing extra rewards to fans who contribute. 
This result demonstrates that the need to finance the product weakens the ability of the 
entrepreneur to use crowdfunding as a device to successfully implement price discrimination 
between high and low valuation consumers.  
            The effect of the sharing rule 𝛼𝛼 on the funder reward is implied by the fact that when the 
entrepreneur is entitled to a bigger share of the product’s revenue she is more highly motivated to 
increase the likelihood that the project is executed. As a result, she offers fans a more generous 
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reward to ensure that they submit higher pledges. However, a higher 𝛼𝛼 means also that the 
entrepreneur can keep a larger share of each of the contributions made by high valuation 
consumers. Hence, in spite of the higher reward associated with a bigger value of 𝛼𝛼, surplus 
extraction might actually improve when 𝛼𝛼 increases (i.e., 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷 − 𝑝𝑝∆ might be bigger.)  
Having established the optimal funder reward as a function of 𝐹𝐹 as given in Proposition 
3.1, we now turn to the derivation of the optimal campaign goal 𝐹𝐹. We start by considering the 
region 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼. After substituting ∆ and 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗  back into the objective of the entrepreneur (3.3), 
we take the derivative of the entrepreneur’s expected profits when 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼 with respect to 𝐹𝐹 
and obtain: 
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋|𝐹𝐹≥𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹
= −(1−𝛼𝛼)[(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑞𝑞−(1−𝛼𝛼)𝐹𝐹+𝑋𝑋�]
𝑋𝑋�(2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼) = −  (1−𝛼𝛼)[𝑋𝑋�+𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷∗−𝐹𝐹]𝑋𝑋� < 0. (3.4)
The last inequality follows because 𝑋𝑋� + 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ − 𝐹𝐹 > 0 is necessary to ensure that there is a 
positive probability that the campaign is successful for some realization of the random variable 
𝑥𝑥. Proposition 3.2 is a direct result of the sign of (3.4). 
Proposition 3.4. The entrepreneur will never find it optimal to set the campaign goal 𝐹𝐹 above 
the gross-cost threshold 𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄ . 
Recall that 𝐹𝐹 and ∆ are substitutable instruments in affecting the pledge of a high 
valuation consumer in (3.2) because the equilibrium pledge depends on the sum of these two 
variables. However, raising the campaign goal in the region 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄  in order to motivate more 
aggressive pledge behavior may be risky for the entrepreneur because a higher goal reduces the 
probability of a successful campaign and the likelihood that the product is ever produced. Hence, 
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in this region the entrepreneur is more inclined to utilize the instrument ∆ to motivate higher 
pledges while keeping the campaign goal as low as possible (i.e., 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄ .) 
Next we consider the region 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄ . Designating by 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐹𝐹) the expected payoff of the 
entrepreneur as a function of the campaign goal, it is easy to see from the objective function of 
the entrepreneur in (3.3) that: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐹𝐹)|𝐹𝐹<𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
=  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐹𝐹)|𝐹𝐹≥𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
−  𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−𝐹𝐹�2
2𝑋𝑋�
 . (3.5) 
Taking the derivative of the right hand side of (3.5) with respect to F while using (3.4) yields that 
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋|𝐹𝐹<𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹
= −(1−𝛼𝛼)[(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑞𝑞−(1−𝛼𝛼)𝐹𝐹+𝑋𝑋�]
𝑋𝑋�(2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼) + 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾𝑋𝑋� �𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼 − 𝐹𝐹�. (3.6) 
Differentiating the right hand side of (3.5) with respect to 𝐹𝐹, once again, yields: 
𝜕𝜕2�𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋
𝐹𝐹<
𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
�
𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹2
= (1−𝛼𝛼)2
𝑋𝑋�(2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼) − 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾𝑋𝑋� . (3.7) 
This second order derivative of the profit function is negative if 𝑇𝑇 ≡ 2𝛼𝛼(1 + 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠) −
𝛼𝛼2(1 + 𝑠𝑠) − 1 > 0, in which case the objective of the entrepreneur is a concave function of 𝐹𝐹. 
This latter condition for concavity is very likely to be satisfied for reasonable values of the 
parameters of the model. For instance, if the sharing rule assumes a value of 𝛼𝛼 = 0.9 
(Kickstarter’s approximate payment including processing fees is between 8-10%) and the cost of 
borrowing is 𝑠𝑠 > 0.05 (for risky loans), then 𝑇𝑇 > 0 for all 𝑖𝑖 ≥ 1.  Assuming that concavity 
holds we can set the derivative in (3.5) equal to zero and solve for 𝐹𝐹 to obtain the solution: 
𝐹𝐹∗ = (2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾−(1−𝛼𝛼)[(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑞𝑞+𝑋𝑋�]
2𝛼𝛼(1+𝐾𝐾+𝑚𝑚𝐾𝐾)−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝐾𝐾)−1 . (3.8)
This solution should satisfy the constraint that 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ ≤ 𝐹𝐹∗ ≤ 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼 to ensure that it falls in the 
feasible region. The lower bound on 𝐹𝐹∗ is necessary to ensure that the probability of a successful 
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campaign does not exceed 1 and the upper bound is necessary given the result reported in 
Proposition 3.2.    
Proposition 3.3 
(i) The entrepreneur chooses the campaign goal 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹∗ at the interior of the region(𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗,𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄ ) :
If either the development cost of the product or the maximum level of random giving is
relatively high (when 𝐾𝐾 > 𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 or 𝑋𝑋� > 𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, where 𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≡
𝛼𝛼�(1−𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝑋𝑋��(2𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)−(1−𝛼𝛼)2𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ��[1−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾] and 𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾(1−𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(𝑞𝑞𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾+𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞−1)𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾(2𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)−(1−𝛼𝛼)2 ). 
(ii) The entrepreneur chooses the campaign goal 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗:
If either the development cost of the product or the maximum level of random giving is
relatively low (when 𝐾𝐾 < 𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 or 𝑋𝑋� < 𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿).  
(iii) The entrepreneur never chooses the campaign goal so that 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄ .
When the development cost 𝐾𝐾 is relatively high or when the maximum level of random 
donations 𝑋𝑋 is relatively high the entrepreneur chooses the campaign goal to be strictly smaller 
than 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼 and bigger than 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗, implying that the campaign may sometimes be unsuccessful (i.e., 
when 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ + 𝑥𝑥 < 𝐹𝐹 ) and even when it is successful the entrepreneur finances only part of the 
development cost with funds raised from the campaign and part with outside funding (i.e., when 
𝐹𝐹 < 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ + 𝑥𝑥 < 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼). In this situation, the entrepreneur is willing to risk an unsuccessful 
campaign in order to receive additional funds from the high valuation consumers that can enable 
her to save on capital costs. Further, by raising the campaign goal (i.e., setting it over 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗), she 
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can reduce the incidence of free riding by fans who may think their contributions are not needed 
for the campaign to be successful.  
When the development cost 𝐾𝐾 is very low or when the maximum level of random 
donations 𝑋𝑋 is relatively modest part (ii) of the Proposition states that the entrepreneur chooses F 
at the minimum feasible level to ensure that the campaign is always successful; specifically, 
because 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗,𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ + 𝑥𝑥 is always bigger than 𝐹𝐹. When 𝐾𝐾 is relatively small there is no need 
to raise a lot of funds given the low level of development cost. As a result, the entrepreneur does 
not have to raise the goal above the minimum in order to motivate fans to raise their pledges. 
Similarly, when 𝑋𝑋� is relatively small, fans have reduced incentives to “free ride” on random 
donations, given that these donations are relatively small. As a result, high valuation consumers 
are motivated to submit high pledges even when the goal is set at the lowest possible level.  
 According to part (iii) of the Proposition the entrepreneur does not choose the goal so 
high to ensure that she never utilizes the outside funding source. Because of the availability of 
this source the entrepreneur is never so desperate to guarantee that the entire amount of the 
development cost is raised in the campaign. If we relaxed the assumption that outside funding is 
always available following a successful campaign it would be possible that the goal of the 
campaign would be set at the level of the gross cost requirement. However, according to 
Proposition 3.2 it would never exceed this level. (Related analysis and proof are available from 
the authors upon request.)  A direct inspection of the expression derived for 𝐹𝐹∗ in (3.8) yields the 
comparative statics reported in Corollary 3.1. 
Corollary 3.1. When 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ < 𝐹𝐹∗ <  𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄  , the campaign goal is an increasing function of 
𝐾𝐾, 𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑞𝑞 and it is a decreasing function of 𝑋𝑋�,𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿, 𝑝𝑝, and 𝛼𝛼. 
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  When more funds are required to execute the project (higher 𝐾𝐾) or when it becomes 
more expensive to finance the development cost with outside funding (higher 𝑠𝑠), the 
entrepreneur raises the goal in order to more highly motivate the high valuation consumers and 
obtain a bigger share of the development cost from the crowdfunding campaign. When the 
probability 𝑞𝑞  of outside funds becoming available even after a failed campaign is higher the 
entrepreneur is less concerned about the consequences of raising the campaign goal. Even if this 
higher goal is not met outside funds are still likely to be available in this case. When the 
importance of fans to the entrepreneur declines because the random donations are more 
significant (𝑋𝑋 is bigger) the entrepreneur reduces the campaign goal because motivating fans is 
less important to her in this case. When the total consumer surplus is bigger the entrepreneur 
increases the funder reward ∆ in order to generate higher pledges from high valuation consumers. 
Given that ∆ and F are substitute instruments in motivating the fans the entrepreneur can reduce 
the level of the campaign goal when 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 increases or when the probability 𝑝𝑝 that a funded 
campaign turns into a finished product increases. When the entrepreneur obtains a bigger share 
of the product’s revenue (when 𝛼𝛼 is bigger) she is more determined for the campaign to be 
successful. She reduces, therefore, the campaign goal in order to increase the likelihood that the 
lower goal is reached. 
3.3.3 Price Discrimination with Crowdfunding 
We have argued that crowdfunding may play a dual role for the entrepreneur.  While serving the 
basic function of raising funds to finance the new venture it may also serve as an effective price 
discrimination device if it can facilitate extraction of additional surplus from high valuation 
consumers in comparison to uniform pricing. Enhanced surplus extraction arises at the 
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equilibrium if the expected funder reward 𝑝𝑝∆ falls short of the share of the equilibrium pledge of 
each fan that the entrepreneur can retain, namely 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷∗.  However, because of her need to raise 
capital it is unclear whether the entrepreneur can necessarily extract extra surplus from high 
valuation consumers. For instance, the team behind Coolest Cooler (a high tech cooler) promised 
to give backers who contributed $165 their very own Coolest Cooler which had an estimated 
market price of $300 (Grepper 2015).  In Proposition 3.4 we assume that the conditions 
supporting an interior solution for 𝐹𝐹 are valid (i.e., at 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ < 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹∗ < 𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄ ), and we investigate 
circumstances under which enhanced consumer surplus extraction is possible, namely the share 
that the entrepreneur keeps from a contribution is bigger than the reward she must pay to a fan, 
in case the project is successfully completed (𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷∗ > 𝑝𝑝∆.) 
Proposition 3.4. The entrepreneur can extract additional surplus from fans of the product in 
comparison to uniform pricing provided that: 
𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑞𝑞)(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) > 𝐾𝐾{𝛼𝛼[(1−𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)+𝑋𝑋�]−𝐾𝐾[1−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾]}[2𝛼𝛼(1+𝐾𝐾+𝑚𝑚𝐾𝐾)−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝐾𝐾)−1] , (3.9) 
where the right hand side of (3.9) is strictly positive. 
The fact that the right hand side of (3.9) is positive implies that for crowdfunding to 
support price discrimination the extent of heterogeneity in the population, as measured by the 
gap in valuations (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) has to exceed a certain threshold. This extent of heterogeneity 
determines the high valuation consumer’s net consumption benefit from submitting a pledge. 
Because another important objective of the campaign besides surplus extraction is to raise funds, 
fans of the project have to be especially enthusiastic about the product to enable the entrepreneur 
to extract additional surplus from them in comparison to uniform pricing. 
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Condition (3.9) in Proposition 3.4 is more likely to hold the bigger the extent of 
heterogeneity in the consumers’ valuations of the product (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿), the smaller the maximum 
level of random donations (𝑋𝑋�), and the smaller the total surplus (𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿). When the gap (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) is relatively big or when (𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) is relatively small, the entrepreneur provides a 
modest funder reward to fans because her negotiating position relative to that of fans improves. 
When the gap (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) is relatively big, fans are motivated anyhow to submit high pledges even 
when the funder reward is relatively modest. Similarly, when (𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) is small, the 
entrepreneur has reduced incentives to motivate fans to submit high pledges, and she offers them, 
therefore, a smaller reward. When random donations are relatively small (𝑋𝑋 is relatively small), 
fans have reduced incentives to “free ride” on funding by others, and therefore, are more willing 
to contribute to the campaign. 
 Note that the values of 𝐾𝐾 or 𝑠𝑠 have an ambiguous effect on the ability of the entrepreneur 
to extract additional surplus from fans because the right hand side of (3.9) may increase or 
decrease with 𝐾𝐾 or with 𝑠𝑠. To explain the ambiguity, consider, for instance, an increase in the 
development cost 𝐾𝐾. On the one hand, when 𝐾𝐾 increases, the net value of the project declines 
and the entrepreneur is less eager, therefore, to execute the project. On the other hand, a bigger 
value of 𝐾𝐾 implies that the entrepreneur is more eager to raise funds in order to save on financing 
costs. In particular, when financing cost 𝑠𝑠 is sufficiently high so that [1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠] < 0, as 𝐾𝐾 
increases it becomes more difficult for the entrepreneur to extract additional surplus from fans of 
the product because the right hand side of (3.9) increases. The argument is reversed if 𝑠𝑠 is 
sufficiently small. 
The result reported in Proposition 3.4 vividly illustrates the difference between 
crowdfunding and traditional vehicles that have been suggested in the literature in order to 
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implement price discrimination. In the literature on quality differentiation, for instance, the 
success of vendors to segment the market and practice price discrimination primarily depends on 
the extent of heterogeneity in the consumer population (the spread 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 in our model). With 
crowdfunding, while the success of price discrimination still depends on the extent of 
heterogeneity among consumers, it also depends on a variety of other variables. These variables 
determine how eager the entrepreneur is to obtain funding from the campaign to finance the 
project in comparison to how eager fans are to ensure that the product becomes a reality. 
Successful price discrimination between high and low valuation consumers is more likely with 
crowdfunding if fans are relatively more eager for the product to become available than the 
entrepreneur is about covering most development costs from the campaign. 
One example in which price discrimination was likely achieved was the campaign for the 
movie Blue Mountain State. In the campaign, the project creator offered funders a digital 
download of the movie as well as some small affiliated gifts in exchange for a contribution equal 
to or higher than $40. Upon release, the movie retailed at a price of $13. The project creator was 
likely able to price discriminate in this case because the movie was based upon a cult television 
series with a niche, yet eager fan base. On the other hand, the campaign for the Pono Music 
Player (a high-resolution portable digital music player) offered the music player in exchange for 
a $300 contribution (PonoMusic Team 2015). Because the music player would later go on to 
retail at $399, the entrepreneur probably had to entice the fans of the product to contribute by 
giving them a generous reward. This was possibly the case because the music player had high 
development costs and high financing costs given the risk facing startups in the digital music 
market that is dominated by big established companies such as Apple and Sony. It was also 
likely that fans of the product had only a marginally higher valuation for the product than the 
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bulk of the market that the Pono Music Player would eventually serve. In addition, because 
award-winning musician Neil Young provided the vision behind the campaign, it is likely that 
the fans anticipated to free ride on a large group of followers of the musician (in our model a big 
population of random funders). 
3.3.4 Maximization of Platform 
We provide an extension to our previous analysis by allowing the platform to strategically set the 
sharing rule 𝛼𝛼 prior to the entrepreneur’s decision to set her campaign instruments. Therefore, 
the platform sets the sharing rule while anticipating how such a choice affects the entrepreneur’s 
and funder’s strategies. Recall that 𝛼𝛼 denotes the fraction of the contributions that the 
entrepreneur retains and (1 − 𝛼𝛼) is the fraction of the contributions that the platform keeps for 
providing the intermediation services of bringing the entrepreneur and funders together. Unlike 
the entrepreneur’s expected profit, the functional form of the platform’s expected profit is 
independent of whether the campaign goal is set above or below the gross-cost threshold. The 
platform’s profit accrues only from its share of the campaign contributions, and therefore, its 
profit is positive only when the crowdfunding campaign is successful. The platform does not 
derive any additional profit from the actual execution of the project. In the event of an 
unsuccessful campaign, the contributions are returned to the funders and the platform receives no 
compensation. 
Assuming that an interior solution for 𝐹𝐹 exists, in the first stage the platform chooses the 
sharing rule 𝛼𝛼 to maximize its profits which are given by the expression: 
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 = ∫ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ + 𝑥𝑥) 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑋𝑋�𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷∗ =  (1 − 𝛼𝛼) �(𝑋𝑋�+𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷∗)2−𝐹𝐹∗22𝑋𝑋 �,    (3.10)
where 𝐹𝐹∗ is given by (3.8).  
Objective (3.10) illustrates the counteracting forces facing the platform when choosing 𝛼𝛼. 
A bigger value of 𝛼𝛼 reduces the platform’s share of the contributions, thus reducing the term that 
multiplies the expression in the brackets. However, a bigger value of 𝛼𝛼 can increase the value of 
the bracketed expression for two reasons. First, when 𝛼𝛼 increases the goal of the campaign may 
decline, and therefore, the likelihood of a successful campaign increases. Second, when 𝛼𝛼 
increases the entrepreneur may increase the funder reward thus leading to higher contributions at 
the equilibrium. 
Finding an analytical solution for the maximization given by (3.10) is difficult. In Table 
3.1 we conduct numerical calculations to characterize the optimal choice of the sharing rule by 
the platform. The Table also contains information about the manner in which the campaign goal 
selected by the entrepreneur depends on the sharing rule. Note that the goal declines when 𝛼𝛼 
increases, and as predicted in Proposition 3.3, it is always strictly less than the gross-cost of the 
project 𝐾𝐾/𝛼𝛼. 
The optimal value of 𝛼𝛼∗ increases as 𝑋𝑋� declines and K increases. When 𝑋𝑋 declines a 
bigger portion of the funds raised in the campaign stems from strategic funders. Strategic funders 
become relatively more important, and the platform increases 𝛼𝛼∗ in order to provide higher 
powered incentives to the entrepreneur to raise the funder reward. This is also the case when 𝐾𝐾 is 
bigger because the entrepreneur is less motivated in this case, unless the platform increases her 
share of the funds raised in the campaign. 
             It is noteworthy that the sharing rule offered by most crowdfunding platforms is much 
more generous to the entrepreneur than the sharing rule we obtain in Table 3.1. Kickstarter, for 
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instance, offers entrepreneurs in excess of 90% of the funds raised. The reason Kickstarter offers 
entrepreneurs a much higher share of the campaign contributions than the one we derive in Table 
3.1 may be related to the fact that Kickstarter faces competition from other platforms, thus 
forcing it to offer a more generous share to the entrepreneur. In our model, the crowdfunding 
platform acts as a monopolist, and therefore, can secure a better share for itself. It is interesting, 
though, that in spite of this monopoly position in our formulation the platform is still forced to 
offer the entrepreneur a sizable share (around 50%) of the contributions in order to incentivize 
her to set large rewards to funders. 
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Table 3.1: Optimal Choice of Sharing Rule 𝛂𝛂 
For this numerical analysis, the following parameters are fixed:  𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 = 2200, 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 = 200, 𝑖𝑖 =100, 𝑚𝑚 = 1000, 𝑠𝑠 = 0.1, 𝑞𝑞 = 0.5, and 𝑝𝑝 = 1. Note that these parameters satisfy the conditions 
for 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹∗ in Proposition 3.3. For small values of 𝛼𝛼, there is no equilibrium for the 
entrepreneur’s choice of F as either the condition 𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄ > 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 or 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝑋𝑋 > 𝐾𝐾 𝛼𝛼⁄  is not satisfied. 
𝛼𝛼∗ is the value of 𝛼𝛼 that maximizes the platform’s profits. The values for 𝐹𝐹∗ in the table are in 
thousands. 
𝜶𝜶 𝑲𝑲 = 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎,𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝑲𝑲 = 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎,𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 
𝑿𝑿 = 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝑿𝑿 = 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝑿𝑿 = 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝑿𝑿 = 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 
𝑭𝑭∗ Platform 
Profits 
𝑭𝑭∗ Platform 
Profits 
𝑭𝑭∗ Platform 
Profits 
𝑭𝑭∗ Platform 
Profits 0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.15 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.20 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.25 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.30 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.35 -- -- 282.9 568 -- -- 313.7 134 0.40 248.1 1932 244.9 993 274.6 471 271.5 770 0.45 218.9 3264 216.4 1135 242.2 2466 239.7 1030 0.50 196.2 3748 194.2 1138 216.9 3342 214.9 1100 0.55 178 3778 176.3 1071 196.7 3606 195 1071 0.60 163 3561 161.7 968 180.1 3527 178.7 989 0.65 150.6 3208 149.5 848 166.2 3251 165.2 879 0.70 140 2782 139.2 721 154.5 2864 153.6 755 0.75 131 2321 130.3 593 144.4 2416 143.8 625 0.80 123.1 1846 122.6 466 135.7 1939 135.2 495 0.85 116.3 1371 115.9 343 128.1 1449 127.7 366 0.90 110.2 902 110 224 121.3 959 121.1 240 0.95 104.8 444 104.7 110 115.4 474 115.3 118 
𝛼𝛼∗ = .53 𝛼𝛼∗ = .47    𝛼𝛼∗ =.56 𝛼𝛼∗ = .50 
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3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Crowdfunding is traditionally used by entrepreneurs to raise funds necessary to develop and 
produce a product. Such funds allow the entrepreneurs to save on capital costs. In this research 
we discuss how this capital raising role affects another possible role for crowdfunding. High 
valuation consumers are inherently motivated to contribute to a crowdfunding campaign because 
they realize that in order for the product to become a reality the entrepreneur must raise sufficient 
funds to cover the development costs. When the early pledges of such high valuation consumers 
in the campaign exceed the expected reward the entrepreneur promises to pay them when the 
project is complete, consumers with high valuation for the product effectively pay a higher price 
for it than those having lower valuations. Hence, crowdfunding can also be used as a price 
discrimination device to extract a larger amount of surplus from consumers. 
 We show that an entrepreneur’s ability to implement such price discrimination is higher, 
when her need to raise funds through the crowdfunding campaign is less pronounced. 
Specifically, we show that enhanced surplus extraction through price discrimination is feasible 
when the total surplus that the project generates is relatively small, when the extent of 
heterogeneity in the consumer population is relatively high, and when the pool of potential 
contributors in the campaign is relatively small. In contrast, when both the development and the 
financing costs from traditional funding sources are relatively high the capacity of crowdfunding 
to serve as a price discrimination device is hampered. 
90 
Our analysis also helps us to derive interesting insights regarding the entrepreneur’s 
choice of the funding goal. We find that the entrepreneur will always set the campaign goal 
below the level that allows her to cover the development cost of the product. As a result, the 
entrepreneur chooses to sometimes procure a portion of the development costs via traditional 
funding (i.e., a loan from the bank). While raising the campaign goal can help the entrepreneur to 
motivate more aggressive pledge behavior it also exposes her to the risk of a failed campaign 
when funds are insufficient to meet the more demanding goal. Given that the entrepreneur can 
also use the funder reward as an instrument to motivate fans of the product to contribute and 
given that a traditional outside funding source is available to the entrepreneur, she chooses the 
goal to be strictly lower than the level that allows her to cover the entire development cost. Our 
results also show that the entrepreneur may sometimes choose to risk an unsuccessful campaign 
in order to motivate more aggressive pledge behavior from fans. Higher pledges allow the 
entrepreneur to save on capital costs and to also support improved price discrimination. Further, 
by setting the campaign goal at a higher level she can reduce the incidence of free riding of fans 
who may think their contributions are not needed for the campaign to be successful.  
 We limit our current research to platforms that choose to return the contributions to 
funders when the campaign goal is not reached. While this refund rule is practiced by some of 
the most prominent crowdfunding platforms, including Kickstarter, other crowdfunding 
platforms follow modified refund rules. For instance, Indiegogo gives the entrepreneur an option 
to keep a share of the contributions even if the campaign goal is not reached. This refund rule 
(which Indiegogo calls “flexible funding”) raises the risk of fans losing their contributions 
without receiving any pecuniary benefits in return. However, unlike Kickstarter, Indiegogo is 
also utilized for charity projects and this rule may be better suited for these types of projects that 
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have no associated development costs. Further research is necessary to address the implications 
of using different refund rules when the goal of the campaign is not met. 
We model the outside funding source available to the entrepreneur in the form of a 
lender. We could have alternatively modelled it as a venture capitalist that obtains an equity 
share in return for the funds invested in the company. Whereas interest payment is the cost of 
borrowing from the bank in our formulation, the loss of equity is the cost of raising funds from a 
venture capitalist. In addition, in our framework, the lender’s interest rate is determined 
exogenously and is independent of the contributions raised in the crowdfunding campaign. 
However, it is possible that the lender offers a lower interest rate to entrepreneurs who are able to 
raise a bigger share of the required capital through the crowdfunding campaign, possibly because 
the larger contributions serve as a signal of a project that is less risky to finance. Incorporating 
such considerations may be worthwhile extensions of our current investigation. 
In our model we do not allow for any transmission of information between the entrepreneur and 
the funders or communication amongst the fans themselves. Fans may be self-incentivized to tell 
others about a project in order to encourage more contributions, so that the campaign goal is 
reached. Accounting for these social effects may be an interesting extension to the present study. 
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4.0 SETTING ARTIST ROYALTIES ON MUSIC STREAMING PLATFORMS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Digital streaming platforms are rapidly changing the way individuals consume digital content. 
These streaming platforms provide a new way for content producers to reach consumers and 
have become significant players in various industries: music (Spotify, Apple Music, TIDAL), 
movie and television (Hulu, Netflix, Amazon Prime), book and magazine (Kindle Unlimited) 
and video game (Steam, GeForce NOW). Digital streaming platforms allow subscribers to access 
and stream a variety of content hosted by the platform for a flat fee as opposed to traditional 
retail channels which require consumers to buy individual units of content. These platforms must 
create a value proposition for content producers and consumers to attract both user groups to 
their platform. Like traditional platforms, users accessing digital streaming platforms gain from 
cross-network benefits. The more subscribers using a streaming platform, the more revenue the 
platform generates to be shared via royalties with content producers. Likewise, the more content 
producers on a platform, the more valuable the platform is for consumers because it provides 
subscribers with variety. 
The focus of this paper is on digital streaming platforms (for convenience we will also 
refer to streaming platforms as “streamers”) in the music industry. While streaming platforms 
continue to grow in popularity and use, skeptics argue that streamers are decreasing consumers’ 
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willingness-to-pay for content and question whether it is possible for content producers to be 
fairly compensated by the streamer. We investigate conditions for which it may be profitable for 
an artist18 to distribute her music through a streamer. We provide insight regarding the royalty 
that the streamer must set if it wants to lure artists to its platform. We explore the streamer’s 
decision to potentially exclude artists with different valuations. Our research also investigates 
competition between a digital store selling copies of artists’ music and the streaming platform 
that offers a variety of artists’ music for its subscribers to stream. 
Digital streaming platforms are currently in a stage of rapid growth. As of March 2016, 
Spotify claims to have over 30 million users who pay to subscribe to Spotify’s premium service. 
On the other side of the market, Spotify offers over 30 million songs and has paid over $3 billion 
in revenues to artists and labels (Spotify 2016a). In 2015, for first time in the United States, 
streaming revenues surpassed those of digital downloads and was the largest component of 
industry revenues (Friedlander 2016). Apple Music, another streaming platform that debuted in 
June 2015 had already amassed over 10 million paid subscribers as of January 2016 (Garrahan 
and Bradshaw 2016). 
Because streaming platforms are relatively new, artists have not exactly figured out how 
these platforms fit into their business models. Some artists have come out in support of such 
services, while others have launched attacks against these streamers for devaluing their music. 
Bono, lead singer of Grammy award winning and diamond certified rock band U2, supported 
Spotify by saying “Spotify are giving up 70 percent of all their revenues to rights owners” and 
that “the greatest way you serve your songs is to get them heard” (Grow 2014). On the other 
hand, pop sensation Taylor Swift refused to distribute her music through Spotify, criticizing the 
                                                          
18 For the sake of convenience, we refer to these decision makers as artists. In reality, rights holders are not always 
the artists, and when this is the case, the rights holders make content distribution decisions. 
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platform with the following comment: “Everybody's complaining about how music sales are 
shrinking, but nobody's changing the way they're doing things. They keep running towards 
streaming, which is, for the most part, what has been shrinking the numbers of paid album 
sales”19 (Dickey 2016). Thom Yorke, lead singer of the Grammy winning and platinum certified 
alternative rock band Radiohead, casts his line in the debate and seemingly sides with Taylor 
Swift: “I feel like we as musicians need to fight the Spotify thing” (Dredge 2013). Other artists 
that have vocally refused to stream all or some of their content through streaming platforms 
include Prince, Adele, Garth Brooks, the Black Keys, Bob Seger, King Crimson, and the 
Traveling Wilburys. 
In this research, we analyze the revenue sharing model used by Spotify and Apple Music 
to determine exactly what percentage of revenue a streaming platform needs to share with artists 
to entice artists of varying valuations to stream their music through the platform. Artists who 
stream their music through a streamer receive compensation determined by a simple formula. 
First, the streamer keeps a portion of its revenue for its service in bringing together consumers 
and artists. The remaining revenue is then shared with artists on the streaming platform. Each 
individual artist’s earnings from streaming her music on the platform is ultimately determined by 
her individual streaming share (how her streams on the platform compare to other artists’ streams 
on the platform).20 
We construct an analytical model to capture competition between a digital store (retailer) 
and streaming platform. An artist must decide whether to stream her music on the streaming 
platform and sell her music to consumers through the store or to only sell her music to 
consumers through the store. Each artist has her own fan base consisting of consumers who, due 
19 It is worth noting that Taylor Swift has since distributed her music through Apple Music. 
20 For a more in depth look at how Spotify pays artists, see Spotify (2016b) 
95 
to budgetary constraints, must choose whether to buy their preferred artist’s music from the store 
or subscribe to the streamer and gain access to the variety offered by the streamer (and 
potentially their preferred artist’s music). If an artist chooses to stream her music through the 
streamer, she receives a share of the streamer’s revenue based upon the established royalty and 
her streaming share. When an artist streams her music through the streamer she risks 
cannibalizing sales of her content through the store. Therefore, to entice artists to the streamer, 
the streaming platform must set an appropriate royalty (how much of its revenue it will share 
with artists) to ensure that an artist’s expected profit from streaming music through the streamer 
exceeds her expected profit from withholding music from the streaming platform. 
We also distinguish between high valuation and low valuation artists. High valuation 
artists (determined by the benefit that their fan base derives from consuming their music) expect 
a larger demand for music purchases before joining the streamer and thus risk cannibalizing 
more of their sales by streaming their music. Because of this, the streamer may need to increase 
her offered royalty to entice high valuation artists to the platform. Therefore, streaming platforms 
may instead find it beneficial to only curate music from low valuation artists. We characterize 
conditions for which this is more likely to be true. 
However, because having more artists on the streaming platform increases its variety and 
makes the streamer more valuable for consumers (and thus attracts more consumers to the 
platform), a streaming platform may be able to offer a lower royalty when it hosts content from 
both high valuation and low valuation artists. In this scenario, the streamer will curate its 
selection to include music from both high valuation and low valuation artists because it can sell 
more subscriptions at a higher price and retain more of its revenue. 
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Our study contributes to several streams of research in the marketing and economics 
literature. The first is the literature on channel competition (for example, see Coughlan 1985). 
More specifically, we model channel competition for a digital product akin to Balasubramanian 
et al. (2015). Our model accounts for horizontal channel competition between a retailer (digital 
store) and streaming platform. Channel competition of this sort has been studied in Cattani et al. 
(2006) wherein the authors model competition between a producer selling her content directly to 
consumers and a retailer. In our model, artists do not sell their music directly to consumers but 
through a digital store. Given the determined royalty, artists in our study must first decide 
whether or not to stream their music through the streamer, which increases the value of the 
platform and cannibalizes sales of her music in the store. 
Our research also contributes to the literature on platforms. Platform competition has 
been an increasingly studied area in the marketing and economics literature (see Rochet and 
Tirole 2003; Hagiu 2009; Gal-Or et al. 2012). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first 
to investigate competition between a service offered by a platform (with whom a producer could 
or could not be using to enhance her own profits) and a retailer (who sells the producer’s product 
to consumers). By offering her product through the platform, a producer makes the platform 
more desirable to consumers. We also add to the literature by studying digital streaming 
platforms that share revenue with artists who use the platform. We do not believe that any prior 
research on platforms has studied revenue sharing platforms. However, Dana Jr. and Spier 
(2001) investigates revenue sharing in the video rental agency between a retailer and its 
suppliers. Unlike the royalties in our study, they consider an industry in which producers are paid 
an upfront fee for content and then given a share of the revenue. They also do not model the 
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supplier’s decision to distribute content through the retailer and the competitive effects from 
doing so. 
In digital content markets, streaming platforms effectively curate a content bundle to 
which they provide their subscribers access. A content producer must choose whether or not to 
add her content to the bundle and enhance the bundle’s position against her own content. (See 
Venkatesh and Mahajan (2009) for a review of the literature on bundling.) One such paper that 
specifically considers the bundling of digital goods is Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000). In their 
study they investigate competition between two bundlers and show that large bundles may 
provide significant advantage in obtaining upstream content. They limit their focus to pure 
bundling strategies in which a supplier can either sell the product or bundle the product. In our 
research, we investigate an environment more akin to mixed bundling; specifically, how 
licensing content through a streaming platform (bundler) impacts competition between the 
streaming platform (bundler) and a store that sells the content. In an article that studies 
competition between bundlers and individual content producers, Nalebluff (2000) argues that 
bundles may have competitive advantage over component counterparts. In his analysis, the 
component counterparts are owned by different producers and are substitutes to the components 
in the bundle. In our model, while the components serve as substitutes to the bundle, a producer 
must first decide if she will license her component to the bundle for consumers to access. This is 
what happens in the music industry when an artist (the producer) chooses whether she should 
stream her music (the component) through the streamer (the bundle) or only sell it in the store. 
Research on digital streaming platforms is rather nascent. An empirical working paper by 
Wlömert and Papies (2016) provides evidence that paid subscription based streaming platforms 
in the music industry (specifically Spotify) may enhance revenues for artists. A working paper 
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by Aguiar and Waldfogel (2015) further proposes that Spotify may stimulate music sales. The 
authors show that 137 streams appear to reduce the sale of one track by 1 unit on average. 
However, after considering royalties in the industry, the revenue generated from the 137 streams 
should exceed the revenue lost from the cannibalized sale. Our research expands upon these 
empirical results in digital content markets and provides theoretical insight into why distributing 
content through streaming platforms may be profitable for artists. However, we also show that 
dependent upon the royalty set by the platform, high valuation artists may not be able to enhance 
their profits through streaming because they have a larger market to cannibalize when they 
stream their music through the platform. 
In the next section we describe the model. We proceed with our analysis and discuss the 
results. Finally in the conclusion, we recap the main results and discuss potential extensions that 
we plan to consider in the future. 
4.2 MODEL 
We model an environment comparable to the digital music industry in which competition exists 
between a streaming platform and a store that sells music downloads. As such, when a copy of 
the music is sold, it is sold through a digital music store (retailer) and not directly by the artist. 
Indeed, this appears to hold true in the digital music industry in which Apple’s iTunes is 
responsible for the majority of digital music sales (Crupnick 2015). Analysts have also been 
quick to blame the decline in digital sales at such stores to the rise in digital streaming platforms, 
thus our focus on competition between the streaming platform and the store. 
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The store is responsible for setting a single price at which she sells all music downloads, 
regardless of the artist. This assumption is based on the fact that iTunes sells all songs at standard 
prices.21 We denote this store price 𝑝𝑝. Similarly, the streaming platform is in charge of setting a 
subscription fee 𝑠𝑠. Consumers who pay this subscription fee have access to all music streamed 
by the platform. 
 We model a continuum of artists in the market, each with their own fan base. Each fan 
base is a continuum of consumers who individually decide whether to purchase their preferred 
artist’s music from the store at price 𝑝𝑝 or subscribe to the streaming platform for fee 𝑠𝑠 and stream 
the music available. We assume that all consumers have a limited budget to spend on 
entertainment and as such cannot purchase music from the store and simultaneously subscribe to 
the streamer. This ensures an environment in which the artist risks cannibalizing sales of her 
music when she streams her music through the streaming platform. 
 Each artist’s fan base is distributed uniformly along the unit interval (from [0,1] ). A 
fan’s location on this interval, denoted by 𝑥𝑥, determines her innate preference for either 
streaming the music offered by the platform or purchasing (and owning a copy of22) her 
preferred artist’s music from the store. We set the location of the streaming platform to 0 and the 
location of the store to 1 and assume consumers incur a linear transportation cost 𝑡𝑡. Therefore, a 
fan at location 𝑥𝑥 incurs a cost 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 from subscribing to the streaming platform or a cost 𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑥𝑥) 
from purchasing music from the store. The transportation cost 𝑡𝑡 is a parameter that captures the 
                                                          
21 Artists do not have the option to set their own price on iTunes but must sell at one of three prices ($0.99 is the 
most common pricing tier for songs. $0.69 is reserved for classic songs. $1.29 is the price for new releases). 
22 There are benefits from buying content as opposed to streaming it. For one, consumers who buy music have the 
ability to burn the music to a compact disc and listen to it while off line. Streaming is more akin to leasing the 
content. 
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intensity of consumer preferences and as such is a measure of competition in the market. When 𝑡𝑡 
increases, a consumer’s preference for either the streaming platform or the store intensifies. 
An artist has the choice of streaming her music on the streaming platform and selling her 
music through the store or only selling her music through the store (withholding her music from 
the streamer).23 There are two types of artists. A type 𝑖𝑖 artist provides her fans with consumption 
benefit 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, where 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿}, such that 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 > 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿. Therefore, fans of 𝐻𝐻 (high) type (valuation) 
artists value the music from their preferred artists more than fans of 𝐿𝐿 (low) type (valuation) 
artists and thus have a higher reservation price for music, all else equal. This also means that in 
assuming a standard price for all music, there is more demand to buy the high valuation artist’s 
music from the store than there is to buy the low valuation artist’s music.24 
There is a continuum of each type of artist with mass 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖. Having a continuum of artists 
prevents any single artist’s decision to join the platform from having an effect on the store’s and 
streaming platform’s decisions to set prices. Indeed, prices are fairly sticky and there are over 26 
million songs available for purchase in the iTunes store. While data on the number of artists in 
the music industry is not readily available, with over 26 million songs it is sensible that no single 
artist’s decision to join the streaming platform will impact prices. We later restrict 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 = 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 =1 2⁄  to reduce the number of parameters in the model. This allows us to focus on the difference 
in valuations across types as opposed to the mass of each type. With this restriction we can 
interpret the mass of each type as the percentage of artists in the market that belong to a type. 
23 Artists do not make a decision on whether or not to sell their content from the platform. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are not any artists who stream their music but refrain from selling it. 
24 We use these differences in reservation price to make distinction regarding the artist’s popularity. However, one 
could also consider more popular artists having a larger density of fans. For the sake of this analysis, we only 
consider popularity as a difference in reservation price. Future research may investigate differences in sizes of fan 
bases. 
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Figure 4.1 depicts the market when there is a continuum of artists and each artist has its own fan 
base. 
Figure 4.1. Depiction of Continuum of Fan Base for Each Artist 
Streaming platforms provide value by offering variety and curating content. The variety 
benefit that a consumer receives from subscribing to the streamer is 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜. Because a streamer’s 
value depends upon the amount of content available to stream on platform, we assume that this 
benefit is weighted by mass of artists served by the platform. Therefore, if the streamer hosts 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 
high valuation artists and 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 low valuation artists, the platform provides benefit (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 
to consumers. On the other hand if the platform chooses to only host low (high) valuation artists, 
then it provides benefit 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜) to consumers. When we restrict 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 = 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 = 1 2⁄  and the 
platform hosts music from both types, it offers variety benefit 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜. Therefore, it is sensible to 
assume 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 > 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 > 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 because the variety benefit that the platform provides when hosting music 
from many artists (in fact, every other artist in the market) should exceed the value a consumer 
receives from the purchase of a single artist’s music. Finally, because there is a continuum of 
1 00
𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻
1 00
𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿
Fan base of single 
high valuation artist 
Fan base of single low 
valuation artist 
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artists on the platform, any single artist’s decision to join the platform has no impact on the 
variety benefit. 
A consumer’s total benefit from subscribing to the streaming platform depends upon 
whether or not the consumer’s preferred artist streams music through the streamer. When an 𝑖𝑖 
type artist streams her music, her fans receive benefit 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 in addition to the variety benefit from 
subscribing to the streamer, such that 𝛼𝛼 < 1. Fans subscribing to the streamer not only get the 
variety benefit from the curated content, but also the benefit from streaming their preferred 
artist’s music. The benefit from streaming their preferred artist’s music is reduced by 𝛼𝛼 for 
several reasons. First, the fan does not own a copy of the music when she chooses to stream it; 
when she subscribes to the streaming platform it is as if she leases the music. However, fans who 
buy music through a store receive a digital copy of the content to own.25 As well, streaming 
platforms often require the consumer to be connected to the Internet to access the content, and 
the stream may be interrupted by a dropped connection. Fans who buy music from the store are 
able to take a copy with them off line. Finally, the quality of the streamed music is determined by 
the Internet connection, and may sometimes be of lower quality than the download. 
Given the framework aforementioned, the following expression represents the utility of a 
consumer located at 𝑥𝑥 when she buys her type 𝑖𝑖 preferred artist’s music from the store: 
𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥, 𝑖𝑖) = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑥𝑥). 
A fan who buys her preferred artist’s music from the store receives benefit 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, incurs 
transportation cost 𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑥𝑥), and pays store price 𝑝𝑝. The utility of a fan located at 𝑥𝑥 when she 
subscribes to the streamer depends upon whether or not her preferred artist is on the streamer and 
25 Certain rights are bestowed upon consumers who purchase digital content. For instance, the consumer does not 
need to continue to pay for the right to access the content. Additionally, she may burn the content to a compact disc. 
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the mass of artists on the streaming platform. We summarize the streaming utility of a fan 
located at 𝑥𝑥 with a type 𝑖𝑖 preferred artist in Figure 4.2. 
Is the preferred artist’s 
music on the streamer? 
What types of artists are on 
the streamer? 
Streaming utility for fan 
located at 𝒙𝒙 with type 𝒊𝒊 
preferred artist:  𝒖𝒖(𝒙𝒙, 𝒊𝒊) = 
Yes Both types 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 
No Both types (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 
Yes Only low type 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 
No Only low type 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 
Yes Only high type 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 
No Only high type 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 
Figure 4.2. Utility that Fans Receive by Subscribing to the Streaming Platform 
The consumer receives benefit 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 from subscribing to the platform when her preferred artist is 
on the platform. The variety benefit is dependent upon the mass of artists on the streamer. This 
mass is smaller when only one of the types of artists is on the streamer. Finally, a consumer who 
subscribes to the platform incurs transportation cost 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 and pays subscription fee 𝑠𝑠. 
If an artist chooses to stream her music through the streamer, the streaming platform 
shares a portion of its revenue with the artist. This is how streaming platforms such as Spotify 
and Apple Music compensate artists.26 We define royalty as the percentage of revenue that the 
platform shares with all artists who stream their music and denote it as 𝑟𝑟, where 0 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 1 (thus 
26 See Spotify (2016b) and England (2015). 
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the streamer retains (1 − 𝑟𝑟) of its revenue). Once the streaming platform portions out the 
revenue to be shared, it pays each artist based upon that artist’s streaming share. We distinguish 
an artist’s streaming share as the number of streams she receives divided by the number of 
streams an average artist on the streaming platform receives. Therefore, an artist who is streamed 
less (more) than average will receive a smaller (larger) portion of the revenue appropriated for 
the artists. Figure 4.3 outlines how an artist is paid by the streaming platform: 
Total revenue 
acquired by 
the streamer 
x Royalty 𝒓𝒓 at which streamer 
shares revenue 
x Artist’s streaming share on the 
streamer 
= Artist’s payout 
from streamer 
Figure 4.3. How Streaming Platform Pays Artists 
In defining the streaming share, we must also characterize the behavior of streaming 
platform subscribers. We assume that a subscriber on the platform will stream the entire library 
of music offered by the streaming platform. This simplifying assumption allows us to obtain 
distinguishable results and is more likely to hold when the opportunity cost of streaming more 
content is zero.27 
27 In the Concluding Remarks, we consider extensions that relax this assumption. In reality, there is too much 
content on any given streaming platform for a subscriber to be able to stream it all under time constraints. 
Additionally, a subscriber is likely to stream her preferred artist’s music more than she may stream other artist’s 
music. Streaming platforms can aid in introducing fans of one artist to the music of another artist by improving 
recommendation algorithms. However, any of these considerations greatly complicate the current analysis. 
105 
We also denote the royalty that an artist receives every time her music is sold by the store 
as 𝛿𝛿, where 0 < 𝛿𝛿 < 1 (thus the store retains (1 − 𝛿𝛿) of each sale). For this study, we do not 
consider 𝛿𝛿 to be a strategic variable. This is because we assume that all artists sell their music 
through the store and 𝛿𝛿 is not set to entice artists to the store. 28 Additionally, our focus is on a 
streaming platform as an industry entrant and its ability to entice artists to the platform. We leave 
the store’s decision to set 𝛿𝛿 for future research. 
In the first stage of the game, the streamer sets a royalty 𝑟𝑟 at which she will share revenue 
with artists on the platform. Then, artists decide whether or not to stream their music through the 
streamer. Finally, the platform and store set the subscription fee and store price simultaneously. 
Because no single artist has any impact on prices or the platform’s variety benefit, the order that 
prices are set and an artist decides to stream her music is inconsequential and may be reversed. 
4.3 ANALYSIS 
We solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium by determining the optimal pricing strategies for the 
streaming platform and the store and the royalty needed to entice an artist to stream her music. 
To do so we calculate the expected profit of an artist when she streams her music and compare it 
to her expected profit when she withholds her music from the streamer. 
We solve the game for three different environments. In the first environment the 
streaming platform streams music from both types of artists. In the second (third) environment, 
the streamer only streams music from low (high) valuation artists and excludes the other type. In 
28 This is more likely to be the case. Taylor Swift, who pulled her music off of Spotify (the streaming platform), did 
not pull her music off of iTunes (the digital store). Additionally, when Apple Music was released subscribers did not 
have access to every artist in iTunes’ library (Welch 2015). 
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the first environment the platform offers more variety by hosting a larger mass of artists and thus 
provides consumers a greater variety benefit. We compare optimal strategies (store price, 
subscription fee, and royalty) across environments to gain a better understanding of the market 
for digital music in the presence of a streaming platform. 
 The store’s and streamer’s expected profits do not functionally differ across 
environments. In each environment the store sets a store price and the streamer chooses a 
subscription fee simultaneously to maximize expected profit. The store’s expected profit 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 
follows below: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑝𝑝[(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ )𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗)𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿]. (4.1) 
Because the store and streamer compete for a share of each artist’s fan base, we make note of the 
consumer who is indifferent between buying their preferred artist’s music from the store and 
subscribing to the streamer within each fan base. For a low valuation artist this indifferent 
consumer is located at 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗, and for a high valuation artist this indifferent consumer is located at 
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ . We further describe the locations of the indifferent consumer within a fan base when we 
discuss each environment. Because preference is monotonic in consumer location we know that 
consumers to the left of the indifferent consumer choose to subscribe to the platform and 
consumers to the right of the indifferent consumer choose to buy their preferred artist’s music 
from the store. Therefore, expected demand for the store is captured by the bracketed term in 
(4.1), or (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ )𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗)𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿. Notice that we multiply the store’s demand from the fan 
base of an artist of each type by the mass of the corresponding type to get the total store demand. 
The store seeks to maximize her expected profit by setting a single store price at which 
any artist’s music can be purchased. Because demand for the store is decreasing in store price, 
107 
the store encounters a tradeoff when setting an optimal price. Finally, the store shares 𝛿𝛿 of each 
sale with the artist whose music was purchased, retaining (1 − 𝛿𝛿) of the revenue for herself. 
Similarly, the streaming platform’s expected profit is denoted by 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 and follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝑠𝑠[𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿]. (4.2) 
For the streamer, the bracketed term in (4.2), 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿, represents its total demand. The 
streaming platform sets a single subscription fee that maximizes its expected profit. As before, 
because demand for the streamer is decreasing in subscription fee, the streamer faces a tradeoff 
when setting an optimal fee. The streaming platform only retains a portion (1 − 𝑟𝑟) of its 
revenues, sharing the rest as royalties. We later investigate the streamer’s decision to set 𝑟𝑟 such 
that she is able to entice artists to stream their music through her platform. 
4.3.1 Platform Streams Both Types of Artists’ Music 
We first consider the environment in which the platform hosts content from both types of artists. 
Recall that in this environment, consumers are aware that both types of artists are on the 
streaming platform and expect a variety benefit of (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 when they subscribe. Because 
both types of artists stream their music, the indifferent consumer (located at 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗) in an 𝑖𝑖 type 
artist’s fan base is characterized by the following equality: 
𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗). 
Solving the above equality for 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ reveals the demand for the streamer from an 𝑖𝑖 type 
artist’s fan base: 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑡𝑡+(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜−(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖+𝑝𝑝−𝐾𝐾
2𝑡𝑡
. (4.3) 
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As such, (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗) denotes the demand for the store from an 𝑖𝑖 type artist’s fan base. Because 
demand is a function of store price and subscription fee, we substitute (4.3) into (4.1) and (4.2) to 
solve for the prices that maximize expected profits. From (4.3) it is evident that a higher store 
price and lower subscription fee increases the demand for the streaming platform, and a lower 
store price and higher subscription fee increases the demand for the store. 
Recall that store price and subscription fee are set simultaneously. Differentiating (4.1) 
and (4.2) with respect to store price and subscription fee and solving the resulting system of 
equations yields the following response functions: 
𝑝𝑝 = 3𝑡𝑡−(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
3
+ (1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
3(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿) , and (4.4) 
𝑠𝑠 = 3𝑡𝑡+(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
3
−
(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
3(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿) . 
A higher 𝑡𝑡 is an indicator of more intense consumer preferences and as such reduces competition 
and allows the streamer and store to sustain higher prices. As consumers value variety 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 more, 
the streamer is able to charge a higher subscription fee but the store must offer a lower purchase 
price. When enhanced technology makes the streamer more effective at replicating the benefit 
from purchasing an artist’s music, 𝛼𝛼 increases. This increases the value that a platform offers 
fans and results in a higher subscription fee and lower store price. However, because 𝛼𝛼 < 1 an 
increase in valuation 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 or 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 has a more profound impact on the store and allows the store to 
charge a higher price while forcing the streamer to lower its subscription fee. 
When we restrict the mass of each artist type such that 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 = 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 = 1 2⁄ , the store price 
given in (4.4) reduces to 𝑝𝑝 = [3𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 + 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿) 2⁄ ] 3⁄ . It is noteworthy that price is a 
function of horizontal and vertical preferences. The parameter 𝑡𝑡 captures the intensity of 
horizontal preference for either the store or streaming platform. 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 + 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿) 2⁄  is the 
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difference in benefit, on average, between the two outlets and thus captures the intensity of 
vertical preference. 
When store price and subscription fee are set according to (4.4), the demand for the 
streaming platform from a fan base with an 𝑖𝑖 type preferred artist is: 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
∗ = 3𝑡𝑡+(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜−3(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖
6𝑡𝑡
+ (1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
3𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿) . (4.5) 
Even after accounting for prices, demand for the streaming platform increases when consumers 
value variety 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 more or the effectiveness of streaming 𝛼𝛼 is enhanced. This is because higher 
values of 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 or 𝛼𝛼 strengthen the streamer’s competitive position. The total demand for the 
streamer 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 can be written as: 
�
3𝑡𝑡+(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
6𝑡𝑡
−
3(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+3(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
12𝑡𝑡
+ (1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
3𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿) �. (4.6) 
An artist observes the streaming platform’s royalty and is aware of the pricing strategies 
given in (4.4) when she decides whether or not she should stream her music. Recall that any 
single artist’s decision to withhold her music from the streaming platform has no effect on the 
prices or variety benefit. However, her decision affects the utility that her fans receive from 
subscribing to the streamer. When a high valuation artist streams her music through the streamer, 
her fans receive benefit 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 + (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 from the platform; when she withholds her music 
from the streaming platform her fans only receive benefit (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 from the platform. 
When a high valuation artist withholds her music from the platform, the consumer in her fan 
base who is indifferent between subscribing to the streamer and purchasing her music from the 
store is located at 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗  such that: (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − s − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗  𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 − 𝑝𝑝 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗  �𝑡𝑡. 
By removing her content from the platform, a high valuation artist makes the streaming platform 
less valuable to her fans and increases the demand for her music from the store (all else equal). 
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After accounting for the pricing strategies given in (4.4), the location of the indifferent consumer 
in a fan base of a high valuation artist who withholds her music is: 
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗  = 3𝑡𝑡+(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜−3𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻
6𝑡𝑡
+ (1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
3𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)  (4.7) 
As expected, the consumer who is indifferent between the streamer and store is located closer to 
the streamer (and thus the demand for the streamer is lower) when the artist withholds her music 
from the streamer. Thus, when an artist streams her music she cannibalizes sales of her content 
through the store. The extent of cannibalization is characterized by �1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗  � − (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ ) =
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ = 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 6𝑡𝑡⁄ . If we repeat the preceding analysis for a low valuation artist, we find that 
low valuation artists risk cannibalizing sales due to streaming by 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 6𝑡𝑡⁄ .29 Because 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 > 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿, a 
high valuation artist risks cannibalizing more store sales than a low valuation artist by streaming 
her music. 
A high valuation artist will only stream her music when the expected profit that she 
receives from streaming her music exceeds the expected profit that she earns when she withholds 
her music from the streamer and only sells it through the store. When an artist streams her music 
she earns a payoff from the streaming platform that is determined by the royalty, the streamer’s 
revenues, and the artist’s streaming share. An artist’s fan base that opted for the streaming 
platform will always stream their preferred artist’s music when it is on the streaming platform. A 
high valuation artist is guaranteed 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗  streams and a low valuation artist is guaranteed 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗ streams. 
We assume that every subscriber on the streaming platform will stream each artist’s music 
resulting, on average, in an additional 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗ streams per artist. 
29 We denote the location 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗ of the indifferent consumer in the fan base of the low valuation artist who withholds 
her music from the streamer as: 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗ = 3𝑡𝑡 + (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − 3𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿6𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)3𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)  
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We denote a high valuation artist’s expected profit from streaming her music as 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
and her expected profit from withholding her music from the streamer as 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ ) + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗) � 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗)𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗�+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗+𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗��, 
and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝�1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ �. (4.8) 
The expected profit for an artist who streams her music is the sum of her earnings from both the 
store and the streamer. The first term in 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚, 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ ), is the revenue she receives from 
the store. In the second term, 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗), is the revenue that the streamer shares with all 
artists. However, an individual artist earns an amount weighted by her streaming share: 
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ +(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗)
𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗�+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗+𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗�
. (4.9) 
The numerator of the streaming share in (4.9) is the sum of streams an artist receives from her 
own fans that opt to subscribe to the platform 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗  and the streams she receives, on average, from 
other subscribers (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗). The denominator in (4.9) is the expected number of streams 
an average artist on the streaming platform receives; 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 artists are high valuation artists 
receiving 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ + 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗ streams and 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 artists are low valuation artists receiving 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗ +
𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗ streams. The denominator in (4.9) reduces to (1 + 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗).30 
When an artist withholds her music from the streamer, her profit accrues from sales at the 
store, 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝�1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ �. Recall that by streaming her music she cannibalizes sales from the store 
(𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ < 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ ). Therefore, the streaming platform needs to offset the loss of store sales by setting a 
high enough royalty to ensure that the additional revenue she gets from streaming royalties 
exceeds the revenue she loses due to cannibalization. Because the streamer’s expected profit is 
30 In reality, streaming share is the total number of streams for an artist divided by the total number of streams on the 
platform. Because we assume a continuum of artists and thus the total number of streams approaches infinity, we 
instead consider the expected streams of a particular artist divided by the expected streams of an average artist. 
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decreasing in royalty, when she wants to retain high valuation artists the streaming platform will 
set the lowest royalty that guarantees 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ≥ 0. We denote the royalty that is 
needed to guarantee both types of artists stream their music as 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ: 
𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = �𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ −𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ �𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝(1+𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝐾𝐾�𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗� . 
For the remainder of this study we restrict the mass of each type of artist such that 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 = 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 =1 2⁄ . In this manner, the mass can also be interpreted as the portion of the artist population that 
belongs to each type. Using this restriction and the optimal pricing strategies derived earlier, the 
royalty needed to ensure that both types stream their music is: 
𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝛿𝛿�3𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜+(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�2 �
�3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜−
(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
2
��3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜+
(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿−5𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻�
4
�
. (4.10) 
In Appendix C we repeat the preceding analysis for a low valuation artist in this 
environment and calculate the royalty needed to convince a low valuation artist to stream her 
music. It is easily verifiable that the royalty needed to prevent a high valuation artist from 
withholding her music from the streamer (given in 4.10) is strictly greater than the royalty 
necessary to retain a low valuation artist (given in Appendix C). Therefore, when the streamer 
wants to host content from both types of artists it must set the royalty given in (4.10). 
The numerator in (4.10) is the benefit that a high valuation artist receives if she withholds 
her music from the streamer. In other words, it is the lost revenue from cannibalizing her music 
sales when she also streams her music. The denominator in (4.10) is the artist’s payoff from the 
streaming platform when she chooses to stream her music. Therefore, when the store’s 
competitive position is strengthened, the streamer needs to set a higher royalty to convince high 
valuation consumers to stream their music. When the platform’s competitive position is 
enhanced, the platform generates more shareable revenue and can decrease the royalty. We 
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conduct comparative statics on 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ to show how the parameters of the model affect the royalty 
needed to prevent an artist from withholding her music from the streamer. 
Observation 4.1. A higher royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ is needed when 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 increases, when 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 decreases, or 
when 𝑡𝑡 decreases and 𝑡𝑡 is sufficiently large. The effects of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 on royalty are ambiguous. 
Observation 4.1 is the result of differentiating 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ with respect to each parameter. For 
results that are not easily verifiable, calculations for Observation 4.1 can be found in Appendix 
C. When the value that fans derive from a high valuation artist’s music 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 increases, a high
valuation artist risks cannibalizing more store sales when she chooses to stream her music. 
Therefore, to offset this effect and entice her to stream her music, the streamer must offer a more 
generous (from the artists’ perspective) royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ. As consumers value variety 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 more, the 
streaming platform sells more subscriptions at a higher price. This strengthens the streamer’s 
position as artists become interested in her revenue pool and thus she can offer a lower royalty 
𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ. 
When consumers’ preferences intensify (larger 𝑡𝑡), the store can increase its profit margin 
from each sale. This strengthens the position of the store and provides an additional incentive for 
the artist to refrain from streaming. However, more intense preferences also ease the rate of 
cannibalization from streaming because it becomes increasingly difficult to convince consumers 
who prefer purchasing music to instead subscribe to the streamer. When the intensity of 
preferences 𝑡𝑡 is sufficiently large, the cannibalization easing effect dominates and an increase in 
𝑡𝑡 allows the streamer to offer a lower royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ. 
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Streaming’s effectiveness at replicating purchased music 𝛼𝛼 has opposing effects on the 
royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ. When 𝛼𝛼 increases, an artist who streams her music risks cannibalizing more of her 
store sales. However, an increase in 𝛼𝛼 allows the platform to sell more subscriptions at a higher 
price in order to grow her revenue to share with streaming artists. Additionally, when the low 
valuation artists become more valuable (𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 increases) the store is able to sustain a higher price 
for all music sales and high valuation artists worry more about cannibalization. However, the 
value of low type artists 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 also impacts a high valuation artist’s position on the platform through 
its streaming share. As 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 increases there are fewer low valuation fans on the streamer and thus a 
high valuation artist ends up with a higher streaming share when she streams her music. This 
increases her potential earnings from streaming her music. 
Having found the royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ needed to entice any artist to stream her music when the 
streaming platform hosts content from both types of artists, we next consider the environment 
where the streaming platform only hosts music from one type of artist. 
4.3.2 Platform Streams Only One Type of Artist’s Music 
In this section, we consider a streaming platform that hosts music from only one type of artist. 
Because the platform excludes an entire type of artists, the variety benefit and pricing strategies 
differ from those in the preceding section. The variety benefit that the streamer provides to 
subscribers is 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 when it hosts 𝑖𝑖 type artists’ music. Given that 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 = 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 = 1 2⁄ , the variety 
benefit is the same regardless of the type of artists that streams their music through the streamer. 
4.3.2.1 Platform Streams Only Low Valuation Artists’ Music. We consider the environment 
in which only low valuation artists stream their music. Indeed, this context may mimic reality in 
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the music industry. Examples of artists who have withheld their music from streaming platforms 
such as Spotify consist of very popular artists such as Taylor Swift, Adele, the Beatles, and 
AC/DC. In fact, Taylor Swift and Adele had the top selling albums in 2014 and 2015 
respectively, and neither could be found on Spotify (Caulfield 2014, 2016). 
Because high valuation artists do not stream their music in this environment, the location 
of the indifferent consumer in a high valuation artist’s fan base is denoted 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗  and characterized 
by the following equality: 
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
− s − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗  𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 − 𝑝𝑝 − (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ )𝑡𝑡. 
Fans of high valuation artists do not receive benefit 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 from subscribing to the 
platform. Because low valuation artists stream their music through the streaming platform, the 
location of the indifferent consumer in a low valuation artist’s fan base is denoted 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗ 
characterized by the following equality: 
𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 + 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 − 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗ = 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗). 
Solving the first equality for 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗  and the second equality for 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗ reveals the demand for the 
streamer from a fan base for each type: 
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ = 𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣 𝑜𝑜2 −𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑝𝑝−𝐾𝐾
2𝑡𝑡
, and 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗ = 𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 −(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+𝑝𝑝−𝐾𝐾
2𝑡𝑡
. 
The equations for 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗  and 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗ can be substituted in to the expected profit functions given 
in (4.1) and (4.2). Differentiating (4.1) and (4.2) with respect to store price and subscription fee 
and solving the resulting system of equations yields the following response functions: 
𝑝𝑝 = 3𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2
3
+ [𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]
6
, and (4.11) 
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𝑠𝑠 = 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2
3
−
[𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]
6
. 
When the streaming platform excludes music from high valuation artists, it limits its variety 
benefit and does not provide high valuation artists’ fan bases with their preferred artist’s music. 
Therefore, the streamer sets a lower subscription fee in this environment. On the other hand, the 
store finds it optimal to set a higher price. 
When store price and subscription fee are set according to (4.11), the demand for the 
streaming platform from a fan base of a high valuation artist is: 
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ = 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 −2𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
6𝑡𝑡
, (4.12) 
and the demand for the streaming platform from a fan base of a low valuation artist is: 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗ = 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 −2(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻
6𝑡𝑡
. (4.13) 
Comparing the demand for the streamer from a low valuation’s fan base when the platform hosts 
both types of artists (4.7) to that when the platform hosts only low type artists (4.13), we see that 
demand is higher in the former environment when 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 > 2𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻. Thus, when the benefit from 
variety 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 is sufficiently large, the streamer expects to serve more consumers from low type fan 
bases when she streams content from both types of artists. This is because for large 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜, adding 
the second type of artists to her platform is more beneficial and thus the platform is significantly 
more attractive to consumers when it hosts music from both types of artists. However, the 
demand for the streaming platform from a high valuation artist’s fan base is always less when the 
streamer hosts music from low valuation artists. This is also the case for total demand for the 
streaming platform, given in this environment by �
3𝑡𝑡+
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
6𝑡𝑡
−
𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
12𝑡𝑡
�. It is easy to verify that 
this term is less than the total demand given in the preceding environment by (4.6). 
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An artist observes the streaming platform’s royalty and is aware of the pricing strategies 
given in (4.11) when she decides whether or not she should stream her music. Because the 
streaming platform only streams content from low valuation artists, it needs to set a royalty to 
entice low valuation artists to stream their music. When a low valuation artist streams her music, 
her consumers receive benefit 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 + 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 2⁄  from subscribing to the streamer; when she withholds 
her music from the streamer her consumers receive benefit 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 2⁄  from subscribing to the 
streamer. When a low valuation artist withholds her music from the platform, the consumer in 
her fan base who is indifferent between subscribing to the streamer and purchasing her music 
from the store is located at 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗  such that: 
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
− s − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 − 𝑝𝑝 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗�𝑡𝑡. 
After accounting for the pricing strategies given in (4.11), the location of the indifferent 
consumer in a fan base of a low valuation artist who withholds her music is: 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗  = 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 −(2+𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻
6𝑡𝑡
. 
The demand for the streaming platform is lower when the artist withholds her music from the 
streamer. The extent of cannibalization that occurs when the artist streams her content is 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 6𝑡𝑡⁄ . 
We denote a low valuation artist’s expected profit from streaming her music as 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
and her expected profit from withholding her music from the streamer as 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗) + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 �12 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ + 12 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗�, and 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝�1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗�. 
The artist’s expected profit from streaming music is modified from the one given in (4.8). When 
only one type of artist streams their music, the streaming share reduces to 1. In calculating the 
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streaming share we compare an artist’s average number of streams with the expected number of 
streams for an average artist on the streaming platform. Thus when an artist receives fewer 
(more) streams than the average artist on the streamer, she collects a reduced (magnified) portion 
of the shareable revenue. However, when there is only one type of artist on the streaming 
platform, every artist is identical and receives the same number of streams. Therefore, a low 
valuation artist’s stream count is equal to the stream count for the average artist, and all artists’ 
streaming profits are equally weighted by 1. 
To maintain this environment, the streaming platform will set the lowest possible royalty 
that ensures a low valuation artist will continue to stream her music, or 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ≥ 0. 
We denote the royalty that is needed to guarantee low valuation artists stream their music as 
𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, such that: 
𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 = 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝛿𝛿�3𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 +𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2 �
�3𝑡𝑡+
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
−
(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
2
�
2 . (4.14) 
As was the case for 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ, the numerator in (4.14) is the benefit that a low valuation artist 
receives if she withholds her music from the streamer. The denominator in (4.14) is the artist’s 
payoff from the streaming platform when she chooses to stream her music. In Observation 4.2 
we summarize comparative statics for 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 to reveal how the model parameters affect the royalty 
needed to prevent an artist from withholding her music from the streamer. 
Observation 4.2. A higher royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 is needed when 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 increases, when 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 increases, when 
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 decreases, or when 𝑡𝑡 decreases and 𝑡𝑡 is sufficiently large. The effect of 𝛼𝛼 on royalty is 
ambiguous. 
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Observation 4.2 is the result of differentiating 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 with respect to each parameter. For 
results that are not easily verifiable, calculations for Observation 4.2 can be found in Appendix 
C. Many of the results stated in Observation 4.2 are like those in Observation 4.1. When the
value that fans derive from a low valuation artist’s music 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 increases, a low valuation artist risks 
cannibalizing more store sales when she chooses to stream her music and thus must be rewarded 
with a more generous royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. As consumers value variety 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 more, the streaming platform 
earns more revenue to share with artists and can offer a reduced royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. 
When consumers’ preferences intensify (larger 𝑡𝑡), both the position of the streamer and 
the position of the store are enhanced. When preference intensity is sufficiently high, 
intensifying preferences ease the rate of cannibalization, ensures that the streamer’s position 
becomes relatively advantageous, and affords the streamer the ability to offer a lower royalty 
𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. 
Streaming’s effectiveness at replicating purchased music 𝛼𝛼 has opposing effects on the 
royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. An increase in 𝛼𝛼 causes an artist who streams her music to cannibalize more of her 
store sales but also results in more revenue for the platform to share with streaming artists. We 
are now able to sign the effect of an increase in the other artists’ valuation 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 (in the previous 
environment this was 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿). When both types stream their music, as low type artists’ valuation 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 
increases, a high valuation artist’s streaming share will diminish. However, when only low types 
are on the streamer, the high types’ valuation has no such effect on streaming share. Therefore, 
when the value that fans derive from a high valuation artist’s music 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 increases, the store sets a 
higher price and strengthens the position of all artists who refrain from streaming their music. 
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4.3.2.2 Platform Streams Only High Valuation Artists’ Music. We repeat the analysis for the 
environment in which only high valuation artists stream their music. Because low valuation 
artists are not on the platform, their fans do not receive benefit 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 from subscribing to the 
streamer. On the other hand, high valuation artists’ fans receive benefit 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 when they subscribe 
to the streamer. Repeating the exercise results in the following prices and demands: 
𝑝𝑝 = 3𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2
3
+ [(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]
6
, (4.15) 
𝑠𝑠 = 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2
3
−
[(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]
6
, 
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ = 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 −2(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
6𝑡𝑡
, and 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗ = 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 −2𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻
6𝑡𝑡
. 
We again consider a high valuation artist’s decision to stream her music. When she 
withholds her music from the streaming platform, she decreases the demand for the streamer 
from her fans: 
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻
∗ = 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 −(2+𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
6𝑡𝑡
. 
A high valuation artist’s rate of cannibalization from streaming her music is 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 6𝑡𝑡⁄ . 
If the streamer wants to maintain an environment in which it streams music from only 
high valuation artists, it must offer an appropriate royalty to entice a high valuation artist to 
stream her music. The streaming platform must ensure that a high valuation artist’s expected 
profit from streaming her music exceeds her expected profit from withholding her music from 
the streamer. As is the case when the streaming platform only streams music from low valuation 
artists, a high valuation artist who streams her music receives the same number of streams as the 
average artist on the streamer (because all artists on the streaming platform have the same 
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valuation). If the streamer wants to host music from only high valuation artists, she finds it 
optimal to offer royalty 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ, such that: 
𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ = 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝛿𝛿�3𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 +𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻2 �
�3𝑡𝑡+
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
−
�𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻�
2
�
2 . (4.16) 
We do not discuss comparative statics for the royalty 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ because 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ mirrors 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. 
We also show in the next section that the platform never curates its offerings so that it only hosts 
music from high valuation artists. 
4.3.3 Comparing Royalties 
We compare royalties 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ, 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, and 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ to gain insight as to how a streaming platform may 
set a royalty to curate its musical offerings. All else equal, the streamer seeks a lower royalty so 
that it may retain a sizable portion of its revenue. However, the environment determines exacting 
how much revenue the streaming platform has to share. When the streamer hosts music from 
both low valuation and high valuation artists, she is able to sell more subscriptions at a higher 
price than when she hosts music from only one of the types. In order for the streaming platform 
to choose to exclude one of the two types of artists, it must be the case that the royalty needed to 
host music from the desired type is sufficiently smaller than the royalty needed to host music 
from both types. 
Proposition 4.1. When 𝛼𝛼 > 1 3⁄  𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 > (3 2⁄ )(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 − 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿), the streamer never chooses to 
stream music from only high valuation artists. 
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The proof for Proposition 4.1 is found in Appendix C. In the proof we show that the royalty 
needed for the platform to host both types of artists 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ is less than the royalty needed to host 
high valuation artists 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ as long as the value consumers place on variety 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 or the 
effectiveness of streaming 𝛼𝛼 is sufficiently large. When 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ < 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ, the streamer’s expected 
profit from hosting music from both types of artists always exceeds its expected profit from 
hosting music from only high type artists. The streaming platfrom not only has a more 
advantageous royalty position but sells more subscriptions at higher prices when it hosts music 
from both types of artists. 
The constraint on the effectiveness of streaming sufficient to ensure 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ < 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ (𝛼𝛼 >1 3⁄ ) is likely to always hold in reality. Streaming platforms may not be able to exactly replicate 
the value of purchasing a preferred artist’s music, but streaming effectiveness is likely to not 
discount the potential benefit by over two-thirds. In fact, technology has improved significantly 
since streaming platforms first came into existence. Streaming platforms now offer high 
definition audio and allow subscribers to temporarily download music so that she can stream 
while offline. However, even in extreme cases when 𝛼𝛼 < 1 3⁄ , if consumers value variety 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 
sufficiently, the platform will still never choose to stream music from only high valuation artists. 
From here on forward, we assume 𝛼𝛼 > 1 3⁄  to ensure that the streaming platform does not 
consider hosting content from only high type artists. This restricts our attention to comparisons 
between 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ and 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. 
As discussed in the preceding sections, the streaming platform is able to sell more 
subscriptions at higher prices when it hosts content from both types of artists than when it hosts 
content from only low type artists. Therefore, whenever 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ ≤ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, the platform chooses to 
host music from both types and sets royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ. 
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Proposition 4.2. When 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 becomes indistinguishable from 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿, it follows that 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ < 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. As 
such, the streamer finds it optimal to set royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ and host music from both types of artists. 
Proposition 4.2 states that when fans of high valuation artists and low valuation artists have 
indistinguishable reservation prices for their artist’s music, the streamer offers royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ and 
hosts music from both types of artists. As the artists become more alike in valuation, the 
difference in rate of cannibalization between types becomes negligible. Because the streaming 
platform does not need to raise the royalty to offset higher cannibalization rates, she instead uses 
her stronger position from having more artists on the platform (higher subscription fee, more 
subscription sales) to offer a less generous royalty 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ. 
The streamer may choose to exclude high valuation artists and only host music from low 
valuation artists when 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 is sufficiently less than 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ. When this is the case, the streamer 
sacrifices on the better revenue prospects from hosting music from both types (higher 
subscription fee and larger demand) to retain a higher portion of its revenue. This may occur 
when high valuation artists are valued significantly more by their fans than low valuation artists 
because high valuation artists risk cannibalizing a substantial amount of sales and thus must be 
enticed to the streamer with a higher royalty. 
Indeed, streaming platforms appear to exclude high valuation artists. The top selling 
artists in the years 2015 and 2014 (Adele and Taylor Swift respectively) both withheld their 
music from streaming platforms. We compare comparative statics for royalties 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ and 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 to 
gain insight as to when the streaming platform may choose to exclude high valuation artists. For 
parameter 𝑗𝑗, if 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜕𝜕𝑗𝑗⁄ − 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝜕𝜕𝑗𝑗⁄ > 0, then an increase in parameter 𝑗𝑗 will increase the 
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likelihood that the streamer chooses to only host low valuation artists. However, in order to 
compare comparative statics for each royalty we need to assume that 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ and 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 are initially 
at the same level, such that 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. 
Proposition 4.3. Starting from the case when 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝛼𝛼 > 1 3⁄ ), the streamer is more 
likely to switch to only hosting content from low types as 𝛼𝛼 decreases, 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 decreases, and 𝑡𝑡 
increases. 
When 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, the streaming platform will always choose to stream music from both types 
of artists. Proposition 4.3 states that changes in parameters might tip this balance in favor of the 
streamer only streaming low valuation artists’ music if such changes lead to 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ > 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. This 
occurs when a change in the parameter causes 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ to increase at a greater rate than 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 to 
decrease at a greater rate than 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ, or 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 to decrease while 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ increases. 
In Appendix C we show that 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼⁄ < 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼⁄  when 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. Therefore as 
streaming becomes less effective at replicating the benefit from purchasing an artist’s music (𝛼𝛼 
decreases), the streamer is more likely to only stream music from low valuation artists. As 
discussed in Observations 4.1 and 4.2, the direction of the effect of 𝛼𝛼 on each royalty is 
ambiguous. A lower level of 𝛼𝛼 reduces the rate of cannibalization when an artist chooses to 
stream her music but also weakens the position of the platform and reduces its shareable revenue. 
A decrease in 𝛼𝛼 has a greater effect on the streamer’s revenue when it streams music from both 
types of artists because it loses market share from more fan bases. This results in the streamer 
setting 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ higher than 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 to maintain each environment. Therefore a decrease in 𝛼𝛼 makes it 
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more likely that the platform will exclude high valuation artists and only stream music from low 
valuation artists. 
In Appendix C we show that when 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜⁄ < 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜⁄  and thus the 
streamer is more likely to exclude high valuation artists when consumers become less concerned 
about variety (𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 decreases). Observations 4.1 and 4.2 state that a decrease in 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 makes the 
streaming platform less desirable by consumers, reduces the platform’s shareable revenue, and 
forces the streamer to set higher royalties to continue to attract artists. The benefit from variety is 
weighted by the number of artists on the platform and thus the effect is more pronounced when 
the platform streams content from both types of artists. Therefore a decrease in 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 requires the 
streaming platform to set 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ higher than 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 and makes it more likely to exclude high 
valuation artists. 
In Observations 4.1 and 4.2 we show that the directional effect of an increase in 
preference intensity 𝑡𝑡 requires 𝑡𝑡 to be sufficiently large. When 𝑡𝑡 is sufficiently large we know 
that stronger preferences (𝑡𝑡 increases) allows the streamer to reduce her royalty. In this region 
larger 𝑡𝑡 causes the streamer’s position to enhance more than the store’s position, and thus she can 
afford to set lower royalties. Proposition 4.3 states that an increase in preference intensity 𝑡𝑡 
causes the streamer to set 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 below 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ and thus increases the likelihood that the streamer 
will choose to exclude high valuation artists from the platform. In Appendix C, we show that 
when 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡⁄ > 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡⁄ . An increase in 𝑡𝑡 has a more pronounced effect on the 
streamer’s revenue and position when it streams only low valuation artists, and thus it is able to 
retain more revenue when it only streams low valuation artists’ music (𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 < 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ). 
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4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this study, we explore the competitive effects of an artist’s decision to stream her content 
through a streaming platform. We study how a streaming platform may set its royalty and 
determine when it might choose to exclude high valuation artists from the platform. In particular, 
we show that high valuation artists risk cannibalizing more of their sales when they choose to 
stream their music than low valuation artists. Therefore, all else equal, the streaming platform 
must offer more to high valuation artists, potentially in the form of a higher royalty. However, 
when the streamer chooses to serve both low and high valuation artists, she offers more variety 
and enhances the value of the platform. This leads to the streamer being able to sell more 
subscriptions at higher prices. Because the streaming platform shares its revenue with streaming 
artists, this potentially allows the platform to set a less generous royalty when she hosts content 
from both types. 
Future research can investigate whether low valuation artists may be disadvantaged when 
a streaming platform chooses to stream music from low and high types rather than only stream 
music from low types. This may be the case if a low valuation artists’ streaming share drops 
significantly when high valuation artists join the streaming platform. When Radiohead decided 
to withdraw its music from Spotify, Radiohead’s producer Nigel Godrich justified the action by 
stating that streaming services are unfair for new artists (Gibsone 2013). 
In our model we assume that all subscribers on the platform listen to all of the music on 
the streaming platform. This assumption affects how we model streaming share. In an extension, 
it may be interesting to relax this assumption and instead assume that high valuation artists will 
be streamed more than low valuation artists. If a high valuation artist’s music is more likely to be 
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streamed than a low valuation artist’s music, low valuation artists may receive less of the 
streamer’s revenue when high valuation artists stream their music. 
In our analysis, we restrict the mass of each type so that there is an equal proportion of 
low valuation and high valuation artists in the market. This restriction allows us to instead focus 
on differences between valuations. Instead, we could limit the valuation of each type and allow 
for there to be proportional differences between types. Additionally, we assume that every 
artist’s fan base is of the same size. To better capture popularity differences between artists, we 
may allow high valuation artists to have larger fan bases. Future research can address these 
issues. 
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APPENDIX A 
PROOFS FOR “DAILY DEAL WEBSITES AS MATCHMAKERS” 
Explanation of the Quality-Price Schedule - Gal-Or (2013) and Shapiro (1983) 
Consider a competitive market with free entry and exit where firms act as price takers and 
quality can vary across firms. Consumers cannot observe the quality of a given firm prior to 
consuming his product, and instead, use the reputation of the firm to assess quality. The 
reputation of a firm in period 𝑡𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡, is determined by the quality of the product in period (𝑡𝑡 − 1), 
𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡−1), or 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡−1). Hence, communication among consumers ensures that the quality 
observed by a given consumer in a given period is quickly disseminated to all other consumers, 
thus establishing the reputation of the firm. The unit cost of producing a product of quality 𝑞𝑞 is 
𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞), where 𝑐𝑐′(𝑞𝑞) > 0. There is a minimum quality level, 𝑞𝑞0 = 0, below which firms cannot 
produce. For simplicity, let 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞0) = 0. The benefit from “milking” the current reputation 𝑞𝑞 
relates to the costs savings that accrue when deviating to produce a product of quality 𝑞𝑞0; these 
cost savings amount to 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞). However, “milking” reputation leads to deteriorated reputation of 
the firm, which declines to 𝑞𝑞0. Because potential entrants can easily enter and offer a product of 
quality 𝑞𝑞0, 𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞0) = 0. A firm will maintain his current reputation if the benefit from doing so, 
the future stream of discounted profits  𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞)−𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞)
𝑟𝑟
, is greater than the benefit from “milking” 
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reputation, 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞), thus yielding the following inequality necessary for firms to have incentives to 
maintain reputation: 
𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) ≥ (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞). 
New entrants hoping to offer a product of quality 𝑞𝑞 can expect a discounted stream of profits 
amounting to 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞) + 𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞)−𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞)𝑟𝑟  where 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 is the price that a new entrant with no reputation 
receives from selling his product. Consumers are wary of “fly-by-night” vendors and thus 
suspect new entrants to be selling a product of quality 𝑞𝑞0, thus resulting in 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 = 0. At the 
equilibrium where no further entry is profitable, it should be that an entrant of quality 𝑞𝑞 does not 
have an incentive to enter, thus leading to the following inequality: 
𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) ≤ (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞). 
Combining the two inequalities on the price implies that the price schedule at a stationary 
equilibrium with free entry satisfies the equation: 
𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞). 
Platforms Set Sharing Rule 
Given that the sharing fraction 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 multiplies the entire revenue expression of the platform in 
(2.17) and (2.18), choosing its value optimally does not affect the platform’s optimization with 
respect to 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖. As a result, the expressions for equilibrium prices 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 and 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 remain the same at all 
three types of segmenting equilibria. Because the consumer choice between the platforms is 
independent of the sharing rules, the expressions for 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 remain unaffected as well. In the 
main text we implicitly assume that the common sharing rule 𝛼𝛼 used by both platforms 
guarantees a positive net benefit to each vendor in the population. When 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is chosen 
strategically each platform will have to ensure that each vendor in the segment the platform 
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serves benefits from its services. However, because the platform’s profits decline when 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
increases the platform selects the lowest 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 consistent with ensuring the participation of all 
vendors. 
From (2.13) and (2.14) the participation constraints are: 
𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞 �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽(1−𝑥𝑥)𝛽𝛽(1−𝑥𝑥)+(1−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝑦𝑦)� for platform 𝐻𝐻, (A.1) 
𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞 �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦� for platform 𝐿𝐿. 
The participation constraints are more demanding for vendors of higher quality. Assuming that 
platforms wish to serve every vendor in the segment that chooses them, as we implicitly assume 
in the text, it follows that: 
𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞 �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽(1−𝑥𝑥)𝛽𝛽(1−𝑥𝑥)+(1−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝑦𝑦)� for 𝐻𝐻, 
𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞
∗ �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥
𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦� for 𝐿𝐿. (A.2) 
Note that the payoff of each platform in (2.17) and (2.18) does not depend on the size of 
the segment of vendors it attracts because its revenues accrue only from consumers purchasing 
the deals. However, in order to satisfy the demand of consumers, platforms have to attract 
sufficient capacity to answer this demand. In the main text we implicitly assume the existence of 
ample capacity so that the vendors choosing platform 𝑖𝑖 can always serve the entire demand from 
consumers choosing this platform. When 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 and 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 are chosen strategically, the platforms 
should select the sharing rules to ensure that they attract sufficient capacity to serve the demand 
of consumers. If 𝜇𝜇 designates the mass of consumers of each type 𝜃𝜃 and 𝑇𝑇 designates the 
capacity available at each type of vendor 𝑞𝑞, 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 and 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 should satisfy the following inequalities. 
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𝑇𝑇 �1 − 𝑞𝑞∗
𝑞𝑞
� ≥ 𝜇𝜇[(1 − 𝑥𝑥)𝛽𝛽 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝑦𝑦)], and 
𝑇𝑇 �
𝑞𝑞∗
𝑞𝑞
� ≥ 𝜇𝜇[𝑥𝑥𝛽𝛽 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦]. (A.3) 
Equation (A.3) guarantees that the capacity offered from vendors is sufficient to answer demand. 
Finally, while the first condition for segmentation of vendors from Lemma 2.1 stays the same as 
in the main text, the second condition changes when 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 and 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 may be different as follows: 
𝛾𝛾 ≡ �[𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦]𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 − [𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑥𝑥) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝑦𝑦)]𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻� > 0, 
and the solution for 𝑞𝑞∗ is given as: 
𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞∗ = [𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦]𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿−[𝛽𝛽(1−𝑥𝑥)+(1−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝑦𝑦)]𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻[𝛽𝛽(1−𝑐𝑐)(2𝑥𝑥−1)+(1−𝛽𝛽)(2𝑦𝑦−1)] . (A.4) 
To maximize its profits platform 𝐻𝐻 chooses the lowest possible sharing rule 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 that ensures the 
participation of a vendor of type 𝑞𝑞, namely 
𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 = 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 [𝛽𝛽(1−𝑐𝑐)(1−𝑥𝑥)+(1−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝑦𝑦)][𝛽𝛽(1−𝑥𝑥)+(1−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝑦𝑦)] , (A.5) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻, 𝑥𝑥, and 𝑦𝑦 remain as derived in the main text. With this choice, all other vendors served 
by 𝐻𝐻 obtain a strictly positive payoff, including a vendor of type 𝑞𝑞∗. Because of vendor of type 
𝑞𝑞∗ is indifferent between 𝐿𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻, it follows that the sharing rule 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 guarantees a strictly positive 
payoff to vendor 𝑞𝑞∗, and therefore, to all other vendors 𝑞𝑞 ≤ 𝑞𝑞∗ as well. Hence, the participation 
constraint for vendor 𝐿𝐿 is slack. 
Platform 𝐿𝐿 wishes to set 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 at the lowest possible level. However, it has to guarantee that 
sufficient capacity exists to serve demand. It lowers 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 until its capacity constraint is just 
binding. Substituting into (A.4) the expression derived for 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 from (A.5), it follows from 
(A.3) that in order to exactly satisfy the demand from consumers: 
𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 = 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 �𝛽𝛽(1−𝑥𝑥)(1−𝑐𝑐)+(1−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝑦𝑦)𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦 + 𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇 [𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑐𝑐)(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(2𝑦𝑦 − 1)]�, (A.6) 
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where 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿, 𝑥𝑥, and 𝑦𝑦 remain as derived in the main text. Note that as the mass of consumers per 𝜃𝜃 
type 𝜇𝜇 increases and/or the capacity per vendor 𝑞𝑞 type 𝑇𝑇 declines platform 𝐿𝐿 is forced to increase 
the share of revenues awarded to each vendor. The comparison of 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 and 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 from (A.5) and 
(A.6) is ambiguous, and depends upon the equilibrium values of 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻, 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿, 𝑥𝑥, and 𝑦𝑦. Substituting 
the equilibrium values of 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 and 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 back into the expression for 𝑞𝑞∗ in (A.4) we obtain that 𝑞𝑞∗ =
𝑞𝑞[𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦] 𝜇𝜇
𝑇𝑇
. Hence, platform L attracts capacity that exactly matches the demand from 
consumers. From (A.3) it follows also that platform 𝐻𝐻 exactly satisfies the demand from its 
consumers because 𝑞𝑞 − 𝑞𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝑞[𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑥𝑥) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝑦𝑦)] 𝜇𝜇
𝑇𝑇
. 
Note that when platforms can choose 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 strategically it may become easier to support 
segmentation. The strategic choice of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ensures that if the first condition for vendor 
segmentation in Lemma 2.1 is valid, the second condition for vendor segmentation from this 
Lemma is automatically satisfied (i.e., 𝛾𝛾 > 0). As a result, there are fewer restrictions on the 
parameters of the model necessary to support segmentation. 
To illustrate that segmentation may become easier to support, consider the partial 
segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. Because the constraint that 𝛾𝛾 > 0 was binding when 
platforms chose a common sharing rule (as in the main text), we can now expand the region that 
supports segmentation as follows: 
𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃
2
−
1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
�𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� �
3
2(1−𝑐𝑐) − 𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐1+𝑟𝑟� < 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)(1+𝑚𝑚) < 𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃2 − 32 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚+1) − 12 (1−𝛽𝛽)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟) ≡
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿), 
𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(1−𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑚𝑚+1)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�[(1+𝑟𝑟)−(1−𝑐𝑐)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)] < 1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 < (1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃� �𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃 − 3𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚+1)�. 
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Note that the upper bound on 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)(1+𝑚𝑚)  remains identical to that derived when the sharing rules are 
common to both platforms (equal to 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿)). However, the lower bound on the slope is 
smaller, thus expanding the interval of values for the quality-price slope that supports 
segmentation. Moreover, the upper bound on 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
 is bigger and the lower bound on 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
 is smaller 
than the bounds derived for this ratio in the main text. 
In contrast, the region that supports the partial segmenting equilibrium with 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 
remains as reported in the main text. In this case, the second condition for vendor segmentation 
from Lemma 2.1 (𝛾𝛾 > 0) is nonbinding, given that the first condition that 𝛿𝛿 > 0 is more 
demanding. Hence, even when the sharing rules are strategically chosen by the platforms, the 
existence of this type of segmentation remains unlikely. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2. 
The discounted stream of profits that a platform can obtain from a given information seeker is 
equal to: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 �𝑐𝑐 ∗ 1 + 𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝑐𝑐) �1 + 11+𝑟𝑟� + 𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝑐𝑐)2 �1 + 11+𝑟𝑟 + 1(1+𝑟𝑟)2� + ⋯�. 
With probability 𝑐𝑐 an information seeker considers the sampled vendor suitable after one trial 
and stops sampling after that. The first term of the expression inside the brackets above evaluates 
this possibility. With probability 𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝑐𝑐) it takes two trials before the information seeker stops 
sampling. In this case, platform 𝑖𝑖 can expect discounted revenues of �1 + 1
1+𝑟𝑟
� (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 from 
the consumer. More generally, if the information seeker samples 𝑖𝑖 times, the expected revenue 
that platform 𝑖𝑖 obtains from her is �1 + 1
1+𝑟𝑟
+ ⋯+ 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑛𝑛−1� (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖. This event happens with 
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probability 𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑚𝑚−1. Using the formula of the sum of a finite geometric series, we can 
rewrite 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 as: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 �1 + (1+𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑟𝑟 �1 − � 11+𝑟𝑟�2� + ⋯+ (1−𝑐𝑐)𝑛𝑛−1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑟𝑟 �1 − � 11+𝑟𝑟�𝑚𝑚� + ⋯� =(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 
��1 + (1−𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑟𝑟
+ (1−𝑐𝑐)2(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑟𝑟
+ ⋯+ (1−𝑐𝑐)𝑛𝑛−1(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑟𝑟
+ ⋯� − � (1−𝑐𝑐)
𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟) + (1−𝑐𝑐)2𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟)2 + ⋯+ (1−𝑐𝑐)𝑛𝑛−1𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑛𝑛−1 +
⋯��. 
By using the formulas for the sum of infinite geometric series we obtain: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ��1−𝑐𝑐+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 � − � 1−𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)�� = (1−𝛼𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐) . 
The first term of (2.17) and (2.18) is obtained by multiplying 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 by the market share of each 
platform among information seekers. One time shoppers do not engage in repeat purchasing, thus 
explaining the second term of (2.17) and (2.18). Since both types of groups (i.e. information 
seekers and one time shoppers) arrive in every period the entire expression is multiplied by 1/𝑟𝑟. 
Proof of Lemma 2.3. 
(i), (ii)  The first condition for segmentation of vendors from Lemma 2.1 is: 
−𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑐𝑐)(1 − 2𝑥𝑥) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(2𝑦𝑦 − 1) > 0. 
Because one time shoppers are segmented it follows that 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿. From (2.19), therefore: 
𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐) (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(2𝑦𝑦 − 1) > 0. 
The two inequalities above are consistent only when 0 < 𝑥𝑥 < 1
2
 and 1
2
< 𝑦𝑦 < 1 because 1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
>1 − 𝑐𝑐.  The two inequalities yield: 
(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐) > (2𝑦𝑦−1)(1−2𝑥𝑥) �1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 � > (1 − 𝑐𝑐). 
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The second condition for segmentation of vendors from Lemma 2.1 is: [𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦]𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 − [𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝑥𝑥) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝑦𝑦)]𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 0, 
which upon substitution of 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 and 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 from (2.19) reduces to: 
(2𝑦𝑦−1)(1−2𝑥𝑥) �1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 � > �(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)+�1−𝛽𝛽2𝛽𝛽 ��1+(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)���1
2
�1+
(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)�+1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 � . 
The second part of the Lemma follows from the above constraints on the ratio (2𝑦𝑦−1)(1−2𝑥𝑥).
Lemma 2.4. 
To support segmentation of vendors when 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿, it is necessary that 2𝑥𝑥 − 1 > (1−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽(1−𝑐𝑐).
Proof of Lemma 2.4. 
Because 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 it follows from (2.22) that: 
𝑞𝑞�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚+1)
2𝑚𝑚
�(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) − (1−𝛽𝛽)
𝛽𝛽
(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)
1+𝑟𝑟
� > 0. 
To ensure the first condition for segmentation of vendors from Lemma 2.1 
�2𝑥𝑥 − 1 − (1−𝛽𝛽)
𝛽𝛽
1(1−𝑐𝑐)� > 0. 
Because 1
1−𝑐𝑐
> 𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
1+𝑟𝑟
, the second inequality is more binding, thus leading to the condition of the 
Lemma. If this condition holds the second condition for segmentation of vendors in Lemma 2.1 
is automatically satisfied. 
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 Proof of Proposition 2.1. 
(i) Using the expression for 𝑥𝑥 obtained in (2.23) and imposing the condition of Lemma 2.4,
yields the lower bound on 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑚𝑚+1
: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿>𝐻𝐻) ≡ 𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃2 + (1−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽 �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� � 32(1−𝑐𝑐) − 𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐1+𝑟𝑟�  Imposing the 
requirement that 𝑥𝑥 < 1, yields the upper bound:  �2𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� − (1−𝛽𝛽)
𝛽𝛽
�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟) ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿>𝐻𝐻) . 
(ii) The size of the interval of 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑚𝑚+1
 values that support the equilibrium is equal to 3�𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃�[1 −
(1−𝛽𝛽)
𝛽𝛽(1−𝑐𝑐).  This interval expands as �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� and 𝛽𝛽 increase and as 𝑐𝑐 decreases.
(iii) From Lemma 2.4 𝑥𝑥 > 1
2
+ (1−𝛽𝛽)
2𝛽𝛽(1−𝑐𝑐) > 12.  And since Platform H charges a lower deal price 
while representing high quality vendors, it is chosen by all one time shoppers (i.e., 𝑦𝑦 = 0). 
Lemma 2.5. 
To support segmentation of vendors when 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 and 𝑦𝑦 = 1, it is necessary that: 
𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚+1)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃� + (1−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽 (𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟) < 1 − 2𝑥𝑥 < 1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 �12�1+1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐�+1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ��1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
+
1−𝛽𝛽
2𝛽𝛽
�1+
1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
��
. 
Proof of Lemma 2.5. 
To support the requirement that 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 it follows from (2.26) that (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) > 1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 �𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐1+𝑟𝑟�. To 
support 𝑦𝑦 = 1 it is necessary that 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷∗ > 𝜃𝜃. Substituting (2.26) into (2.12) yields (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) >
𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚+1)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃� + �1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 � �𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐1+𝑟𝑟�, thus yielding the lower bound on (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) in the Lemma. To support 
the first condition for vendor segmentation in Lemma 2.1 it follows that: (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) < 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽(1−𝑐𝑐) ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿1. 
To support the second condition it is necessary that: 
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−
(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐) (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) + 1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 �1 + 1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐� 𝑥𝑥 + �1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 �2 > 0.
Solving for (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) from the above inequality yields: 
(1 − 2𝑥𝑥) < 1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 �12�1+1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐�+1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 �
�
1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
+
1−𝛽𝛽
2𝛽𝛽
�1+
1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
��
≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿2. 
Because 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿2 < 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿1 we obtain the upper bound on (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) stated in the Lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. 
(i), (ii)  Using the expression for 𝑥𝑥 from (2.27) and imposing the lower bound on (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) from 
Lemma 2.5 yields the constraint that: 
𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑚𝑚+1
< 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) ≡ 𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃2 − �1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 � (𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)2(1+𝑟𝑟) �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� − 3𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃2(𝑚𝑚+1).
Imposing the upper bound on (1 − 2𝑥𝑥) from Lemma 2.5 yields that: 
𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑚𝑚+1
> 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1𝑑𝑑 ≡ 𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃2 − �1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 � �14�3(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐) −1�+�1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ��1−12(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟)���𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃��1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
+�
1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
��1+
(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)�� . 
Imposing the constraint that 𝑥𝑥 > 0 yields: 
𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑚𝑚+1
> 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2𝑑𝑑 ≡ �1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 � (𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟) �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� − �𝜃𝜃 − 2𝜃𝜃�. 
In the Proposition, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 {𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1𝑑𝑑, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2𝑑𝑑}. To ensure a nonempty region of feasible values 
for 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
𝑚𝑚+1
, it is necessary that 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) > 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1𝑑𝑑 and 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) > 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2𝑑𝑑. Imposing the constraint 
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) > 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1𝑑𝑑 yields the following inequality: 
�
1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
�
2
�𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� �
1
2
−
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
1+𝑟𝑟
� + �1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
� �
3
4
�
1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
− 1� �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� − 3
2
𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚+1)𝜃𝜃 �1 + 1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐�� − 3𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃(1+𝑟𝑟)2(𝑚𝑚+1)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐) >0 (A.7) 
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However, for the above inequality to hold 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
 should be strictly positive, thus yielding the lower 
bound 𝑇𝑇∗ on the value of 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
 stated in the Proposition. Imposing the constraint 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) > 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2𝑑𝑑 
yields the upper bound on 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
 values: 
1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
< 1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
�1 − 𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃(𝑚𝑚+1)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃��. (A.8) 
The constraints (A.7) and (A.8) generate a nonempty region of values that the ratio 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
 can 
assume provided that 𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃(𝑚𝑚+1)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃� is sufficiently small and 1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐 is sufficiently big. Hence, as the 
spread 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃 increases and 𝑐𝑐 decreases, it is more likely that the equilibrium exists. 
(iii) To ensure that 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 it follows from (2.25) and (2.26) that 𝑥𝑥 < 12. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3. 
Using the bounds on 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
1+𝑚𝑚
 derived in (2.24) and (2.29) of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, it is 
straightforward to show that 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) < 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿), or (1−𝛽𝛽)
𝛽𝛽
�𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� �
3
2(1−𝑐𝑐) − 𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐1+𝑟𝑟� + (1−𝛽𝛽)2𝛽𝛽 (𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)(1+𝑟𝑟) �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃� > 0, 
when 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1, 0 < 𝑐𝑐 < 1, 0 < 𝑟𝑟 < 1, and 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃. Hence 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) < 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿) and the 
interval of possible values of 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)
1+𝑚𝑚
 for the 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 equilibrium never overlaps with those for 
the 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 equilibrium. As a result, for moderate values of 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟)1+𝑚𝑚  in the interval (𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿), 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐻𝐻<𝐿𝐿)) no segmenting equilibrium exits. 
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Values of the Bounds in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. 
In Figure 2.2: ?̂?𝛽 ≡
�1+2�1−
(1−𝑐𝑐)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)
1+𝑟𝑟
��[(2−𝑐𝑐)+2�1−(1−𝑐𝑐)(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)
1+𝑟𝑟
�
. 
In Figure 2.3: 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥
(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) ≡ 𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃
2
−
𝑇𝑇∗(𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃�
2(1+𝑟𝑟) − 3𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃2(𝑚𝑚+1),  𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) ≡ 𝜃𝜃 − 𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚+1
𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥
(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) ≡ 1
1+𝑇𝑇∗
. 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
(𝐻𝐻>𝐿𝐿) is obtained by solving the equation 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
= 1+𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟+𝑐𝑐
�1 − 𝑚𝑚𝜃𝜃(𝑚𝑚+1)�𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃��. 
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APPENDIX B 
PROOFS FOR “CROWDFUNDING AS A VEHICLE FOR RAISING CAPITAL AND 
FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION” 
The arguments for the proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions are outlined in the main text. In 
this appendix we provide technical details of the proofs. 
Explanation of High Valuation Consumer 𝐢𝐢’s Objective Function Given in (3.1) 
Solving the integral in (3.1) given the uniform distribution of random donations yields: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = (𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 + ∆) − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) �𝑋𝑋−�𝐹𝐹−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 �𝑋𝑋 � + 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) �𝐹𝐹−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 �. 
Proof of Lemma 3.1 
Second stage pledge of high valuation consumer 𝑖𝑖 is obtained by maximizing (3.1) which yields 
the following first order condition: 
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
= 𝐹𝐹−𝑋𝑋−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑋
+ (𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻−𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿+∆)−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖)
𝑋𝑋
−
𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻−𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)𝑞𝑞
𝑋𝑋
= 0. (B.1) 
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Evaluating (B.1) at the symmetric equilibrium  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 = 𝐷𝐷 and solving it for 𝐷𝐷, we get the 
second stage equilibrium pledge strategy as given in (3.2) in the Lemma. Note the condition 
(B.1) is sufficient for maximization because 𝜕𝜕
2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
2 < 0. 
 
Behavior of Fans if Crowdfunding Platform Used the Posted Price Model 
If the entrepreneur dictated the pledge level 𝐷𝐷 necessary to receive the reward ∆ it would choose 
it at the highest level that induces the fan to participate in the campaign instead of simply waiting 
for the product to become available in the future. Specifically, 𝐷𝐷 would satisfy the equation: (𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 + ∆) − 𝐷𝐷) �𝑋𝑋−(𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷)𝑋𝑋 � + 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) �𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑋𝑋 � = 𝑝𝑝(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) ��𝑋𝑋−(𝐹𝐹−(𝑚𝑚−1)𝐷𝐷)𝑋𝑋 � +
𝑞𝑞
(𝐹𝐹−(𝑚𝑚−1)𝐷𝐷)
𝑋𝑋
�, where the LHS of the above equation corresponds to the payoff of a fan who 
participates in the campaign and the RHS corresponds to his payoff if he stays out and waits for 
the product to become available. The above equation yields a quadratic equation in 𝐷𝐷. Solving it 
for 𝐷𝐷 in terms of the two instruments ∆ and 𝐹𝐹 yields: 
 𝐷𝐷 = 𝑅𝑅+�𝑅𝑅2+4𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝∆�𝑋𝑋−𝐹𝐹�
2𝑚𝑚
,𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅 ≡ �𝐹𝐹 + 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝∆ + (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑞𝑞) − 𝑋𝑋�. 
Similar to the comparative statics obtained from equation (3.2), it is easy to show that the 
“Posted Price” 𝐷𝐷 is an increasing function of the instruments ∆ and 𝐹𝐹 (similar “instrument 
effect” as with NYOP) and a decreasing function of 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑖𝑖 (similar “free riding” effect as with 
NYOP). Because the effect of the instruments of the campaign on the behavior of fans is 
qualitatively similar under both the NYOP and PP models, we do not anticipate that our 
predictions will be significantly affected. However, the simpler derivations under NYOP allow 
us to obtain closed form solutions for the optimal level of the instruments and to more clearly 
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demonstrate the tradeoff between the fund raising and price discrimination objectives of 
crowdfunding.  
Explanation of Entrepreneur’s Objective Function Given in (3.3) 
Solving the integral in (3.3) given the uniform distribution of random donations yields: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧𝜔𝜔 + [𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 + (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∆ − 𝐾𝐾) − 𝑠𝑠(𝐾𝐾 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷)]�𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋 � + 𝛼𝛼(1 + 𝑠𝑠) ��𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷�2−(𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷)22𝑋𝑋 �+[𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 + (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∆ − 𝐾𝐾)] �𝑋𝑋−�𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋 � + 𝛼𝛼 �𝑋𝑋2−�𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷�22𝑋𝑋 �  if 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼
𝜔𝜔 + [𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 + (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∆ − 𝐾𝐾)] �𝑋𝑋−(𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷)𝑋𝑋 � + 𝛼𝛼 �𝑋𝑋2−(𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷)22𝑋𝑋 �    if 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼
where 𝜔𝜔 = 𝑞𝑞[𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 − (1 + 𝑠𝑠)𝐾𝐾] �𝐹𝐹−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑋𝑋 �. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1 
The entrepreneur’s choice of funder reward is derived by optimizing (3.3) which yields: 
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸
𝑑𝑑∆
= 𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸
𝜕𝜕∆
+ 𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸
𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷
𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷
𝑑𝑑∆
= (B.2) 
𝑚𝑚𝑞𝑞(𝑚𝑚+1)𝑋𝑋 [(1 + 𝑠𝑠)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚)] + �𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼(1+𝐾𝐾)(𝑚𝑚+1) − 𝑖𝑖� �𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋 � + � 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼(𝑚𝑚+1) − 𝑖𝑖� �𝑋𝑋−𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼+𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑋𝑋 � +
[𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿(𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚) + 𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∆ − 𝐾𝐾] � 𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚+1)𝑋𝑋� + 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚�𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷�(𝑚𝑚+1)𝑋𝑋 + 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼(1+𝐾𝐾)�𝐹𝐹−𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼�(𝑚𝑚+1)𝑋𝑋 = 0 
 if 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
 , and 
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𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸
𝑑𝑑∆
= 𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸
𝜕𝜕∆
+ 𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸
𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷
𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷
𝑑𝑑∆
= (B.3) 
�
𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚+1) − 𝑖𝑖� �𝑋𝑋−𝐹𝐹+𝐷𝐷𝑋𝑋 � + [𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷−𝑚𝑚∆]𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋(𝑚𝑚+1) + 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋(𝑚𝑚+1) [𝐹𝐹 − 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷] − [(𝑞𝑞−1)𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿−(𝑞𝑞−1)𝐾𝐾−𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑞𝑞]𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋(𝑚𝑚+1) = 0 
if 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
. 
Using (3.2) in (B.2) and (B.3) and solving each equation for ∆ yields the following funder 
reward: 
∆= (𝑚𝑚+1)(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+(𝑚𝑚+1)𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾+𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚+1+𝑚𝑚)−(𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)𝑋𝑋�
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚(2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼) − (1 − 𝑞𝑞)(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿). (B.4) 
Note that conditions (B.2) and (B.3) are sufficient for maximization because 𝑑𝑑
2𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸
𝑑𝑑∆2
< 0. 
The following aggregate pledge is obtained by substituting (B.4) in (3.2): 
𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ = (1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾+(2𝑚𝑚+1)𝐹𝐹−(2𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)𝑋𝑋�
2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼
 . (B.5) 
The comparative statics reported in the Proposition are obtained by differentiating ∆ in (B.4) 
with respect to the parameters of the model.  
Proof of Proposition 3.2 
The proof straightforwardly follows from the arguments made before the Proposition in the main 
text.  
Proof of Proposition 3.3 
Define 
𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≡
𝛼𝛼�(1−𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝑋𝑋��(2𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)−(1−𝛼𝛼)2𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ��[1−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾] , 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 ≡ 𝛼𝛼{(1−𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)+𝑋𝑋�}[1−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾] , 
𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≡
𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾(1−𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(𝑞𝑞𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾+𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞−1)
𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾(2𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)−(1−𝛼𝛼)2 . 
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(i), (ii).  From (B.5)  𝐹𝐹∗ > 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ if and only if: 
𝐹𝐹∗ > (1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾−(2𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)𝑋𝑋(1−𝛼𝛼) . (B.6) 
Substituting 𝐹𝐹∗ from (3.8) in (B.6) yields: 
(2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾−(1−𝛼𝛼)�(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑞𝑞+𝑋𝑋�
2𝛼𝛼(1+𝐾𝐾+𝑚𝑚𝐾𝐾)−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝐾𝐾)−1 > (1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾−(2𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)𝑋𝑋1−𝑚𝑚 , 
which implies: 
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) − (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠𝐾𝐾 − 𝑋𝑋(𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(2𝑖𝑖 + 1 − 𝛼𝛼) − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)2] < 0.
(B.7) 
(B.7) holds if (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) > 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 and 𝐾𝐾 > 𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  or if (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) < 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 and 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, where 𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and 
𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 are defined above. On the other hand if (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) > 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 and 𝐾𝐾 < 𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 or if (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) < 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 
and 𝑋𝑋 < 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, then  𝐹𝐹∗ ≤  𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗. Because the probability of a successful campaign cannot exceed 
one, 𝐹𝐹∗ =  𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ in these cases, as given in part (ii) of the Proposition. 
From (3.8) 𝐹𝐹∗ < 𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚
  if and only if:
(2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾−(1−𝛼𝛼)�(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑞𝑞+𝑋𝑋�
2𝛼𝛼(1+𝐾𝐾+𝑚𝑚𝐾𝐾)−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝐾𝐾)−1 < 𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼 , 
which simplifies to: 
𝛼𝛼�(1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) + 𝑋𝑋� − (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠)𝐾𝐾 > 0. (B.8) 
(B.8) holds if (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) > 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 and  𝐾𝐾 < 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 , where 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 is defined above. On the other hand if (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) < 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠, then (B.8) always holds as the first term in the inequality is positive. 
Finally, to ensure that a successful campaign is possible 𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ + 𝑋𝑋 > 𝐹𝐹∗ should hold. This 
implies from (B.5) that 
(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾+(2𝑚𝑚+1)𝐹𝐹∗−(2𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)𝑋𝑋
2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼
+ 𝑋𝑋 > 𝐹𝐹∗,
which reduces to: 
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𝐹𝐹∗ < (1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾+𝑋𝑋(1−𝛼𝛼) . (B.9) 
Substituting (3.8) into (B.9) yields: 
(2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾−(1−𝛼𝛼)�(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑞𝑞+𝑋𝑋�
2𝛼𝛼(1+𝐾𝐾+𝑚𝑚𝐾𝐾)−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝐾𝐾)−1 < (1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾+𝑋𝑋(1−𝛼𝛼) , 
which implies: [2𝑖𝑖 + 2 − 𝛼𝛼] �𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 �(1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) + 𝑋𝑋� + 𝑠𝑠𝐾𝐾(𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞 − 1)� > 0. (B.10) 
When (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) < 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠, (B.10) always holds. On the other hand when (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) > 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠, (B.10) 
holds if 𝐾𝐾 < 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿. 
(iii) From (B.5) the condition  𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷∗ + 𝑋𝑋 > 𝐹𝐹 at 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
 yields: 
(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾+(2𝑚𝑚+1)𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−(2𝑚𝑚+1−𝛼𝛼)𝑋𝑋(2𝑚𝑚+2−𝛼𝛼) + 𝑋𝑋 > 𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼 , 
which reduces to: 
𝐾𝐾 < 𝛼𝛼�(1−𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)+𝑋𝑋�(1−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾) = 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 . (B.11) 
However, it is established above that when (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) > 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 and 𝐾𝐾 < 𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿,  𝐹𝐹∗ < 𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼 and when (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞) < 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 it is always the case that 𝐹𝐹∗ < 𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
. Since the expected profit of the entrepreneur is 
continuous at 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐾𝐾
𝛼𝛼
, it follows that the entrepreneur never sets its funding goal at this level. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4 
From (B.4), (B.5) and (3.8), ∆< 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷∗ if and only if the condition (3.9) given in the Proposition 
holds. 
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A Portion 𝛃𝛃 of Low Valuation Consumers are Aware of the Campaign  
Upon inspection of equation (3.1) it is clear that low valuation consumers would join the 
campaign only if 𝑝𝑝∆ − 𝐷𝐷 > 0 because the expression (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿) would disappear in their 
maximization problem. Moreover, if such consumers were free to submit any pledge level in 
order to qualify for the reward, they would submit a lower pledge than the pledge that high 
valuation consumers choose. However, given that the entrepreneur selects the threshold pledge to 
qualify for the reward at the level equal to the pledge of high valuation consumers, if low 
valuation consumers wish to receive the reward they have to match the pledge submitted by the 
high valuation consumers. Define by 𝑖𝑖� = 𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 , then optimizing the expected utility of fans 
of the product while accounting for the bigger population of participants in the campaign, yields 
the same expression as (3.2) with the only difference being that 𝑖𝑖� replaces 𝑖𝑖 in the equation. 
Modifying the payoff function of the entrepreneur to account for the new pledge behavior and 
the bigger number of participants, we obtain that for a fixed campaign goal, the optimal reward 
level is equal to: 
∆= (𝑚𝑚�+1)(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚�𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+(𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚−𝑚𝑚�)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+(𝑚𝑚�+1)𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾+𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚�+1+𝑚𝑚�)−(𝑚𝑚�+1−𝛼𝛼)𝑋𝑋�
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚�(2𝑚𝑚�+2−𝛼𝛼) − (1 − 𝑞𝑞)(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿). 
Optimizing with respect to 𝐹𝐹 with the new expressions for 𝐷𝐷 and ∆, yields the interior solution 
𝐹𝐹∗ as follows: 
𝐹𝐹∗ = (2𝑚𝑚�+2−𝛼𝛼)𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾−(1−𝛼𝛼)[(1−𝑞𝑞)(𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚�𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+(𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚−𝑚𝑚�)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)−𝐾𝐾)+𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑞𝑞+𝑋𝑋�]
2𝛼𝛼(1+𝐾𝐾+𝑚𝑚�𝐾𝐾)−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝐾𝐾)−1 . 
Note that the expressions for the optimal ∆ and 𝐹𝐹∗ are very similar to those derived in the main 
text with the only changes being that 𝑖𝑖� replaces 𝑖𝑖 and [𝑖𝑖�𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + (𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑖𝑖�)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿] replaces [𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿]. 
Given that low valuation consumers who are aware of the campaign join in when the 
entrepreneur cannot practice price discrimination, next we investigate whether the entry of such 
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participants in this case may actually benefit the entrepreneur. We assess this question by 
deriving the expression for (𝑝𝑝∆ − 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷), namely the expression for the gap between the expected 
reward and the share of the contribution retained by the entrepreneur. When the entrepreneur 
cannot use the campaign as a vehicle for price discrimination we know that this gap is positive.  (𝑝𝑝∆ − 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷) = 𝐾𝐾{𝛼𝛼[(1−𝑞𝑞)𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚�𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻+(𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚−𝑚𝑚�)𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿)+𝑋𝑋�]−𝐾𝐾[1−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞−𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝐾𝐾]}[2𝛼𝛼(1+𝐾𝐾+𝑚𝑚�𝐾𝐾)−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝐾𝐾)−1] − 𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑞𝑞)(𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻 − 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿). 
It is easy to show that the above expression is a decreasing function of 𝑖𝑖�. Hence, the bigger the 
portion 𝛽𝛽 of low valuation consumers who are aware of the campaign, the smaller the gap (𝑝𝑝∆ − 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷) is, thus benefitting the entrepreneur. It is unclear whether this smaller gap raises the 
expected profits of the entrepreneur because the reward has to be paid out to a bigger number of 
participants in the campaign (𝑖𝑖� instead of n). However, when the decline in the gap (𝑝𝑝∆ − 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷) 
is sufficiently big to compensate for the bigger number of consumers who receive awards in 
access of their pledge, the profits of the entrepreneur may actually increase. 
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APPENDIX C 
PROOFS FOR “SETTING ARTIST ROYALTIES ON MUSIC STREAMING 
PLATFORMS” 
Throughout Appendix C we use the following definitions: 
𝑇𝑇1 ≡
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
−
(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
2
, 𝑇𝑇2 ≡ 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 −
(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
2
, 𝑇𝑇3 ≡
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
−
�(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
2
, and 
𝑇𝑇4 ≡ 𝑇𝑇2 −
3(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
4
. 
Recall the following restrictions on the parameters in the model: 0 < 𝑡𝑡 31, 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 > 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 > 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿, 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1. 
Therefore, it is evident that 𝑇𝑇2 > 𝑇𝑇1, 𝑇𝑇2 > 𝑇𝑇3, and 𝑇𝑇2 > 𝑇𝑇4. 
31 A more binding constraint on 𝑡𝑡 comes from the requirement that 0 < 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ < 1 and 0 < 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ < 1 for 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿} within 
each environment. Ensuring that the market is always covered and that each fan base has an indifferent consumer 
constrains 𝑡𝑡 above 0. However, this additional requirement is not needed for any of the proofs. 
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Royalty Needed to Retain Low Valuation Artists when Platform Hosts Both Types 
When a low valuation artist withholds her music from the streamer, location 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗  denotes the 
consumer in her fan base who is indifferent between subscribing to the streamer and purchasing 
her preferred artist’s music from the store: (𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − s − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗  𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 − 𝑝𝑝 − �1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗  �𝑡𝑡. 
After accounting for the pricing strategies given in (4.4), we solve for 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗: 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿
∗  = 3𝑡𝑡+(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜−3𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
6𝑡𝑡
+ (1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
3𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿) . 
We denote a low valuation artist’s expected profit from streaming her music as 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 and her 
expected profit from withholding her music from the streamer as 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗) + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗) � 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗+(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗)𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻�𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗�+𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗+𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻∗ +𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗��, 
and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝�1 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿∗�. 
Restricting 𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 = 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 = 1 2⁄ , we solve for the royalty ?̂?𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ needed to retain a low valuation 
artist, such that: 
?̂?𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝛿𝛿�3𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜+(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�2 �
�
3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
3
−
(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
6
��2(3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜)+(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−5𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�2 �. 
Comparing ?̂?𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ to 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ (given in 4.10), it is evident that 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ is the more constraining royalty 
that ensures both types stream their music through the streamer. 
Calculations used in Observation 4.1 
Observation 4.1 is the direct result of differentiating 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ with respect to the parameters: 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ �1𝛼𝛼 − (𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)2(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇2) − (𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)2(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2) − �(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)+3�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�2 �2�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�4 ��, (C.1) 
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𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
= −𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ � 1(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇2) + 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2) + 1�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�4 ��, (C.2) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻
= 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ � 1𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 + (1−𝛼𝛼)2(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇2) + (1−𝛼𝛼)2(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2) + 5(1−𝛼𝛼)4�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�4 ��, (C.3) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
= (1−𝛼𝛼)𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
2
�
1(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇2) + 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2) − 12�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�4 ��, and (C.4) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
= 3𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ � 1(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇2) − 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2) − 1�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�4 ��, (C.5) 
Constraints on the parameters in the model ensure that (C.2) is negative and (C.3) is 
positive. We expand upon the observation made by differentiating 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ with respect to 𝑡𝑡 as 
given in (C.5), or alternatively: 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
= 3𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ �2𝑇𝑇2(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇4)−9𝑡𝑡2+𝑇𝑇22�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇22�(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇4) �. (C.6) 
Constraints on the parameters in the model ensure that the denominator in (C.6) is positive. 
Therefore 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡⁄ < 0 when: 2𝑇𝑇2(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇4) − 9𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑇𝑇22 < 0. 
Using the quadratic formula to find values of 𝑡𝑡 such that 2𝑇𝑇2(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇4) − 9𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑇𝑇22 = 0, 
we get 𝑡𝑡 = 1
3
± �72𝑇𝑇2(𝑇𝑇2+𝑇𝑇3)
18
. Because the above quadratic function is concave in 𝑡𝑡, and the 
vertical intercept is 2𝑇𝑇2𝑇𝑇4 + 𝑇𝑇22 (which is always positive), then 2𝑇𝑇2(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇4) − 9𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑇𝑇22 < 0 
only when 𝑡𝑡 > 1
3
+ �72𝑇𝑇2(𝑇𝑇2+𝑇𝑇3)
18
. Thus, 𝑡𝑡 must be sufficiently large to guarantee 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡⁄ < 0. 
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Calculations used in Observation 4.2 
Observation 4.2 is the direct result of differentiating 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 with respect to the parameters: 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 �1𝛼𝛼 − 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇1) − 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇1)�, (C.7) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
= −𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 � 12(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇1) + 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇1)�, (C.8) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻
= 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 � 12(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇1) + 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇1)�, (C.9) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
= 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 � 1𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 + (1−𝛼𝛼)2(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇1) + (1−𝛼𝛼)(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇1)�, and (C.10) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
= 3𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 � 1(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇1) − 2(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇1)�. (C.11) 
Constraints on the parameters in the model ensure that (C.8) is negative, (C.9) is positive, 
and (C.10) is positive. We expand upon the observation made by differentiating 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ with 
respect to 𝑡𝑡 as given in (C.11), or alternatively: 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
= 3𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙[ 3𝑇𝑇1−3𝑡𝑡�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇12�]. (C.12) 
Constraints on the parameters in the model ensure that the denominator in (C.12) is positive. 
Therefore, (C.12) is negative when 𝑡𝑡 > 𝑇𝑇1. As such, 𝑡𝑡 must be sufficiently large to guarantee 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡⁄ < 0. 
 Proof of Proposition 4.1 
To prove Proposition 4.1 we show that 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ < 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ for all possible values of the parameters. It 
Using the definitions made in this Appendix, we can rewrite (4.10) and (4.14) as: 
𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝛿𝛿(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇2)(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2)�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�4 �, and (C.13) 
𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ = 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝛿𝛿(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇3)(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇3)(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇3). (C.14) 
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Because 𝑇𝑇2 > 𝑇𝑇3 and 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 > 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿, the numerator in (C.13) is always less than the numerator in 
(C.14) and the first term in the denominator in (C.14) is always greater than the first term in the 
denominator in (C.14). Therefore, to show that 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ < 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ we need only to show that the 
second term in the denominator of (C.13) is also greater than the second term in the denominator 
of (C.14), or 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇2 − 3(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)4  > 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇3. We rewrite this inequality as 
 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 > 32 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 − 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2 (3 − 4𝛼𝛼). (C.15) 
The inequality in (C.15) is true for 𝛼𝛼 > 1
3
. It is also true for 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 > 32 (𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 − 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿). Thus, 𝛼𝛼 > 13 or 
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 > 32 (𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 − 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿) is sufficient to ensure 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ < 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ. 
 We can find total demand for the streaming platform in each environment. Using (4.4) 
and (4.5), the streamer’s expected profit when she hosts music from both types of artists is: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ) �3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜3 − (1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)6 � �3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜6𝑡𝑡 − (1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)12𝑡𝑡 �. 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ = �1 − 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ� �3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜23 − [(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]6 � �3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜26𝑡𝑡 − [(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]12𝑡𝑡 �. 
Because  3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
3
−
(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
6
> 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2
3
−
[(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]
6
 and 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
6𝑡𝑡
−
(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
12𝑡𝑡
> 3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2
6𝑡𝑡
−
[(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]
12𝑡𝑡
, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ whenever 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ < 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ. Thus the streamer always prefers to host 
content from both types of artists when 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ < 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.2 
When a fan’s valuation for high type artists is indistinguishable from a fan’s valuation for low 
type artists, 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 = 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿. Using this equality, from (4.14) and (4.10): 
 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 = 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝛿𝛿�3𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜2 +𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2 �
�3𝑡𝑡+
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
−
(𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
2
��3𝑡𝑡+
𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
−�1−
𝛼𝛼
2
�𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
, and (C.16) 
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𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 3𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝛿𝛿�3𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜+(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�2 �
�3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜−
(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
2
�[3𝑡𝑡+𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜−(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]. (C.17) 
Constraints on the parameters in the model ensure that the numerator of (C.16) is always greater 
than the numerator of (C.17). The first term in the denominator of (C.16), �3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
−
(𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
2
�, is always smaller than the first term in the denominator of (C.17), �3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 −
(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)
2
�. Finally, the last term in the denominator of (C.16), �3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
2
− �1 − 𝛼𝛼
2
� 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿� is
always smaller than the last term in the denominator of (C.17), [3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿]. Thus, 
when 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻 = 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿, (C.16) is bigger than (C.17), and 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ < 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3 
Differentiating 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ and 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 with respect to 𝛼𝛼 yields the equations given in (C.1) and (C.7) 
respectively. If we evaluate (C.1) and (C.7) for 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, then 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 < 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼  when: 
(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)6𝑡𝑡
2�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇2
2�
+ �(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)+3�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�2 �
2�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−
3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
4
�
> 6𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿
2�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇1
2�
. 
Because 𝑇𝑇2 > 𝑇𝑇1, (𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)6𝑡𝑡2�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇22� > 6𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇12�. Constraints on the parameters in the model ensure 
�(𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻+𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿)+3�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�2 �
2�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−
3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
4
�
> 0. Therefore, it must be that 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
< 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
. 
Differentiating 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ and 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 with respect to 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 yields the equations given in (C.2) and 
(C.8). If we evaluate (C.2) and (C.8) for 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, then 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 < 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜  when: 
6𝑡𝑡
�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇2
2�
+ 1
�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−
3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
4
�
> (9𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇1)
2�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇1
2�
. 
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Because 𝑇𝑇2 > 𝑇𝑇1, 6𝑡𝑡�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇22� > (9𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇1)2�9𝑡𝑡2−𝑇𝑇12�. Constraints on the parameters in the model ensure 
1
�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−
3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
4
�
> 0. Therefore, 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
< 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜
. 
Differentiating 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ and 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 with respect to 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 yields the equations given in (C.5) and 
(C.11). If we evaluate (C.5) and (C.11) for 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ = 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙, then 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 > 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡  when: 
1(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇2) − 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2) − 1�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�4 � > 1(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇1) − 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇1) − 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇1).
Because 𝑇𝑇2 > 𝑇𝑇1, 1(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇2) − 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2) > 1(3𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇1) − 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇1).  Therefore, we need to check conditions
for which: 
1
�3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇2−
3(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿�
4
�
< 1(3𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇1). (C.18) 
(C.18) is true when 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 > (3−5𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻−3(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿2 . The constraint on 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 to ensure (C.18) holds is most 
restrictive when 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 approaches 0. Because 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜 > 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻, 𝛼𝛼 > 1 5⁄  is sufficient to ensure that (C.18) 
holds. However, we have already restricted 𝛼𝛼 > 1 3⁄  and thus 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
> 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
. 
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